Capabilities and Limitations of an Endpoint-only Security Solution
draft-taddei-smart-cless-introduction-01

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IETF                                                           A. Taddei
Internet-Draft                                                 C. Wueest
Intended status: Informational                                 K. Roundy
Expires: January 9, 2020                            Symantec Corporation
                                                             D. Lazanski
                                                        Last Press Label
                                                           July 08, 2019

   Capabilities and Limitations of an Endpoint-only Security Solution
                draft-taddei-smart-cless-introduction-01

Abstract

   In the context of existing, proposed and newly published protocols,
   this draft RFC is to establish the capabilities and limitations of
   endpoint-only security solutions and explore benefits and
   alternatives to mitigate those limits with the support of real case
   studies.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Taddei, et al.           Expires January 9, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    CLESS                        July 2019

   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Disclaimer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Endpoints: definitions, models and scope  . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Internal representation of an endpoint  . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Endpoints modeled in an end-to-end context  . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Threat Landscape  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Endpoint Security Capabilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  What would be a perfect endpoint security solution? . . . . .  14
   9.  The defence-in-depth principle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   10. Endpoint Security Limits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     10.1.  No possibility to put an endpoint security add-on on the
            UE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       10.1.1.  Not receiving any updates or functioning patches . .  18
       10.1.2.  Mirai IoT bot  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     10.2.  Endpoints may not see the malware on the endpoint  . . .  20
       10.2.1.  LoJax UEFI rootkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       10.2.2.  SGX Malware  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       10.2.3.  AMT Takeover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       10.2.4.  AMT case study (anonymised)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       10.2.5.  Users bypass the endpoint security . . . . . . . . .  23
     10.3.  Endpoints may miss information leakage attacks . . . . .  23
       10.3.1.  Meltdown/Specter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       10.3.2.  Network daemon exploits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       10.3.3.  SQL injection attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       10.3.4.  Low and slow data exfiltration . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     10.4.  Suboptimality and gray areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       10.4.1.  Stolen credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       10.4.2.  Zero Day Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       10.4.3.  Port scan over the network . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       10.4.4.  DDoS attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   11. Learnings from production data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     11.1.  Endpoint only incidents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
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