Cipher Suites for Negotiating Zero Round Trip (0-RTT) Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Renewed Certificate Authentication
draft-thomson-tls-0rtt-and-certs-00

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2016-05-18
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats pdf htmlized bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Network Working Group                                         M. Thomson
Internet-Draft                                                   Mozilla
Intended status: Standards Track                            May 18, 2016
Expires: November 19, 2016

 Cipher Suites for Negotiating Zero Round Trip (0-RTT) Transport Layer
         Security (TLS) with Renewed Certificate Authentication
                  draft-thomson-tls-0rtt-and-certs-00

Abstract

   New cipher suites are defined that allow a client to use zero round
   trip (0-RTT) with Transport Layer Security (TLS), while also enabling
   the peers to renewed certificate-based authentication.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 19, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Thomson                 Expires November 19, 2016               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           TLS 0-RTT Certificates                 May 2016

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  New Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Combining Certificate and PSK Authentication  . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   Transport Layer Security version 1.3 (TLS 1.3) [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
   defines a zero round trip (0-RTT) handshake mode for connections
   where client and server have previously communicated.  In the two
   defined 0-RTT modes, keying material from a previous connection is
   used as a pre-shared key.

   A 0-RTT handshake can rely entirely on the pre-shared key.  These
   handshakes use cipher suites denoted "TLS_PSK_WITH_*".  Alternative
   modes use the pre-shared key to authenticate the connection and
   secure any 0-RTT data, but then a fresh ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (or
   elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman) key exchange is performed.  These
   handshakes use cipher suites denoted "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_*" or
   "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_*".

   Neither of the two 0-RTT handshake modes permits either client or
   server to send the Certificate and CertificateVerify authentication
   messages.  Endpoints are expected to store any authentication state
   with any resumption state.  This means that endpoints are unable to
   update their understanding that a peer has continuing access to
   authentication keys without choosing a one round trip handshake mode
   and sacrificing any potential performance gained by 0-RTT.

   This document defines a third mode for 0-RTT, where the pre-shared
   key is used to authenticate and protect 0-RTT data only.  The
   remainder of the handshake is identical to a regular one round trip
   handshake with the only difference being that the resumption secret
   is mixed into the key schedule.  This allows peers to provide fresh
   proof that they control authentication keys without losing the
   latency advantages provided by the 0-RTT mode.

Thomson                 Expires November 19, 2016               [Page 2]
Internet-Draft           TLS 0-RTT Certificates                 May 2016

1.1.  Notational Conventions

   The words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", and "MAY" are used in this
Show full document text