Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols
draft-sullivan-randomness-improvements-00
Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
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|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Luke Garratt , Nick Sullivan | ||
Last updated | 2017-10-30 | ||
Replaced by | draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Randomness is a crucial ingredient for TLS and related transport security protocols. Weak or predictable cryptographically-strong pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs) can be abused or exploited for malicious purposes. See the Dual EC random number backdoor for a relevant example of this problem. This document describes a way for security protocol participants to mix their long-term private key into the entropy pool from which random values are derived. This may help mitigate problems that stem from broken CSPRNGs.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)