Return Routability Check for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3
draft-tschofenig-tls-dtls-rrc-00

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Last updated 2019-07-08
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TLS                                                           T. Fossati
Internet-Draft                                        H. Tschofenig, Ed.
Updates: 6347 (if approved)                                  Arm Limited
Intended status: Standards Track                           July 08, 2019
Expires: January 9, 2020

           Return Routability Check for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3
                    draft-tschofenig-tls-dtls-rrc-00

Abstract

   This document specifies a return routability check for use in context
   of the Connection ID (CID) construct for the Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.

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Internet-Draft     DTLS Return Routability Check (RRC)         July 2019

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
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   than English.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Application Layer Return Routability Check  . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  The Return Routability Check Message  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  RRC Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix A.  History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix B.  Working Group Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix C.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   In "classical" DTLS, selecting a security context of an incoming DTLS
   record is accomplished with the help of the 5-tuple, i.e. source IP
   address, source port, transport protocol, destination IP address, and
   destination port.  Changes to this 5 tuple can happen for a variety
   reasons over the lifetime of the DTLS session.  In the IoT content
   NAT rebinding is a common reason with sleepy devices.  Other examples
   include end host mobility and multi-homing.  Without CID, if the
   source IP address and/or source port changes during the lifetime of
   an ongoing DTLS session then the receiver will be unable to locate
   the correct security context.  As a result, the DTLS handshake has to
   be re-run.

   A CID is an identifier carried in the record layer header of a DTLS
   datagram that gives the receiver additional information for selecting
   the appropriate security context.  The CID mechanism has been
   specified in [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id] for DTLS 1.2 and in
   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] for DTLS 1.3.

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