BGPSEC Design Choices and Summary of Supporting Discussions
draft-sriram-bgpsec-design-choices-12

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Network Working Group                                     K. Sriram, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                  USA NIST
Intended status: Informational                              July 3, 2017
Expires: January 4, 2018

      BGPSEC Design Choices and Summary of Supporting Discussions
                 draft-sriram-bgpsec-design-choices-12

Abstract

   This document has been written to capture the design rationale for
   the individual draft-00 version of BGPSEC protocol specification (I-
   D.lepinski-bgpsec-protocol-00).  It lists the decisions that were
   made in favor of or against each design choice, and presents brief
   summaries of the arguments that aided the decision process.  A
   similar document can be published in the future as the BGPSEC design
   discussions make further progress and additional design
   considerations are discussed and finalized.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2018.

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Sriram                   Expires January 4, 2018                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            BGPSEC Design Choices                July 2017

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Creating Signatures and the Structure of BGPSEC Update
       Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Origin Validation Using ROA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Attributes Signed by an Originating AS  . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Attributes Signed by an Upstream AS . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  What Attributes Are Not Signed  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.5.  Receiving Router Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.6.  Prepending of ASes in AS Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.7.  What RPKI Data Need be Included in Updates  . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Withdrawal Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Withdrawals Not Signed  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Signature Expire Time for Withdrawal Protection (a.k.a.
           Mitigation of Replay Attacks) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  Should Route Expire Time be Communicated in a Separate
           Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.4.  Effect of Expire-Time Updates in BGPSEC on RFD  . . . . .  11
   4.  Signature Algorithms and Router Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.1.  Signature Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  Agility of Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.3.  Sequential Aggregate Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.4.  Protocol Extensibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.5.  Key Per Router (Rouge Router Problem) . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.6.  Router ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   5.  Optimizations and Resource Sizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.1.  Update Packing and Repacking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.2.  Signature Per Prefix vs. Signature Per Update . . . . . .  18
     5.3.  Maximum BGPSEC UPDATE PDU Size  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.4.  Temporary Suspension of Attestations and Validations  . .  19
   6.  Incremental Deployment and Negotiation of BGPSEC  . . . . . .  20
     6.1.  Downgrade Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     6.2.  Inclusion of Address Family in Capability Advertisement .  20
     6.3.  Incremental Deployment: Capability Negotiation  . . . . .  20
     6.4.  Partial Path Signing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.5.  Consideration of Stub ASes with Resource Constraints:
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