Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-00

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IDR and SIDR                                                   K. Sriram
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Intended status: Informational                                   US NIST
Expires: September 10, 2015                                March 9, 2015

        Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
          draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-00

Abstract

   In [I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition], the authors have
   provided a definition of the route leak problem, and also enumerated
   several types of route leaks.  In this document, we first examine
   which of those route-leak types are detected and mitigated by the
   existing origin validation [RFC 6811] and BGPSEC path validation [I-
   D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].  Where the current BGPSEC protocol
   doesn't offer a solution, this document suggests an enhancement that
   would extend the route-leak detection and mitigation capability of
   BGPSEC.  The solution can be implemented in BGP without necessarily
   tying it to BGPSEC.  Incorporating the solution in BGPSEC is one way
   of implementing it in a secure way.  We do not claim to have provided
   a solution for all possible types of route leaks, but the solution
   covers several, especially considering some significant route-leak
   attacks or occurrences that have been observed in recent years.  The
   document also includes a stopgap method for detection and mitigation
   of route leaks for the phase when BGPSEC (path validation) is not yet
   deployed but only origin validation is deployed.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2015.

Sriram & Montgomery    Expires September 10, 2015               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     Route Leak Detection and Mitigation        March 2015

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Mechanisms for Detection and Mitigation of Route Leaks  . . .   3
     2.1.  Route Leak Protection (RLP) Field Encoding by Sending
           Router  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Recommended Actions at a Receiving Router . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Detection and Mitigation of Route Leaks of Type 5 and
           Type 6  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Stopgap Solution when Only Origin Validation is Deployed  . .   9
   4.  Design Rationale and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Downside of 'Up (Towards Provider AS)' Indication in the
           RLP Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Possibility of Abuse of '01' (i.e. 'Do not Propagate Up')
           Indication in the RLP Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   In [I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition], the authors have
   provided a definition of the route leak problem, and also enumerated
   several types of route leaks.  In this document, we first examine
   which of those route-leak types are detected and mitigated by the
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