Enhanced Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Filtering
draft-sriram-opsec-urpf-improvements-02

Opsec Working Group                                            K. Sriram
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Intended status: Best Current Practice                           US NIST
Expires: May 3, 2018                                             J. Haas
                                                  Juniper Networks, Inc.
                                                        October 30, 2017

         Enhanced Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Filtering
                draft-sriram-opsec-urpf-improvements-02

Abstract

   This document identifies a need for improvement of the unicast
   Reverse Path Filtering techniques (uRPF) [BCP84] for source address
   validation (SAV) [BCP38].  The strict uRPF is inflexible about
   directionality, the loose uRPF is oblivious to directionality, and
   the current feasible-path uRPF attempts to strike a balance between
   the two [BCP84].  However, as shown in this draft, the existing
   feasible-path uRPF still has short comings.  This document proposes
   an enhanced feasible-path uRPF technique, which aims to be more
   flexible (in a meaningful way) about directionality than the
   feasible-path uRPF.  It can potentially alleviate ISPs' concerns
   about the possibility of disrupting service for their customers, and
   encourage greater deployment of uRPF techniques.

Status of This Memo

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Review of Existing Source Address Validation Techniques . . .   3
     2.1.  SAV using Access Control List . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  SAV using Strict Unicast Reverse Path Filtering . . . . .   4
     2.3.  SAV using Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Filtering  .   5
     2.4.  SAV using Loose Unicast Reverse Path Filtering  . . . . .   6
   3.  Proposed New Technique: SAV using Enhanced Feasible-Path uRPF   7
     3.1.  Description of the Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  A Challenging Scenario  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.4.  Overcoming the Above Challenge: Algorithm with Full
           Flexibility Across Customer Cone  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.5.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.5.1.  Impact on FIB Memory Size Requirement . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   This internet draft identifies a need for improvement of the unicast
   Reverse Path Filtering (uRPF) techniques [RFC2827] for source address
   validation (SAV) [RFC3704].  The strict uRPF is inflexible about
   directionality, the loose uRPF is oblivious to directionality, and
   the current feasible-path uRPF attempts to strike a balance between
   the two [RFC3704].  However, as shown in this draft, the existing
   feasible-path uRPF still has short comings.  Even with the feasible-
   path uRPF, ISPs are often apprehensive that they may be dropping
   customers' data packets with legitimate source addresses.

   This document proposes an enhanced feasible-path uRPF technique,
   which aims to be more flexible (in a meaningful way) about
   directionality than the feasible-path uRPF.  It is based on the

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   principle that if BGP updates for multiple prefixes with the same
   origin AS were received on different interfaces (at border routers),
   then incoming data packets with source addresses in any of those
   prefixes should be accepted on any of those interfaces (described in
   Section 3.1).  For some challenging ISP-customer scenarios (see
   Section 3.3), we further propose (a) Forming a list of all unique
   prefixes in the collection of routes received on all customer
   interfaces; and (b) Including that list in the RPF list of each
   customer interface (described in Section 3.4).  Implementation
   considerations are discussed in Section 3.5.

   Note: Definition of Reverse Path Filtering (RPF) list: The list of
   permissible source address prefixes for incoming data packets on a
   given interface.

   The proposed techniques are expected to add greater operational
   robustness and efficacy to uRPF, while minimizing ISPs' concerns
   about accidental service disruption for their customers.  It is
   expected that this will encourage more deployment of uRPF so as to
   realize its DDoS prevention benefits network wide.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Review of Existing Source Address Validation Techniques

   There are various existing techniques for mitigation against DDoS
   attacks with spoofed addresses [RFC2827] [RFC3704].  There are also
   some techniques used for mitigating reflection attacks [RRL]
   [TA14-017A], which are used to amplify the impact in DDoS attacks.
   Employing a combination of these preventive techniques in enterprise
   and ISP border routers, DNS servers, broadband and wireless access
   networks, and data centers provides reasonably effective protection
   against DDoS attacks.

   Source address validation (SAV) is performed in network edge devices
   such as border routers, Cable Modem Termination Systems (CMTS),
   Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexers (DSLAM), and Packet Data
   Network (PDN) gateways in mobile networks.  Ingress Access Control
   List (ACL) and unicast Reverse Path Filtering (uRPF) are techniques
   employed for implementing SAV [RFC2827] [RFC3704] [ISOC].

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2.1.  SAV using Access Control List

   Ingress/egress Access Control Lists (ACLs) are maintained which list
   acceptable (or alternatively, unacceptable) prefixes for the source
   addresses in the incoming Internet Protocol (IP) packets.  Any packet
   with a source address that does not match the filter is dropped.  The
   ACLs for the ingress/egress filters need to be maintained to keep
   them up to date.  Updating the ACLs is an operator driven manual
   process, and hence operationally difficult or infeasible.

   Typically, the egress ACLs in access aggregation devices (e.g.  CMTS,
   DSLAM) permit source addresses only from the address spaces
   (prefixes) that are associated with the interface on which the
   customer network is connected.  Ingress ACLs are typically deployed
   on border routers, and drop ingress packets when the source address
   is spoofed (i.e. belongs to obviously disallowed prefix blocks, RFC
   1918 prefixes, or provider's own prefixes).

2.2.  SAV using Strict Unicast Reverse Path Filtering

   In the strict unicast Reverse Path Filtering (uRPF) method, an
   ingress packet at border router is accepted only if the Forwarding
   Information Base (FIB) contains a prefix that encompasses the source
   address and forwarding information for that destination prefix points
   back to the interface over which the packet was received.  In other
   words, the reverse path for routing to that source address (if it
   were used as a destination address) should use the same interface
   over which the packet was received.  It is well known that this
   method has limitations when networks are multi-homed and there is
   asymmetric routing of packets.  Asymmetric routing occurs (see
   Figure 1) when a customer AS announces one prefix (P1) to one transit
   provider (ISP-a) and a different prefix (P2) to another transit
   provider (ISP-b), but routes data packets with source addresses in
   the second prefix (P2) to the first transit provider (ISP-a) or vice
   versa.

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              +------------+ ---- P1[AS2 AS1] ---> +------------+
              | AS2(ISP-a) | <----P2[AS3 AS1] ---- |  AS3(ISP-b)|
              +------------+                       +------------+
                       /\                             /\
                        \                             /
                         \                           /
                          \                         /
                    P1[AS1]\                       /P2[AS1]
                            \                     /
                           +-----------------------+
                           |      AS1(customer)    |
                           +-----------------------+
                             P1, P2 (prefixes originated)

             Consider data packets received at AS2
             (1) from AS1 with source address in P2, or
             (2) from AS3 that originated from AS1
                 with source address in P1:
                       * Strict uRPF fails
                       * Feasible-path uRPF fails
                       * Loose uRPF works (but ineffective in IPv4)
                       * Enhanced Feasible-path uRPF works best

    Figure 1: Scenario 1 for illustration of efficacy of uRPF schemes.

2.3.  SAV using Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Filtering

   The feasible-path uRPF helps partially overcome the problem
   identified with the strict uRPF in the multi-homing case.  The
   feasible-path uRPF is similar to the strict uRPF, but in addition to
   inserting the best-path prefix, additional prefixes from alternative
   announced routes are also included in the RPF table.  This method
   relies on announcements for the same prefixes (albeit some may be
   prepended to effect lower preference) propagating to all routers
   performing feasible-path uRPF checks.  Therefore, in the multi-homing
   scenario, if the customer AS announces routes for both prefixes (P1,
   P2) to both transit providers (with suitable prepends if needed for
   traffic engineering), then the feasible-path uRPF method works (see
   Figure 2).  It should be mentioned that the feasible-path uRPF works
   in this scenario only if customer routes are preferred at AS2 and AS3
   over a shorter non-customer route.

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             +------------+  routes for P1, P2   +-----------+
             | AS2(ISP-a) |<-------------------->| AS3(ISP-b)|
             +------------+        (p2p)         +-----------+
                       /\                            /\
                        \                            /
                  P1[AS1]\                          /P2[AS1]
                          \                        /
            P2[AS1 AS1 AS1]\                      /P1[AS1 AS1 AS1]
                            \                    /
                           +-----------------------+
                           |      AS1(customer)    |
                           +-----------------------+
                             P1, P2 (prefixes originated)

           Consider data packets received at AS2 via AS3
           that originated from AS1 and have source address in P1:
           * Feasible-path uRPF works (if customer route to P1
             is preferred at AS3 over shorter path)
           * Feasible-path uRPF fails (if shorter path to P1
             is preferred at AS3 over customer route)
           * Loose uRPF works (but ineffective in IPv4)
           * Enhanced Feasible-path uRPF works best

    Figure 2: Scenario 2 for illustration of efficacy of uRPF schemes.

   However, the feasible-path uRPF method has limitations as well.  One
   form of limitation naturally occurs when the recommendation of
   propagating the same prefixes to all routers is not followed.
   Another form of limitation can be described as follows.  In Scenario
   2 (described above, illustrated in Figure 2), it is possible that the
   second transit provider (ISP-b or AS3) does not propagate the
   prepended route for prefix P1 to the first transit provider (ISP-a or
   AS2).  This is because AS3's decision policy permits giving priority
   to a shorter route to prefix P1 via a peer (AS2) over a longer route
   learned directly from the customer (AS1).  In such a scenario, AS3
   would not send any route announcement for prefix P1 to AS2.  Then a
   data packet with source address in prefix P1 that originates from AS1
   and traverses via AS3 to AS2 will get dropped at AS2.

2.4.  SAV using Loose Unicast Reverse Path Filtering

   In the loose unicast Reverse Path Filtering (uRPF) method, an ingress
   packet at the border router is accepted only if the FIB has one or
   more prefixes that encompass the source address.  That is, a packet
   is dropped if no route exists in the FIB for the source address.
   Loose uRPF sacrifices directionality.  This method is not effective
   for prevention of address spoofing since there is little unrouted
   address space in IPv4.  It only drops packets if the spoofed address

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   is unreachable in the current FIB (e.g.  RFC 1918, unallocated,
   allocated but currently not routed).

3.  Proposed New Technique: SAV using Enhanced Feasible-Path uRPF

3.1.  Description of the Method

   Enhanced feasible-path uRPF adds greater operational robustness and
   efficacy to existing uRPF methods discussed in Section 2.  The
   proposed technique is based on the principle that if BGP updates for
   multiple prefixes with the same origin AS were received on different
   interfaces (at border routers), then incoming data packets with
   source addresses in any of those prefixes should be accepted on any
   of those interfaces.  It can be best explained with an example as
   follows:

   Let us say, a border router of ISP-A has in its Adj-RIB-in the set of
   prefixes {Q1, Q2, Q3} each of which has AS-x as its origin and AS-x
   is in ISP-A's customer cone.  Further, the border router received a
   route for prefix Q1 over a customer facing interface, while it
   learned routes for prefixes Q2 and Q3 from a lateral peer and an
   upstream transit provider, respectively.  All these routes passed
   route filtering and/or origin validation (i.e. the origin AS-x is
   deemed legitimate).  That is, the route announcements are considered
   legitimate.  In this example scenario, the enhanced feasible-path
   uRPF method allows source addresses to belong in {Q1, Q2, Q3} on any
   of the three specific interfaces in question (customer, peer,
   provider) on which the three routes were learned.

   Thus, enhanced feasible-path uRPF defines feasible paths in a more
   generalized but precise way (as compared to feasible-path uRPF).  In
   the above example, routes for prefixes Q2 and Q3 were not received on
   a customer facing interface at the border router, yet data packets
   with source addresses in Q2 or Q3 are accepted by the router if they
   come in on the same customer interface on which the route for prefix
   Q1 was received (based on these prefix routes having the same origin
   AS).

   Looking back at Scenarios 1 and 2 (Figure 1 and Figure 2), the
   enhanced feasible-path uRPF provides comparable or better performance
   than the other uRPF methods.  Scenario 3 (Figure 3) further
   illustrates the enhanced feasible-path uRPF method with a more
   concrete example.  In this scenario, the focus is on operation of the
   feasible-path uRPF at ISP4 (AS4).  ISP4 learns a route for prefix P1
   via a customer-to-provider (C2P) interface from customer ISP2 (AS2).
   This route for P1 has origin AS1.  ISP4 also learns a route for P2
   via another C2P interface from customer ISP3 (AS3).  Additionally,
   AS4 learns an alternate route for P2 via a peer-to-peer (p2p)

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   interface from ISP5 (AS5).  Both routes for P2 have the same origin
   AS (i.e.  AS1) as does the route for P1.  Using the proposed enhanced
   feasible-path uRPF scheme, given the commonality of the origin AS
   across the above-mentioned routes for P1 and P2, AS4 would permit
   source addresses belonging to either P1 or P2 in data packets
   received on any of the three interfaces (from AS2, AS3, and AS5).

                    +----------+   P2[AS5 AS1]  +------------+
                    | AS4(ISP4)|<---------------|  AS5(ISP5) |
                    +----------+      (p2p)     +------------+
                        /\   /\                        /\
                        /     \                        /
            P1[AS2 AS1]/       \P2[AS3 AS1]           /
                 (C2P)/         \(C2P)               /
                     /           \                  /
              +----------+    +----------+         /
              | AS2(ISP2)|    | AS3(ISP3)|        /
              +----------+    +----------+       /
                       /\           /\          /
                        \           /          /
                  P1[AS1]\         /P2[AS1]   /P2[AS1]
                     (C2P)\       /(C2P)     /(C2P)
                           \     /          /
                        +----------------+ /
                        |  AS1(customer) |/
                        +----------------+
                             P1, P2 (prefixes originated)

            Consider that data packets (sourced from AS1)
            may be received at AS4 with source address
            in P1 or P2 via any of the neighbors (AS2, AS3, AS5):
            * Feasible-path uRPF fails
            * Loose uRPF works (but not desirable)
            * Enhanced Feasible-path uRPF works best

    Figure 3: Scenario 3 for illustration of efficacy of uRPF schemes.

   Based on the above, the proposed enhanced feasible-path uRPF method
   would reduce ISP concerns about possible service disruption affecting
   their customers and encourage greater adoption of uRPF.

3.2.  Operational Recommendations

   The following operational recommendations will make the operation of
   the proposed enhanced feasible-path uRPF robust:

   For multi-homed stub AS:

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   o  A multi-homed stub AS SHOULD announce at least one of the prefixes
      it originates to each of its transit provider ASes.

   For non-stub AS:

   o  A non-stub AS SHOULD also announce at least one of the prefixes it
      originates to each of its transit provider ASes.

   o  Additionally, from the routes it has learned from customers, a
      non-stub AS SHOULD announce at least one route per origin AS to
      each of its transit provider ASes.

   (Note: It is worth noting that in the above recommendations if "at
   least one" is replaced with "all", then even traditional feasible-
   path uRPF will work as desired.)

3.3.  A Challenging Scenario

   It should be observed that in the absence of ASes adhering the above
   recommendations, the following example scenarios may be constructed
   which pose a challenge for the enhanced feasible-path uRPF (as well
   as for traditional feasible-path uRPF).  In the scenario illustrated
   in Figure 4, since routes for neither P1 nor P2 are propagated on the
   AS2-AS4 interface, the enhanced feasible-path uRPF at AS4 will reject
   data packets received on that interface with source addresses in P1
   or P2.

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                    +----------+
                    | AS4(ISP4)|
                    +----------+
                        /\   /\
                        /     \  P1[AS3 AS1]
         P1 and P2 not /       \ P2[AS3 AS1]
           propagated /         \ (C2P)
             (C2P)   /           \
              +----------+    +----------+
              | AS2(ISP2)|    | AS3(ISP3)|
              +----------+    +----------+
                       /\           /\
                        \           / P1[AS1]
       P1[AS1] NO_EXPORT \         / P2[AS1]
       P2[AS1] NO_EXPORT  \       / (C2P)
                    (C2P)  \     /
                        +----------------+
                        |  AS1(customer) |
                        +----------------+
                             P1, P2 (prefixes originated)

             Figure 4: Illustration of a challenging scenario.

3.4.  Overcoming the Above Challenge: Algorithm with Full Flexibility
      Across Customer Cone

   Adding further flexibility to the enhanced feasible-path uRPF method
   can help address the potential limitation identified above using the
   scenario in Figure 4 (Section 3.3).  In the following, "route" refers
   to a route currently existing in the Adj-RIB-in.  Including the
   additional degree of flexibility, the modified algorithm can be
   described as follows:

   o  Let I = {I1, I2, ..., In} represent the set of all directly-
      connected customer interfaces at customer-facing edge routers in a
      transit provider's AS.

   o  Let P = {P1, P2, ..., Pm} represent the set of all unique prefixes
      for which routes were received over the interfaces in Set I.

   o  Let A = {AS1, AS2, ..., ASk} represent the set of all unique
      origin ASes seen in the routes that were received over the
      interfaces in Set I.

   o  Let Q = {Q1, Q2, ..., Qj} represent the set of all unique prefixes
      for which routes were received over peer or provider interfaces
      such that each of the routes has its origin AS belonging in Set A.

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   o  Then, Set Z = Union(P,Q) represents the RPF list for each
      customer-facing edge router in the AS in question.  That is, over
      each interface in Set I, the edge router SHOULD permit only those
      ingress data packets that have SA in any of the prefixes in Set Z.

   When this algorithmic flexibility is incorporated, then the type of
   limitation identified in Figure 4 (Section 3.3) goes away.  This
   should significantly reduce the possibility of blocking legitimate
   customer-data packets in uRPF implementations.

3.5.  Implementation Considerations

   The existing RPF checks in edge routers take advantage of existing
   line card implementations to perform the RPF functions.  For
   implementation of the proposed technique, the general necessary
   feature would be to extend the line cards to take arbitrary RPF lists
   that are not necessarily the same as the existing FIB contents.  For
   example, in the proposed method, the RPF lists are constructed by
   applying a set of rules to all received BGP routes (not just those
   selected as best path and installed in FIB).

3.5.1.  Impact on FIB Memory Size Requirement

   The proposed technique requires that there should be FIB memory
   (i.e., TCAM) available to store the RPF lists in line cards.  For an
   ISP's AS, the RPF list size for each line card will roughly and
   conservatively equal the total number of prefixes in its customer
   cone (assuming the algorithm in Section 3.4 is used).  The following
   table shows the measured customer cone sizes for various types of
   ISPs [sriram-ripe63]:

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   +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | Type of ISP                     | Measured Customer Cone Size in  |
   |                                 | # Prefixes (in turn this is an  |
   |                                 | estimate for RPF list size on   |
   |                                 | line card)                      |
   +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | Very Large Global ISP           | 32392                           |
   | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
   | Very Large Global ISP           | 29528                           |
   | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
   | Large Global ISP                | 20038                           |
   | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
   | Mid-size Global ISP             | 8661                            |
   | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
   | Regional ISP (in Asia)          | 1101                            |
   +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+

   Table 1: Customer cone sizes (# prefixes) for various types of ISPs.

   For some super large global ISPs that are at the core of the
   Internet, the customer cone size (# prefixes) can be as high as a few
   hundred thousand [caida].  But uRPF is most effective when deployed
   at ASes at the edges of the Internet where the customer cone sizes
   are smaller as shown in Table 1.

   A very large global ISP's router line card is likely to have a FIB
   size large enough to accommodate 2 to 6 million routes [cisco1].
   Similarly, the line cards in routers corresponding to a large global
   ISP, a mid-size global ISP, and a regional ISP are likely to have FIB
   sizes large enough to accommodate about 1 million, 0.5 million, and
   100K routes, respectively [cisco2].  Comparing these FIB size numbers
   with the corresponding RPF list size numbers in Table 1, it can be
   surmised that the conservatively estimated RPF list size is only a
   small fraction of the anticipated FIB memory size under various ISP
   scenarios.

4.  Security Considerations

   This document offers a technique to improve the robustness features
   of uRPF and thus improve the security of the Internet as a whole.
   The proposed technique does not warrant any additional security
   considerations.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not request new capabilities or attributes.  It
   does not create any new IANA registries.

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6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Job Snijders, Marco Marzetti, Marco
   d'Itri, Nick Hilliard, Gert Doering, Igor Gashinsky, Barry Greene,
   and Joel Jaeggli for comments and suggestions.

7.  Informative References

   [caida]    "Information for AS 174 (COGENT-174)", CAIDA Spoofer
              Project , <https://spoofer.caida.org/as.php?asn=174>.

   [cisco1]   "Internet Routing Table Growth Causes ROUTING-FIB-
              4-RSRC_LOW Message on Trident-Based Line Cards", Cisco
              Trouble-shooting Tech-notes , January 2014,
              <https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/routers/asr-
              9000-series-aggregation-services-routers/116999-problem-
              line-card-00.html>.

   [cisco2]   "Cisco Nexus 7000 Series NX-OS Unicast Routing
              Configuration Guide, Release 5.x (Chapter: Managing the
              Unicast RIB and FIB)", Cisco Configuration Guides , June
              2017, <https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/data
              center/sw/5_x/nx-
              os/unicast/configuration/guide/l3_cli_nxos/
              l3_manage-routes.html#22859>.

   [ISOC]     Vixie (Ed.), P., "Addressing the challenge of IP
              spoofing", ISOC report , September 2015,
              <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
              May 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827>.

   [RFC3704]  Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
              Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, DOI 10.17487/RFC3704, March
              2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3704>.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.

Sriram, et al.             Expires May 3, 2018                 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft              Enhanced FP-uRPF                October 2017

   [RRL]      "Response Rate Limiting in the Domain Name System",
              Redbarn blog , <http://www.redbarn.org/dns/ratelimits>.

   [sriram-ripe63]
              Sriram, K. and R. Bush, "Estimating CPU Cost of BGPSEC on
              a Router", Presented at RIPE-63; also at IETF-83 SIDR WG
              Meeting, March 2012,
              <http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/83/slides/
              slides-83-sidr-7.pdf>.

   [TA14-017A]
              "UDP-Based Amplification Attacks", US-CERT alert
              TA14-017A , January 2014,
              <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A>.

Authors' Addresses

   Kotikalapudi Sriram
   US NIST
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg  MD 20899
   USA

   Email: ksriram@nist.gov

   Doug Montgomery
   US NIST
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg  MD 20899
   USA

   Email: dougm@nist.gov

   Jeffrey Haas
   Juniper Networks, Inc.
   1133 Innovation Way
   Sunnyvale  CA 94089
   USA

   Email: jhaas@juniper.net

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