Hybrid Quantum-Safe Key Exchange for Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-00

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Internet Engineering Task Force                                 C. Tjhai
Internet-Draft                                              M. Tomlinson
Intended Status: Informational                                  A. Cheng
Expires: January 19, 2018                                   Post-Quantum
                                                             G. Bartlett
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                           July 18, 2017

             Hybrid Quantum-Safe Key Exchange for Internet
                Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
                draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-00

Abstract

   This document describes the optional key-exchange payload of Internet
   Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) that carries quantum-safe key
   exchange data.  This optional payload is used in conjunction with the
   existing Diffie-Hellman key exchange to establish a quantum-safe
   shared secret between an initiator and a responder.  The optional
   payload supports a number of quantum-safe key exchange schemes.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 

Tjhai et al.            Expires January 19, 2018                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           Hybrid QSKE for IKEv2             July 18, 2017

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
     1.1.  Problem Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
     1.2.  Proposed Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Hybrid Quantum-Safe Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Quantum-Safe Group Transform Type  . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  IKE_SA_INIT Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.3.  CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.3.1.  New Child SAs from the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange  . . .  7
       2.3.2.  Rekeying IKE SAs with the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange . .  8
       2.3.3.  Rekeying Child SAs with the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange .  8
     2.4.  QSKE Payload Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.  Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.1.  Threat Categories  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.2.  Dealing with Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.3.  Removal of the Diffie-Hellman exchange . . . . . . . . . . 12
   4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   6.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Appendix A.  Quantum-safe Ciphers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Appendix A.1.  Ring Learning With Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Appendix A.2.  NTRU Lattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Problem Description

   Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2) as specified in RFC 7296
   [RFC7296] uses the Diffie-Hellman algorithm [DH] to establish a
   shared secret between an initiator and a responder.  The security of
   the Diffie-Hellman algorithm relies on the difficulty to solve a
   discrete logarithm problem when the order of the group parameter is
   large enough.  While solving such a problem remains difficult with
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