Concise Encoding of Signed Merkle Tree Proofs
draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-00
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Orie Steele , Henk Birkholz , Maik Riechert , Antoine Delignat-Lavaud , Cedric Fournet | ||
| Last updated | 2023-03-13 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-00
TBD O. Steele
Internet-Draft Transmute
Intended status: Standards Track H. Birkholz
Expires: 15 September 2023 Fraunhofer SIT
M. Riechert
A. Delignat-Lavaud
C. Fournet
Microsoft
14 March 2023
Concise Encoding of Signed Merkle Tree Proofs
draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-00
Abstract
This specification describes three CBOR data structures for primary
use in COSE envelopes. A format for Merkle Tree Root Signatures with
metadata, a format for Inclusions Paths, and a format for disclosure
of a single hadh tree leaf payload (Merkle Tree Proofs).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 September 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
Steele, et al. Expires 15 September 2023 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft CoMETRE March 2023
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. CBOR Merkle Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Signed Merkle Tree Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Inclusion Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Signed Merkle Tree Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Signed Merkle Tree Multiproof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Merkle Tree Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. RFC9162_SHA256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Additions to Existing Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1.1. New Entries to the COSE Header Parameters Registry . 7
7.2. New SCITT-Related Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2.1. Tree Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
Merkle proofs are verifiable data structures that support secure data
storage, through their ability to protect the integrity of batches of
documents or collections of statements.
Merkle proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof
of existence), or that a smaller set of statements are contained in a
large set of statements (proof of disclosure).
A merkle proof is a path from a leaf to a root in a merkle tree.
Merkle trees are constructed from simple operations such as
concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function.
The simple design and valuable cryptographic properties of merkle
trees have been leveraged in many network and database applications.
Steele, et al. Expires 15 September 2023 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft CoMETRE March 2023
Differences in the representation of a merkle tree, merkle leaf and
merkle inclusion proof can increase the burden for implementers, and
create interoperability challenges.
This document describes the three data structures necessary to use
merkle proofs with COSE envelopes.
1.1. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Terminology
Leaf Bytes: A merkle tree leaf is labelled with the cryptographic
hash of a sequence of bytes. These bytes may be structured as a
combination of Payload and Extra Data.
Merkle Tree: A Merkle tree is a tree where every leaf is labelled
with the cryptographic hash of a sequence of bytes and every node
that is not a leaf is labeled with the cryptographic hash of the
labels of its child nodes.
Merkle Tree Root: A Merkle tree root is the root node of a tree
which represents the cryptographic hash that commits to all leaves
in the tree.
Merkle Tree Algorithm: A Merkle tree algorithm specifies how nodes
in the tree must be hashed to compute the root node.
Payload and Extra Data: A payload is data bound to in a Merkle tree
leaf. The Merkle tree algorithm determines how a payload together
with extra data is bound to a leaf. The simplest case is that the
payload is the leaf itself without extra data.
Inclusion Path: An inclusion path confirms that a value is a leaf of
a Merkle tree known only by its root hash (and tree size,
possibly).
Signed Merkle Tree Proof: A signed Merkle tree proof is the
combination of signed Merkle tree root hash, inclusion path, extra
data, and payload.
Steele, et al. Expires 15 September 2023 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft CoMETRE March 2023
3. CBOR Merkle Structures
This section describes representations of merkle tree structures in
CBOR.
Some of the structures such as the construction of a merkle tree
leaf, or an inclusion proof from a leaf to a merkle root, might have
several different representations.
Some differences in representations are necessary to support
efficient verification of proofs and compatibility with deployed tree
algorithms used in specific implementations.
3.1. Signed Merkle Tree Root
A Merkle tree root is signed with COSE_Sign1, creating a Signed
Merkle Tree Root:
SMTR = THIS.COSE.profile .and COSE_Sign1_Tagged
Protected header parameters:
* alg (label: 1): REQUIRED. Signature algorithm. Value type: int /
tstr.
* tree alg (label: TBD): REQUIRED. Merkle tree algorithm. Value
type: int / tstr.
* tree size (label: TBD): OPTIONAL. Merkle tree size as the number
of leaves. Value type: uint.
A COSE profile of this specification may add further header
parameters, for example to identify the signer.
Payload: Merkle tree root hash bytes according to tree alg (i.e.,
header params tell you what the alg id is here)
Note: The payload is just a byte string representing the Merkle tree
root hash (and not some wrapper structure) so that it can be detached
(see defintion of payload in https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/
rfc9052#section-4.1) and easily re-computed from an inclusion path
and leaf bytes. This allows to design other structures that force
re-computation and prevent faulty implementations (forgetting to
match a computed root with one embedded in a signature).
One example of a Signed Merkle Tree Proof is a "transparent signed
statement" or "claim" as defined in [I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture].
Steele, et al. Expires 15 September 2023 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft CoMETRE March 2023
3.2. Inclusion Paths
[RFC6962] defines a merkle audit path for a leaf in a merkle tree as
the shortest list of additional nodes in the merkle tree required to
compute the merkle root for that tree.
[RFC9162] changed the term from "merkle audit path" to "merkle
inclusion proof".
We prefer to use the term "inclusion path" to avoid confusion with
Signed Merkle Tree Proof.
If the tree size and leaf index is known, then a compact inclusion
path variant can be used:
IndexAwareInclusionPath = #6.1234([
leaf_index: int
hashes: [+ bstr]
])
Otherwise, the direction for each path step must be included:
FIXME bit vector: 0 right, 1 left, so no bit labels
IndexUnawareInclusionPath = #6.1235([
hashes: [+ bstr]
left: uint ; bit vector
])
For some tree algorithms, the direction is derived from the hashes
themselves and both the index and direction can be left out in the
path:
; TODO: find a better name for this
UndirectionalInclusionPath = #6.1236([+ bstr])
InclusionPath = IndexAwareInclusionPath / IndexUnawareInclusionPath / UndirectionalInclusionPath
Note: Including the tree size and leaf index may not be appropriate
in certain privacy-focused applications as an attacker may be able to
derive private information from them.
TODO: Should leaf index be part of inclusion path
(IndexAwareInclusionPath) or outside?
TODO: Define root computation algorithm for each inclusion path type
Steele, et al. Expires 15 September 2023 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft CoMETRE March 2023
TODO: Do we need both inclusion path types? what properties does each
type have? (https://github.com/ietf-scitt/cose-merkle-tree-proofs/
issues/6)
TODO: Should the inclusion path be opaque (bstr) and fixed by the
tree algorithm? It seems this is orthogonal and the choice of
inclusion path type should be application-specific.
3.3. Signed Merkle Tree Proof
A signed Merkle tree proof is a CBOR array containing a signed tree
root, an inclusion path, extra data for the tree algorithm, and the
payload.
SignedMerkleTreeProof = [
signed_tree_root: bstr .cbor SMTR ; payload of COSE_Sign1_Tagged is detached
inclusion_path: bstr .cbor InclusionPath
extra_data: bstr / nil
payload: bstr
]
extra_data is an additional input to the tree algorithm and is used
together with the payload to compute the leaf hash. A use case for
this field is to implement blinding.
TODO: maybe rename extra_data
3.4. Signed Merkle Tree Multiproof
TODO: define a multi-leaf variant of a signed Merkle tree proof like
in:
* https://github.com/transmute-industries/merkle-proof
* https://transmute-industries.github.io/merkle-disclosure-proof-
2021/
TODO: consider using sparse multiproofs, see
https://medium.com/@jgm.orinoco/understanding-sparse-merkle-
multiproofs-9b9f049e8f08 and https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.07648.pdf
4. Merkle Tree Algorithms
This document establishes a registry of Merkle tree algorithms with
the following initial contents:
[FIXME] exploration table, what should go into -00?
Steele, et al. Expires 15 September 2023 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft CoMETRE March 2023
+================+=======+======================+
| Name | Label | Description |
+================+=======+======================+
| Reserved | 0 | |
+----------------+-------+----------------------+
| RFC9162_SHA256 | 1 | RFC9162 with SHA-256 |
+----------------+-------+----------------------+
Table 1: Merke Tree Alogrithms
Each tree algorithm defines how to compute the root node from a
sequence of leaves each represented by payload and extra data. Extra
data is algorithm-specific and should be considered opaque.
4.1. RFC9162_SHA256
The RFC9162_SHA256 tree algorithm uses the Merkle tree definition
from [RFC9162] with SHA-256 hash algorithm.
For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n.
MTH({d(0)}) = SHA-256(0x00 || d(0))
MTH(D[n]) = SHA-256(0x01 || MTH(D[0:k]) || MTH(D[k:n]))
where d(0) is the payload. This algorithm takes no extra data.
5. Privacy Considerations
TBD
6. Security Considerations
TBD
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. Additions to Existing Registries
7.1.1. New Entries to the COSE Header Parameters Registry
IANA will be requested to register the new COSE Header parameters
defined below in the "COSE Header Parameters" registry at some point.
7.2. New SCITT-Related Registries
IANA will be asked to add a new registry "TBD" to the list that
appears at https://www.iana.org/assignments/.
Steele, et al. Expires 15 September 2023 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft CoMETRE March 2023
The rest of this section defines the subregistries that are to be
created within the new "TBD" registry.
7.2.1. Tree Algorithms
IANA will be asked to establish a registry of tree algorithm
identifiers, named "Tree Algorithms", with the following registration
procedures: TBD
The "Tree Algorithms" registry initially consists of:
+============+====================+===============+
| Identifier | Tree Algorithm | Reference |
+============+====================+===============+
| TBD | TBD tree algorithm | This document |
+------------+--------------------+---------------+
Table 2: Initial content of Tree Algorithms
registry
The designated expert(s) should ensure that the proposed algorithm
has a public specification and is suitable for use as [TBD].
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC2119>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC6234>.
[RFC6962] Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC6962>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC6979>.
Steele, et al. Expires 15 September 2023 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft CoMETRE March 2023
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8032>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8174>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8949>.
[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
December 2021, <https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC9162>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-cose-countersign]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Countersignatures", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-cose-countersign-10, 20 September 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
countersign-10>.
[I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture]
Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., and Y.
Deshpande, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and
Transparent Digital Supply Chains", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-01, 13 March
2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
scitt-architecture-01>.
Authors' Addresses
Orie Steele
Transmute
Email: orie@transmute.industries
Henk Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT
Rheinstrasse 75
64295 Darmstadt
Germany
Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de
Steele, et al. Expires 15 September 2023 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft CoMETRE March 2023
Maik Riechert
Microsoft
United Kingdom
Email: Maik.Riechert@microsoft.com
Antoine Delignat-Lavaud
Microsoft
United Kingdom
Email: antdl@microsoft.com
Cedric Fournet
Microsoft
United Kingdom
Email: fournet@microsoft.com
Steele, et al. Expires 15 September 2023 [Page 10]