BGPsec Design Choices and Summary of Supporting Discussions
draft-sriram-bgpsec-design-choices-16

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Last updated 2018-04-23 (latest revision 2018-01-19)
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Independent Submission                                    K. Sriram, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                  USA NIST
Intended status: Informational                          January 19, 2018
Expires: July 23, 2018

      BGPsec Design Choices and Summary of Supporting Discussions
                 draft-sriram-bgpsec-design-choices-16

Abstract

   This document captures the design rationale of the initial draft of
   the BGPsec protocol specification.  The designers needed to balance
   many competing factors, and this document lists the decisions that
   were made in favor of or against each design choice.  This document
   also presents brief summaries of the arguments that aided the
   decision process.  Where appropriate, this document also provides
   brief notes on design decisions that changed as the specification was
   reviewed and updated by the IETF SIDR working group, resulting in RFC
   8205.  These notes highlight the differences and provide pointers to
   details and rationale about those design changes.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 23, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

Sriram                    Expires July 23, 2018                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            BGPsec Design Choices             January 2018

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Creating Signatures and the Structure of BGPsec Update
       Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Origin Validation Using ROA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Attributes Signed by an Originating AS  . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Attributes Signed by an Upstream AS . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  What Attributes Are Not Signed  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.5.  Receiving Router Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.6.  Prepending of ASes in AS Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.7.  What RPKI Data Need be Included in Updates  . . . . . . .   9
   3.  Withdrawal Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.1.  Withdrawals Not Signed  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.2.  Signature Expire Time for Withdrawal Protection (a.k.a.
           Mitigation of Replay Attacks) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.3.  Should Route Expire Time be Communicated in a Separate
           Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.4.  Effect of Expire-Time Updates in BGPsec on RFD  . . . . .  13
   4.  Signature Algorithms and Router Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.1.  Signature Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.2.  Agility of Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.3.  Sequential Aggregate Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.4.  Protocol Extensibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.5.  Key Per Router (Rogue Router Problem) . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.6.  Router ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   5.  Optimizations and Resource Sizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.1.  Update Packing and Repacking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.2.  Signature Per Prefix vs. Signature Per Update . . . . . .  19
     5.3.  Maximum BGPsec Update PDU Size  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.4.  Temporary Suspension of Attestations and Validations  . .  21
   6.  Incremental Deployment and Negotiation of BGPsec  . . . . . .  22
     6.1.  Downgrade Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     6.2.  Inclusion of Address Family in Capability Advertisement .  22
     6.3.  Incremental Deployment: Capability Negotiation  . . . . .  23
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