Guidance to Avoid Carrying RPKI Validation States in Transitive BGP Path Attributes
draft-spaghetti-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-01
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Job Snijders , Tobias Fiebig , Massimiliano Stucchi | ||
| Last updated | 2024-02-23 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources |
GitHub Repository
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document provides guidance to avoid carrying Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) derived Validation States in Transitive Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Path Attributes. Annotating routes with attributes signaling validation state may flood needless BGP UPDATE messages through the global Internet routing system, when, for example, Route Origin Authorizations are issued, revoked, or RPKI-To- Router sessions are terminated. Operators SHOULD ensure Validation States are not signalled in transitive BGP Path Attributes. Specifically, Operators SHOULD NOT group BGP routes by their Prefix Origin Validation state into distinct BGP Communities.
Authors
Job Snijders
Tobias Fiebig
Massimiliano Stucchi
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)