Optional Security Is Not An Option
draft-trammell-optional-security-not-00
The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
Expired & archived
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Author | Brian Trammell | ||
Last updated | 2018-09-19 (Latest revision 2018-03-18) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document explores the common properties of optional security protocols and extensions, and notes that due to the base-rate fallacy and general issues with coordinated deployment of protocols under uncertain incentives, optional security protocols have proven difficult to deploy in practice.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)