Abstract Mechanisms for a Cooperative Path Layer under Endpoint Control
draft-trammell-plus-abstract-mech-00

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PLUS BoF                                                     B. Trammell
Internet-Draft                                                ETH Zurich
Intended status: Informational                        September 28, 2016
Expires: April 1, 2017

Abstract Mechanisms for a Cooperative Path Layer under Endpoint Control
                  draft-trammell-plus-abstract-mech-00

Abstract

   This document describes the operation of three abstract mechanisms
   for supporting an explicitly cooperative path layer in the Internet
   architecture.  Three mechanisms are described: sender to path
   signaling with receiver integrity verification; path to receiver
   signaling with confidential feedback to sender; and direct path to
   sender signaling.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 1, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Trammell                  Expires April 1, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            Path Layer Mechanisms           September 2016

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Mechanism Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Sender-to-Path Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Path-to-Receiver Declarations with Feedback . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Direct Path-to-Sender Declarations  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Technical Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Cryptographic Context Bootstrapping . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Adding Integrity and Confidentiality Protection Along the
           Path  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Defending against On-Path Injection of Declarations . . .  10
     5.2.  Defending against Off-Path Injection of Declarations  . .  10
     5.3.  Defending against fingerprinting attacks and overexposure  10
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   The boundary between the network and transport layers was originally
   defined to be that between information used (and potentially
   modified) hop-by- hop, and that used end-to-end.  End-to-end
   information in the transport layer is associated with state at the
   endpoints, but processing of network-layer information was assumed to
   be stateless.

   The widespread deployment of network address and port translation
   (NAPT) in the Internet has eroded this boundary.  Since the first
   four bytes after the IP header or header chain - the source and
   destination ports - are frequently used for forwarding and access
   control decisions, and are routinely modified on path, they have de
   facto become part of the network layer.  In-network functions that
   exploit the fact that transport headers are in cleartext in the
   absence of widespread deployment of IPsec [RFC4301] further erode
   this boundary.

   Evolution above the network layer and integrity of transport layer
   functions is only possible if this layer boundary is reinforced.
   Asking on-path devices nicely not to muck about in the transport
   layer and below - stating in an RFC that devices on path MUST NOT use
   or modify some header field - has not proven to be of much use here.
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