@techreport{sriram-sidrops-asra-verification-04,
    number =    {draft-sriram-sidrops-asra-verification-04},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sriram-sidrops-asra-verification/04/},
    author =    {Kotikalapudi Sriram and Nan Geng and Amir Herzberg},
    title =     {{Autonomous System Relationship Authorization (ASRA) as an Extension to ASPA for Enhanced AS Path Verification}},
    pagetotal = 13,
    year =      2026,
    month =     may,
    day =       15,
    abstract =  {Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) record authorizes provider ASes of a customer AS (CAS). While ASPA-based AS\_PATH verification can correctly detect and mitigate route leaks and some forged-origin or forged-path-segment hijacks, it fails to detect some malicious path manipulations for routes that are received from transit providers. This document utilizes a new RPKI object called Autonomous System Relationship Authorization (ASRA) that significantly enhances AS\_PATH verification complementing ASPA. ASRA fills in a significant gap in the ASPA method by adding the capability to detect fake links in the AS\_PATHs in BGP Updates propagated from providers to customers. ASRA achieves this by allowing an AS to register additional AS relationships, i.e., customers and lateral peers.},
}