AS Hijack Detection and Mitigation
draft-sriram-sidrops-as-hijack-detection-05
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
Expired & archived
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Authors | Kotikalapudi Sriram , Doug Montgomery | ||
Last updated | 2023-07-25 (Latest revision 2023-01-09) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document proposes a method for detection and mitigation of AS hijacking. In this mechanism, an AS operator registers a new object in the RPKI called 'ROAs Exist for All Prefixes (REAP)'. REAP is digitally signed using the AS holder's certificate. By registering a REAP object, the AS operator is declaring that they have Route Origin Authorization (ROA) coverage for all prefixes originated by their AS. A receiving AS will mark a route as Invalid if the prefix is not covered by any Validated ROA Payload (VRP) and the route origin AS has signed a REAP. Here Invalid means that the route is determined to be an AS hijack.
Authors
Kotikalapudi Sriram
Doug Montgomery
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)