Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols
draft-sullivan-randomness-improvements-00

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2017-10-30
Replaced by draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-sullivan-randomness-improvements-00.txt

Abstract

Randomness is a crucial ingredient for TLS and related transport security protocols. Weak or predictable cryptographically-strong pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs) can be abused or exploited for malicious purposes. See the Dual EC random number backdoor for a relevant example of this problem. This document describes a way for security protocol participants to mix their long-term private key into the entropy pool from which random values are derived. This may help mitigate problems that stem from broken CSPRNGs.

Authors

Luke Garratt (luke.garratt@wolfson.ox.ac.uk)
Nick Sullivan (nick@cloudflare.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)