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Optional Security Is Not An Option
draft-trammell-optional-security-not-01

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision is Expired
Author Brian Trammell
Last updated 2019-07-22 (Latest revision 2019-01-14)
Stream (None)
Formats
Expired & archived
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:

Abstract

This document explores the common properties of optional security protocols and extensions, and notes that due to the base-rate fallacy and general issues with coordinated deployment of protocols under uncertain incentives, optional security protocols have proven difficult to deploy in practice. This document defines the problem, examines efforts to add optional security for routing, naming, and end-to-end transport, and extracts guidelines for future efforts to deploy optional security protocols based on successes and failures to date.

Authors

Brian Trammell

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)