@techreport{sriram-sidrops-as-hijack-detection-07,
    number =    {draft-sriram-sidrops-as-hijack-detection-07},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sriram-sidrops-as-hijack-detection/07/},
    author =    {Kotikalapudi Sriram and Doug Montgomery},
    title =     {{AS Hijack Detection and Mitigation}},
    pagetotal = 5,
    year =      2024,
    month =     jan,
    day =       24,
    abstract =  {This document proposes a method for detection and mitigation of AS hijacking. In this mechanism, an AS operator registers a new object in the RPKI called 'ROAs Exist for All Prefixes (REAP)'. REAP is digitally signed using the AS holder's certificate. By registering a REAP object, the AS operator is declaring that they have Route Origin Authorization (ROA) coverage for all prefixes originated by their AS. A receiving AS will mark a route as Invalid if the prefix is not covered by any Validated ROA Payload (VRP) and the route origin AS has signed a REAP. Here Invalid means that the route is determined to be an AS hijack.},
}