Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols
draft-sullivan-randomness-improvements-00
| Document | Type | Replaced Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Luke Garratt , Nick Sullivan | ||
| Last updated | 2017-10-30 | ||
| Replaced by | RFC 8937 | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-sullivan-randomness-improvements-00.txt
Abstract
Randomness is a crucial ingredient for TLS and related transport security protocols. Weak or predictable cryptographically-strong pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs) can be abused or exploited for malicious purposes. See the Dual EC random number backdoor for a relevant example of this problem. This document describes a way for security protocol participants to mix their long-term private key into the entropy pool from which random values are derived. This may help mitigate problems that stem from broken CSPRNGs.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)