Freedom of Association on the Internet
draft-tenoever-hrpc-association-01
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Niels ten Oever , Gisela Perez de Acha | ||
| Last updated | 2017-06-22 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-irtf-hrpc-association, draft-irtf-hrpc-association | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-tenoever-hrpc-association-01
Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group N. ten Oever
Internet-Draft ARTICLE 19
Intended status: Informational G. Perez de Acha
Expires: December 24, 2017 Derechos Digitales
June 22, 2017
Freedom of Association on the Internet
draft-tenoever-hrpc-association-01
Abstract
This document aims to scope the relation between Internet protocols
and the rights to freedom of assembly and association. The Internet
increasingly mediates our lives and our ability to excercise human
rights. Since Internet protocols play a central role in the
management, development and use of the Internet, the relation between
the mentioned rights should be documented and adverse impacts should
be mitigated. As there have been methods of protest on the Internet
-a form of freedom of assembly- that have proven to be harmful to
connectivity and infrastructure, such as DDoS attacks, this text aims
to document forms of protest, association and assembly that do not
have a negative impact on the Internet infrastructure.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 24, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Vocabulary used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Research questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Cases and examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Communicating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.1. Mailinglists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.2. Multi party video conferencing and risks . . . . . . 6
4.2. Peer-to-peer networks and systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. Peer-to-peer system achitectures . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2. Version control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Reaching out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.1. Spam, filter bubbles, and unrequested messaging . . . 9
4.3.2. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. Grouping together (identities) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4.1. DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4.2. ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Research Group Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
Freedom of assembly and freedom of association are two human rights
that protect and enable collective action and expression [UDHR]
[ICCPR]. Both rights ensure everyone in a society has the
opportunity to express the opinions they hold in common with others,
which in turn facilitates dialogue among citizens, as well as between
them and political leaders or government [OSCE]. This is important
in the process of democratic delibration because causes and opinions
are more widely heard when a group of people come together behind the
same cause or issue [Tocqueville]. The rights to freedom of assembly
and association thus protect any collective, gathered either
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
permanently or temporarily for peaceful purposes. It is indeed a
"freedom" because it is voluntary and uncoerced: anyone can join or
leave a group of choice, which in turn means not to be forced to
either stay or leave.
The difference between freedom of assembly and freedom of association
is merely gradual one: the former tends to have an informal and
ephemeral nature, whereas the latter refers to established and
permanent bodies with specific objectives. Nonetheless, one and the
other are protected to the same degree.
An assembly is an intentional and temporary gathering of a collective
in a private or public space for a specific purpose: demonstrations,
inside meetings, strikes, processions, rallies or even sits-in
[UNHRC]. It is essentially a gathering. The right to protest is
encompassed by this right, and it coincides with the right to freedom
of expression and the right to hold an opinion. Nonetheless protest,
unlike assembly, involves an element of dissent that can be exercised
individually whereas assembly always has a collective component
[ARTICLE19]. Association on the other hand has a more formal and
established nature. It refers to a group of individuals or legal
entities brought together in order to collectively act, express,
pursue or defend a field of common interests [UNGA]. Within this
category we can think about civil society organizations, clubs,
cooperatives, NGOs, religious associations, political parties, trade
unions or foundations.
Rights to assembly and association are crucial for the Internet, even
if privacy and freedom of expression are the most discussed human
rights when it comes to the online world. It is undeniable that
communities, collaboration and joint action lie at the heart of the
Internet. Even at at linguistical level, the words "networks" and
"associations" are close synonyms. Both interconnected groups and
assemblies of people depend on "links" and "relationships" [Swire].
One could even argue that as a whole, the networked internet
constitutes a big collective, and thus an assembly and an
association.
IETF itself, defined as a 'open global community' of network
designers, operators, vendors, and researchers, is also protected by
freedom of assembly and association [RFC3233]. Discussions, comments
and consensus around RFCs are possible because of the collective
expression that freedom of association and assembly allow. The very
word "protocol" found its way into the language of computer
networking based on the need for collective agreement among network
users [HafnerandLyon].
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
In less democratic or authoritarian countries, online association and
assembly have been crucial to mobilise groups and people where
physical gatherings have been impossible or dangerous [APC].
Throughout the world -from the Arab Spring to Latin American student
movements- the Internet has also played a crucial role by providing a
means for the fast dissemination of information that was otherwise
mediated by broadcast media, or even forbidden by the government
[Pensado]. According to Hussain and Howard the Internet helped to
'build solidarity networks and identification of collective
identities and goals', facilitate protest, 'extend the range of local
coverage to international broadcast networks' and as platform for
contestation for the future of 'the future of civil society and
information infrastructure' [HussainHoward].
Some of these examples go beyond the use of Internet protocols and
flow over into the applications layer or examples in the offline
world whereas the purpose of the following document is to break down
the relationship between Internet protocols and the right to freedom
of assembly and association. We do recognize however that in some
cases the line between protocols, applications, implementations,
policies, and the offline world are often blurry and hard (if not
impossible) to differentiate, since protocols are a part of the
socio-technical ordering of the world.
In draft-irtf-hrpc-research the relationship between human rights and
Internet protocols has been shown, and guidelines for considerations
of human rights impact in protocol design have been provided.
Further research is needed to understand the exact impact of Internet
protocols on human rights, including assembly and association given
their importance for the Internet, in order to mitigate (potential)
negative impacts. This is the aim of this document.
2. Vocabulary used
Anonymity The condition of an identity being unknown or concealed.
[RFC4949]
Censorship resistance Methods and measures to mitigate Internet
censorship.
Connectivity The extent to which a device or network is able to
reach other devices or networks to exchange data. The Internet is
the tool for providing global connectivity [RFC1958]. Different
types of connectivity are further specified in [RFC4084]. The
combination of the end-to-end principle, interoperability,
distributed architecture, resilience, reliability and robustness
are the enabling factors that result in connectivity to and on the
Internet.
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
Decentralization Implementation or deployment of standards,
protocols or systems without one single point of control.
Pseudonymity The ability to disguise one's identity online with a
different name than the "real" one, allowing for diverse degrees
of disguised identity and privacy. It is strengthened when less
personal data can be linked to the pseudonym; when the same
pseudonym is used less often and across fewer contexts; and when
independently chosen pseudonyms are more frequently used for new
actions (making them, from an observer's or attacker's
perspective, unlinkable)." [RFC6973]
3. Research questions
How does the internet architecture enables and/or inhibits freedom of
association and assembly.
4. Cases and examples
Whereas rights to freedom of assembly and association protect
collective expression, systems and protocols than enable comunal
communication between people or between servers allow these rights to
prosper. The Internet itself was originally designed as "a medium
for communication for machines that share resources with each other
as equals" [NelsonHedlun]. In this sense, decentralized
architectures that protect anonimity and privacy, assure a resilient
network of speakers and recipients or receivers and thus ensure
better conditions for the exercise of such freedoms in the online
environment. At the same time, centralized solutions have enabled
people to group together in recognizable places and helped the
visbility of groups. Here we will discuss different cases to bring
out the affordances of different protocols, technologies and
architectual features. This issue is particularly timely since an
increasing trend of centralization and consolidation on the Internet
can be observed. This is trend can be parallely observed on the
application level, among Content Distribution Networks, hosting
providers, as well as Internet access providers. Through the
discussion of specific case we will try to further understand how
this impact freedom of assembly, freedom of association as well as
the distributed nature of the Internet [RFC1287].
4.1. Communicating
The ability to produce, receive and spread information is an
essential pre-requisite for discussing and organizing. Protocols
that enable private, open, collaborative and non-excluding
communication models are the best fitted to foster and enable
assembly and association rights.
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
4.1.1. Mailinglists
Since the beginning of the Internet mailing lists have been a key
site of assembly and association [RFC0155] [RFC1211]. In fact,
mailing lists were one of the Internet's first functionalities
[HafnerandLyon].
In 1971, four years after the invention of email, the first mailing
list was created to talk about the idea of using Arpanet for
discussion. By this time, what had initially propelled the Arpanet
project forward as a resource sharing platform was gradually replaced
by the idea of a network as a means of bringing people together
[Abbate]. More than 45 years after, mailing lists are pervasive and
help communities to engage, have discussion, share information, ask
questions, and build ties. Even as social media and discussion
forums grew, mailing lists continue to be widely used
[AckermannKargerZhang]. They are a crucial tool to organise groups
and individuals around themes and causes [APC].
4.1.2. Multi party video conferencing and risks
Multi party video conferencing protocols such as webRTC [RFC6176]
[RFC7118] allow for robust, bandwidth-adaptive, wideband and super-
wideband video and audio discussions in groups. 'The WebRTC protocol
was designed to enable responsive real-time communications over the
Internet, and is instrumental in allowing streaming video and
conferencing applications to run in the browser. In order to easily
facilitate direct connections between computers (bypassing the need
for a central server to act as a gatekeeper), WebRTC provides
functionality to automatically collect the local and public IP
addresses of Internet users (ICE or STUN). These functions do not
require consent from the user, and can be instantiated by sites that
a user visits without their awareness. The potential privacy
implications of this aspect of WebRTC are well documented, and
certain browsers have provided options to limit its behavior.'
[AndersonGuarnieri].
'The disclosure of network addresses presents a specific risk to
individuals that use privacy tools to conceal their real IP address
to sites that they visit. Typically, when a user browses the
Internet over a VPN, the only address that should be recorded by
sites they visit would be that of the VPN provider itself. Using the
WebRTC STUN function allows a site to additionally enumerate the
addresses that are associated with the computer that the visitor is
using - rather than those of intermediaries. This means that if a
user is browsing the Internet on an ADSL connection over a VPN, a
malicious site they visit could potentially surreptitious record the
home address of the user.' [AndersonGuarnieri].
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
While facilitating freedom of assembly and association multi party
video conferencing tools might pose concrete risks for those who use
them. One the one hand webRTC is providing a resilient channels of
communications, but on the other hand it also exposed information
about those who are using the tool which might lead to increased
surveillance, identification and the consequences that might be
derived from that. The risk of surveillance is also true in an
offline space, but this is generally easy to analyze for the end-
user. Security and privacy expectations of the end-user could be
made more clear to the user (or improved) which would result in a
more secure and/or private excercise or the right of freedom of
assembly or association.
4.2. Peer-to-peer networks and systems
4.2.1. Peer-to-peer system achitectures
Peer-to-peer (P2P) is esentially a model of how people interact in
real life because "we deal directly with one another whenever we wish
to" [Vu]. Usually if we need something we ask our peers, who in turn
refer us to other peers. In this sense, the ideal definition of P2P
is that "nodes are able to directly exchange resources and services
between themselves without the need for centralized servers" and
where each participating node typically acts both as a server and as
a client [Vu]. In RFC 5694 it has been defined that peers or nodes
should be able to communicate directly between themselves without
passing intermediaries, and that the system should be self organizing
and have decentralized control [RFC5694]. With this in mind, the
ultimate model of P2P is a completely decentralized system, which is
more resistant to censorship, immune to single points of failure and
have a higher performance and scalability. Nonetheless, in practice
some P2P systems are supported by centralized servers and some others
have hybrid models where nodes are organized into two layers: the
upper tier servers and the lower tier common nodes [Vu].
Since the ARPANET project, the original idea behind the Internet was
conceived as what we would now call a peer-to-peer system [RFC0001].
Over time it has increasingly shifted towards a client/server model
with "millions of consumer clients communicating with a relatively
priviledged set of servers" [NelsonHedlun]. Whether for resource
sharing or data sharing, P2P systems are a form of enabling freedom
of assembly and association. Not only they allow for effective
dissemination of information, but they also because leverage
computing resources by diminishing costs allowing for the formation
of open collectives at the network level. At the same time, in
completely descentralized systems the nodes are autonomous and can
join or leave the network as they want also makes the system
unpredicable: a resource might be only sometimes available, and some
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
others it might be missing or incomplete [Vu]. Lack of information
might in turn make association or assembly more difficult.
Additionally, when one architecturally asseses the role of P2P
systems on can say that: "The main advantage of centralized P2P
systems is that they are able to provide a quick and reliable
resource locating. Their limitation, however, is that the
scalability of the systems is affected by the use of servers. While
decentralized P2P systems are better than centralized P2P systems in
this aspect, they require a longer time in resource locating. As a
result, hybrid P2P systems have been introduced to take ad- vantages
of both centralized and decentralized architectures. Basically, to
maintain the scalability, similar to decentralized P2P systems, there
are no servers in hybrid P2P systems. However, peer nodes that are
more powerful than others can be se- lected to act as servers to
serve others. These nodes are often called super peers. In this
way, resource locating can be done by both decentralized search
techniques and centralized search techniques (asking super peers),
and hence the systems benefit from the search techniques of
centralized P2P systems." {Vu}}
4.2.2. Version control
At the organizational level, peer production is one of the most
relevant innovations from Internet mediated social practices.
According to [Benkler], it implies 'open collaborative innovation and
creation, performed by diverse, decentralized groups organized
principally by neither price signals nor organizational hierarchy,
harnessing heterogeneous motivations, and governed and managed based
on principles other than the residual authority of ownership
implemented through contract.' [Benkler].
In his book The Wealth of Networks, Benkler significantly expands on
his definition of commons-based peer production. According to
Benkler, what distinguishes commons-based production is that it
doesn't rely upon or propagate proprietary knowledge: "The inputs and
outputs of the process are shared, freely or conditionally, in an
institutional form that leaves them equally available for all to use
as they choose at their individual discretion." To ensure that the
knowledge generated is available for free use, commons-based projects
are often shared under an open license.
Ever since developers needed to collaboratively write, maintain and
discuss large code basis for the Internet there have been different
approaches of doing so. One approach is discussing code through
mailing lists, but this has proven to be hard in case of maintaining
the most recent versions. There are many different versions and
characteristics of version control systems.
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
4.3. Reaching out
4.3.1. Spam, filter bubbles, and unrequested messaging
In the 1990s as the internet became more and more commercial, spam
came to be defined as irrelevant or unsolicited messages that were
porsted many times to multiple news groups or mailing lists [Marcus].
Here the question of consent is crucial. In the 2000s a large part
of the discussion revolved around the fact that certain corporations
-protected by the right to freedom of association- considered spam to
be a form of "comercial speech", thus encompassed by free expression
rights [Marcus]. Nonetheless, if we consider that the rights to
assembly and association also mean that "no one may be compelled to
belong to an association" [UDHR], spam infringes both rights if an
op-out mechanism is not provided and people are obliged to receive
unwanted information, or be reached by people they do not know.
This leaves us with an interesting case: spam is currently handled
mostly by mailproviders on behalf of the user, next to that countries
are increasingly adopting opt-in regimes for mailinglists and
commercial e-mail, with a possibility of serious fines in case of
violation.
This protects the user from being confronted with unwanted messages,
but it also makes it legally and technically very difficult to
communicate a message to someone who did not explicitly ask for this.
In public offline spaces we regularly get exposed to flyers,
invitations or demonstrations where our opinions get challenged, or
we are invited to consider different viewpoints. There is no
equivalent on the Internet with the technical and legal regime that
currently operates in it. In other words, it is nearly impossible to
provide information, in a proportionate manner, that someone is not
explicility expecting or asking for. This reinforces a concept that
is regularly discussed on the application level, called 'filter
bubble': "The proponents of personalization offer a vision of a
custom-tailored world, every facet of which fits us perfectly. It's
a cozy place, populated by our favorite people and things and ideas."
[Pariser]. "The filter bubble's costs are both personal and
cultural. There are direct consequences for those of us who use
personalized filters. And then there are societal consequences,
which emerge when masses of people begin to live a filter bubbled-
life (...). Left to their own devices, personalization filters serve
up a kind of invisible autopropaganda, indoctrinating us with our own
ideas, amplifying our desire for things that are familiar and leaving
us oblivious to the dangers lurking in the dark territory of the
uknown." [Pariser]. It seem that the 'filter bubble'-effect can
also be observed at the infrastructure level, which actually
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
strenghtens the impact and thus hampers the effect of collective
expression.
This could be interpretated as an argument for the injection of
unrequested messages, spam or other unrequested notifications. But
the big difference between the proliferation of such messages offline
and online is the investment that is needed. It is not hard for a
single person to message a lot of people, whereas if that person
needed to go house by house the scale and impact of their actions
would be much smaller.
4.3.2. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
One of the most common examples of association at the infrastructure
level are Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS) in which the
infrastructure of the Internet is used to express discontent with a
specific cause [Abibil] [GreenMovement]. Unfortunately DDoS are
often used to stifle freedom of expression as they complicate the
ability of independent media and human rights organizations to
exercise their right to (online) freedom of association, while
facilitating the ability of governments to censor dissent. This is
one of the reasons protocols should seek to mitigate DDoS attacks
[BCP72]. As described in draft-irtf-hrpc-research: "Uses of DDoS
might or might not be legitimate for political reasons, but the IETF
has no means or methods to assess this, and in general enabling DDoS
would mean a deterioration of the network and thus freedom of
expression". This is argued from the vector of freedom of
expression, but if we would analyze it from the perspective of
freedom of association the argument could be as follows: If the
Internet is an association, any attack should be prevented and
mitigated because it prevents the possibility of exercising a right
to collective expression, which is consistent with [BCP72].
On the other hand, it must be taken into consideration that DDoS
attacks are a form of forced assembly when done without the agreement
-or even knowledge- of the involved parts. This point was also
described in draft-irtf-hrpc-research: "When it comes to comparing
DDoS attacks to protests in offline life, it is important to remember
that only a limited number of DDoS attacks involved solely willing
participants. In most cases, the clients are hacked computers of
unrelated parties that have not consented to being part of a DDoS
(for exceptions see Operation Abibil [Abibil] or the Iranian Green
Movement DDoS [GreenMovement]).""
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
4.4. Grouping together (identities)
Collective identities are also protected by freedom of association
and assembly rights. Acording to Melucci these are 'shared
definitions produced by several interacting individuals who are
concerned with the orientation of their action as well as the field
of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place.'
[Melucci] In this sense, assemblies and associations are an important
base in the maintenance and development of culture, as well as
preservation of minority identities [OSCE].
4.4.1. DNS
Domain names allow hosts to be identified by human parsable
information. Whereas an IP address might not be the expression of an
identity, a domain name can be, and often is. On the other hand the
grouping of a certain identity under a specific domain, or even a Top
Level Domain, also brings about risks because connecting an identity
to a hierarchically structured identifier systems also bring risks
about. Risks could be surveillance of the services running on the
domain, domain based censorship, or impersonation of the domain
through DNS cache poisoning. Several technologies have been
developed in the IETF to mitigated these risks such as DNS over TLS
[RFC7858], DNSSEC, and TLS.
The structuring of DNS as a hierarchical authority structure also
brings about specific characteristic, namely the possibility of
centralized policy making on the management and operation of domain
names, which is what (in part) happens at ICANN. The impact of ICANN
processes on human rights will not be discussed here.
4.4.2. ISPs
In order for edge-users to connect to the Internet, a user needs to
be connected to a network. This means that in the process of
accessing the Internet the edge-user needs to accept the policies and
practices of the edge network that provides them access to the other
networks. This means that in order to users to be able to join the
assembly of a 'network of networks', they always need to connect
through an intermediary.
While access the Internet through an intermediary, the user is forced
to accept the policies, practices and principles of a network. This
could impede the rights of the edge-user, depending on the
implemented policies and practices on the network and how (if at all)
they are communicated to the end-user. In terms of rights infringing
habits one could think of filtering, blocking, extensive logging or
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
other invasive practices that are not clearly communicated to the
user.
In some cases it also means that there is no other way for the edge-
user to connect to the network of networks, and is thus forced into
accepting the policies of a specific network, because it is not
trivial for an edge-user to operate its own Autonomous System. This
design, combined with the increased importance of the Internet to
make use of basic services, forces edge-user to engage in association
with a specific network eventhough the user does not consent with the
policies of the network.
5. Conclusions
- Internet has impact for on the ability for people to excercise
their right to freedom of association and assembly.
- The Internet itself is a form of an associtation and assembly, and
should thus be protected.
- To get access to the Internet one could argued on is caught in a
forced assembly with the access network.
- It need to be further researched which level of the network is
responsible for these impacts, and considerations could be
developed for this.
6. Acknowledgements
7. Security Considerations
As this draft concerns a research document, there are no security
considerations.
8. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
9. Research Group Information
The discussion list for the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations
Research Group is located at the e-mail address hrpc@ietf.org [1].
Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the
list is at https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc
Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.irtf.org/mail-
archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
10. References
10.1. Informative References
[Abbate] Janet Abbate, ., "Inventing the Internet", Cambridge: MIT
Press (2013): 11. , 2013, <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/
inventing-internet>.
[Abibil] Danchev, D., "Dissecting 'Operation Ababil' - an OSINT
Analysis", 2012, <http://ddanchev.blogspot.be/2012/09/
dissecting-operation-ababil-osint.html>.
[AckermannKargerZhang]
Ackerman, M., Karger, D., and A. Zhang, "Mailing Lists:
Why Are They Still Here, What's Wrong With Them, and How
Can We Fix Them?", Mit. edu (2017): 1. , 2017,
<https://people.csail.mit.edu/axz/papers/
mailinglists.pdf>.
[AndersonGuarnieri]
Anderson, C. and C. Guarnieri, "Fictitious Profiles and
webRTC's Privacy Leaks Used to Identify Iranian
Activists", 2016,
<https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/webrtc-
deanonymization/>.
[APC] Association for Progressive Communications and . Gayathry
Venkiteswaran, "Freedom of assembly and association online
in India, Malaysia and Pakistan. Trends, challenges and
recommendations.", 2016,
<https://www.apc.org/es/system/files/
FOAA_online_IndiaMalaysiaPakistan.pdf>.
[ARTICLE19]
ARTICLE 19, "The Right to Protest Principles: Background
Paper", 2016,
<https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38581/
Protest-Background-paper-Final-April-2016.pdf page 7>.
[BCP72] IETF, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security
Considerations", 2003, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/
bcp72/>.
[Benkler] Benkler, Y., "Peer Production and Cooperation", 2009,
<http://www.benkler.org/
Peer%20production%20and%20cooperation%2009.pdf>.
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
[GreenMovement]
Villeneuve, N., "Iran DDoS", 2009,
<https://www.nartv.org/2009/06/16/iran-ddos/>.
[HafnerandLyon]
Hafnerand, K. and M. Lyon, "Where Wizards Stay Up Late.
The Origins of the Internet", First Touchstone Edition
(1998): 93. , 1998, <https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12020>.
[HussainHoward]
Hussain, M. and P. Howard, "What Best Explains Successful
Protest Cascades? ICTs and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab
Spring", Int Stud Rev (2013) 15 (1): 48-66. , 2013,
<https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12020>.
[ICCPR] United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights", 1976,
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
CCPR.aspx>.
[Marcus] Marcus, J., "Commercial Speech on the Internet: Spam and
the first amendment", 1998, <http://www.cardozoaelj.com/
wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Marcus.pdf>.
[Melucci] Melucci, A., "The Process of Collective Identity", Temple
University Press, Philadelphia , 1995.
[NelsonHedlun]
Minar, N. and M. Hedlun, "A Network of Peers: Models
Through the History of the Internet", Peer to Peer:
Harnessing the Power of Disruptive Technologies, ed: Andy
Oram , 2001, <http://library.uniteddiversity.coop/REconomy
_Resource_Pack/More_Inspirational_Videos_and_Useful_Info/
Peer_to_Peer-
Harnessing_the_Power_of_Disruptive_Technologies.pdf>.
[OSCE] OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,
"Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly", page 24 ,
2010, <https://www.osce.org/odihr/73405?download=true>.
[Pariser] Pariser, E., "The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized
Web Is Changing What We Read and How We Think", Peguin
Books, London. , 2012.
[Pensado] Jaime Pensado, ., "Student Activism. Utopian Dreams.",
ReVista. Harvard Review of Latin America (2012). , 2012,
<http://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/student-activism>.
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
[RFC0001] Crocker, S., "Host Software", RFC 1, DOI 10.17487/RFC0001,
April 1969, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1>.
[RFC0155] North, J., "ARPA Network mailing lists", RFC 155,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0155, May 1971,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc155>.
[RFC1211] Westine, A. and J. Postel, "Problems with the maintenance
of large mailing lists", RFC 1211, DOI 10.17487/RFC1211,
March 1991, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1211>.
[RFC1287] Clark, D., Chapin, L., Cerf, V., Braden, R., and R. Hobby,
"Towards the Future Internet Architecture", RFC 1287,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1287, December 1991,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1287>.
[RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the
Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1958>.
[RFC3233] Hoffman, P. and S. Bradner, "Defining the IETF", BCP 58,
RFC 3233, DOI 10.17487/RFC3233, February 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3233>.
[RFC4084] Klensin, J., "Terminology for Describing Internet
Connectivity", BCP 104, RFC 4084, DOI 10.17487/RFC4084,
May 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4084>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC5694] Camarillo, G., Ed. and IAB, "Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
Architecture: Definition, Taxonomies, Examples, and
Applicability", RFC 5694, DOI 10.17487/RFC5694, November
2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5694>.
[RFC6176] Turner, S. and T. Polk, "Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) Version 2.0", RFC 6176, DOI 10.17487/RFC6176, March
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6176>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
[RFC7118] Baz Castillo, I., Millan Villegas, J., and V. Pascual,
"The WebSocket Protocol as a Transport for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 7118,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7118, January 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7118>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[Swire] Peter Swire, ., "Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of
Association: Data Empowerment vs. Data Protection", North
Carolina Law Review (2012) 90 (1): 104. , 2012,
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1989516 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1989516>.
[Tocqueville]
de Tocqueville, A., "Democracy in America", n.d., <http://
classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/De_tocqueville_alexis/
democracy_in_america_historical_critical_ed/
democracy_in_america_vol_2.pdf p. 304>.
[UDHR] United Nations General Assembly, "The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights", 1948,
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>.
[UNGA] Hina Jilani, ., "Human rights defenders", A/59/401 , 2004,
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/59/401 para. 46>.
[UNHRC] Maina Kiai, ., "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association", A/HRC/20/27 , 2012,
<http://freeassembly.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/
A-HRC-20-27_en-annual-report-May-2012.pdf>.
[Vu] Vu, Quang Hieu, ., Lupu, Mihai, ., and . Ooi, Beng Chin,
"Peer-to-Peer Computing: Principles and Applications",
2010, <https://www.springer.com/cn/book/9783642035135>.
10.2. URIs
[1] mailto:hrpc@ietf.org
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft FoA June 2017
Authors' Addresses
Niels ten Oever
ARTICLE 19
EMail: niels@article19.org
Gisela Perez de Acha
Derechos Digitales
EMail: gisela@derechosdigitales.org
ten Oever & Perez de AchExpires December 24, 2017 [Page 17]