Optional Security Is Not An Option
draft-trammell-optional-security-not-02
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Brian Trammell | ||
| Last updated | 2020-04-19 (Latest revision 2019-10-17) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document explores the common properties of optional security protocols and extensions, and notes that due to the base-rate fallacy and general issues with coordinated deployment of protocols under uncertain incentives, optional security protocols have proven difficult to deploy in practice. This document defines the problem, examines efforts to add optional security for routing, naming, and end-to-end transport, and extracts guidelines for future efforts to deploy optional security protocols based on successes and failures to date.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)