Extension for protecting (D)TLS handshakes against Denial of Service
draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Marco Tiloca , Ludwig Seitz , Maarten Hoeve , Olaf Bergmann | ||
Last updated | 2018-09-06 (Latest revision 2018-03-05) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes an extension for TLS and DTLS to protect the server from Denial of Service attacks against the handshake protocol, carried out by an on-path adversary. The extension includes a nonce and a Message Authentication Code (MAC) over that nonce, encoded as a Handshake Token that a Trust Anchor entity computes and provides to the client. The server registered at the Trust Anchor verifies the MAC to determine whether continuing or aborting the handshake.
Authors
Marco Tiloca
Ludwig Seitz
Maarten Hoeve
Olaf Bergmann
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)