Routing Security in Sensor Network: HELLO Flood Attack and Defense
draft-suhopark-hello-wsn-00
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Suho Park | ||
Last updated | 2005-12-09 | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
In this document, We consider Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) security and focus our attention to tolerate damage caused by an adversary who has compromised deployed sensor node to modify, block, or inject packets. We adopt a probabilistic secret sharing protocol where secrets shared between two sensor nodes are not exposed to any other nodes. Adapting to WSN characteristics, we incorporate these secrets with bidirectional verification and multipath routing to multiple base stations to defend against HELLO flood attacks. We then analytically show that our defense mechanisms against HELLO flood attack can tolerate damage caused by an intruder
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)