Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3
draft-urien-tls-im-04

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Pascal Urien 
Last updated 2021-01-16
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TLS Working Group                                            P. Urien 
  Internet Draft                                          Telecom Paris 
  Intended status: Experimental                                         
                                                                        
                                                        January 16 2021 
  Expires: June 2021 
 
                    Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 
                         draft-urien-tls-im-04.txt 
    
    
Abstract 
    
   TLS 1.3 will be deployed in the Internet of Things ecosystem. In 
   many IoT frameworks, TLS or DTLS protocols, based on pre-shared key 
   (PSK), are used for device authentication. So PSK tamper resistance, 
   is a critical market request, in order to prevent hijacking issues. 
   If DH exchange is used with certificate bound to DH ephemeral public 
   key, there is also a benefit to protect its signature procedure. The 
   TLS identity module (im) MAY be based on secure element; it realizes 
   some HKDF operations bound to PSK, and cryptographic signature if 
   certificates are used. Secure Element form factor could be 
   standalone chip, or embedded in SoC like eSIM. 
    
Requirements Language 
    
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 
    
Status of this Memo 
    
   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 
    
   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 
   Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 
   working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 
    
   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six 
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents 
   at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 
    
   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 2021. 
    
   . 

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Copyright Notice 
    
   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 
   document authors. All rights reserved. 
    
   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 
   publication of this document. Please review these documents 
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with 
   respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this 
   document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in 
   Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without 
   warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. 
    
    

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                 Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3    January 2021 
 
Table of Contents 
   Abstract........................................................... 1 
   Requirements Language.............................................. 1 
   Status of this Memo................................................ 1 
   Copyright Notice................................................... 2 
   1 Overview......................................................... 5 
   2 Protecting the Key Schedule for PSK.............................. 5 
      2.1 Context..................................................... 5 
      2.2 Identity Module Procedures.................................. 6 
      2.3 KSGS: Keys Secure Generation and Storage.................... 6 
      2.4 Identity Module Key Procedures (IMKP)....................... 6 
          2.4.1 CETS: Client Early Traffic Secret .................... 6 
          2.4.2 EEMS: Early Exporter Master Secret ................... 7 
          2.4.3 HEDSK: HKDF-Extract from Derived Secret Key .......... 7 
          2.4.4 HBSK: HMAC from Binder Key Secret .................... 7 
   3. Asymmetric Signature............................................ 7 
      3.1 GENKEY...................................................... 8 
      3.2 GETPUB...................................................... 8 
      3.3 SIGN........................................................ 8 
   4 Optional Procedures.............................................. 8 
      4.1 GENDHE...................................................... 8 
      4.2 GETEPK...................................................... 8 
      4.3 RAND........................................................ 8 
   5 Identity Module Procedures Summary............................... 9 
   6. Secure Element as Identity Module.............................. 10 
      6.1 Administrator mode......................................... 10 
      6.2 User Mode.................................................. 10 
      6.3 KSGS: Keys Secure Generation and Storage................... 10 
          6.3.1 Example ............................................. 11 
      6.4 CETS: Client Early Traffic Secret.......................... 11 
          6.4.1 Example ............................................. 11 
      6.5 EEMS: Early Exporter Master Secret......................... 11 
          6.5.1 Example ............................................. 12 
      6.6 HEDSK: HKDF-Extract from Derived Secret Key................ 12 
          6.6.1 Example ............................................. 12 
      6.7 HBSK: HMAC from Binder Key Secret.......................... 12 
          6.7.1 Example ............................................. 12 
      6.8 Signature Procedures....................................... 12 
          6.8.1 Keys Generation ..................................... 12 
          6.8.2 Keys Setting ........................................ 13 
          6.8.3 Signature ........................................... 14 
      6.9 GENDHE..................................................... 14 
          6.9.1 Example ............................................. 14 
      6.10 GETEPK.................................................... 14 
          6.10.1 Example ............................................ 14 
      6.11 RAND...................................................... 14 
          6.11.1 Example ............................................ 15 
   7. A simple Identity Module code for Javacard 3.04................ 15 
   8 IANA Considerations............................................. 32 
   9 Security Considerations......................................... 32 
   10 References..................................................... 32 

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                 Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3    January 2021 
 
      10.1 Normative References...................................... 32 
      10.2 Informative References.................................... 32 
   11 Authors' Addresses............................................. 32 
 

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1 Overview 
    
   TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] will be deployed in the Internet of Things 
   ecosystem. In many IoT frameworks, TLS or DTLS protocols, based on 
   pre-shared key (PSK), are used for device authentication. So PSK 
   tamper resistance, is a critical market request, in order to prevent 
   hijacking issues. If DH exchange is used with certificate bound to 
   DH ephemeral public key, there is also a benefit to protect its 
   signature procedure. The TLS identity module (im) MAY be based on 
   secure element [ISO7816]; it realizes some HKDF [RFC5869] operations 
   bound to PSK, and cryptographic signature if certificates are used. 
   Secure Element form factor could be standalone chip or embedded in 
   SOC like eSIM. 
    
                       +-----------+      +----------+ 
                       | Processor |      | Identity | 
                       |  TLS 1.3  +------+  Module  | 
                       |           |      |    im    | 
                       +-----------+      +----------+ 
    
   Figure 1. TLS 1.3 Identity Module (im) 
    
   The ISO7816 standards specify the binary encoding for ISO7816-4 
   commands and responses, refereed as Application Protocol Data Unit 
   (APDU). APDUs can be exchanged with secure elements according to 
   various transport protocols [GP-SPI-I2C] such as ISO7816-3 T=0, 
   ISO7816-3 T=1, Inter Integrated Circuit (I2C) or Serial Peripheral 
   Interface (SPI) 
    
2 Protecting the Key Schedule for PSK 
    
2.1 Context 
    
   According to [RFC8446] external PSKs MAY be provisioned outside of 
   TLS. 
    
   The Early Secret (ESK) is computed according to relation: 
   ESK =HKDF-Extract(salt=0s,PSK) = HMAC(salt=0s,PSK) 
    
   The Binder Key (BSK) for outside provisioning is computed according 
   to the relation: 
   BSK = Derive-Secret(ESK, "ext binder", "") 
    
   The Derived Secret (DSK) is computed according to the relation: 
   DSK= Derive-Secret(ESK, "derived", "") 
    
   The Finished External Key (FEK) is computed according to the 
   relation: 
   FEK = KDF-Expand-Label(BSK, "finished", "", Hash.length) 
    

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   For Derive-Secret procedures, "" is equivalent to the value 
   hash(empty), whose size is hash-length. 
    
2.2 Identity Module Procedures 
    
   The identity module MUST provide a "Keys Secure Generation and 
   Storage" (KSGS) procedure, which computes and securely stores ESK, 
   BSK and FEK keys. 
    
   The KSGS procedure MUST require administrative rights. 
    
   A set "Identity Module Key Procedures" (IMKP) of four procedures is 
   required, in order to protect from public exposure ESK, BSK, and 
   FEK: 
    
   - CETS: Client Early Traffic Secret 
   - EEMS: Early Exporter Master Secret 
   - HEDSK: HKDF-Extract from Derived Secret Key 
   - HBSK: HMAC from Binder Key Secret 
    
   These procedures MAY require user rights. 
    
2.3 KSGS: Keys Secure Generation and Storage 
    
   The Identity module MUST provide a KSGS procedure, requiring 
   administrative rights, which computes and securely stores ESK, BSK, 
   DSK, and FEK. The KSGS procedure uses with a hash function (for 
   example SHA256) identifies by an AlgoId attribute. 
    
   Input: AlgoId, salt, PSK 
   Output: Success or Failure 
    
   ESK, DSK, and BSK secret values are stored in the identity module. 
    
   HL16 : hash Length, 16 bits 
   HL8  : hash length, 8 bits 
   H0   : hash(empty) 
    
   ESK= HMAC(salt=0s,PSK) 
   DSK= HMAC(ESK,HL16||0d746c7331332064657269766564||HL8||H0||01) 
   BSK= HMAC(ESK,HL16||10746c733133206578742062696e646572||HL8||H0||01) 
   FEK= HMAC(BSK,HL16||0E746C7331332066696E69736865640001) 
    
    
2.4 Identity Module Key Procedures (IMKP) 
    
  2.4.1 CETS: Client Early Traffic Secret 
    
   Input: Length, Message 
   Output: Client Early Traffic Secret or Failure 
    

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   CETS(ClientHello) = Derive-Secret(ESK, "c e traffic", Message) 
   = HMAC(ESK, Length || 11746c733133206320652074726166666963 || 
   Message || 01) 
    
   Message is a hash value. 
    
  2.4.2 EEMS: Early Exporter Master Secret 
    
   Input: Length, Message 
   Output: Early Exporter Master Secret or Failure 
    
   EEMS(ClientHello) = Derive-Secret(ESK, "e exp master", Message) 
   = HMAC(ESK, Length || 12746c733133206520657870206d6173746572 || 
   Message || 01) 
    
   Message is a hash value 
    
  2.4.3 HEDSK: HKDF-Extract from Derived Secret Key 
    
   Input: DHE value 
   Output: Handshake Secret or Failure  
    
   HEDSK(DHE)= HKDF-Extract(salt=DSK,DHE) = HMAC(salt=DSK, DHE) 
    
  2.4.4 HBSK: HMAC from Binder Key Secret 
    
   Input: data 
   Output: HMAC(BSK, data) or Failure 
    
   HBSK(data) = HMAC(FEK, data) 
    
   Data is a hash value 
    
3. Asymmetric Signature 
    
   The identity module MUST provide a "Generate Key" (GENKEY) 
   procedure, in order to store or generate private asymmetric key and 
   associated public key. This procedure MUST require administrative 
   rights. 
    
   The procedure "Get Public Key" (GETPUB:) is required in order to 
   read the public key value. This procedure MAY require user rights. 
    
   The procedure "Signature" (SIGN) is required in order to perform a 
   raw signature for a digest value, computed from certificate. This 
   procedure MAY require user rights. 
    
   The symmetric algorithm is identified by the AlgoId attribute. The 
   key is identified by the KeyId attribute. 
    
    

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3.1 GENKEY 
    
   Input: AlgoId, KeyId 
   Output: Success or Failure 
    
   A private key is generated and stored in the identity module. A 
   public key is computed from the private key. 
    
3.2 GETPUB 
    
   Input: KeyId 
   Output: Public Key Value or Failure 
    
3.3 SIGN 
    
   Input: KeyId, DigestValue 
   Output: Signature Value or Failure 
    
    
4 Optional Procedures 
    
   In IoT context, the computing resources needed for supporting 
   cryptographic procedures such as elliptic curves or true random 
   number generators can be an issue. Optional procedures facilitate 
   TLS1.3 support in such devices. 
    
4.1 GENDHE 
    
   Input: AlgoId, PublicKey, KeyId 
   Output: The DHE value 
    
   A DHE is computed according to an input public key, and an algorithm 
   identifier. 
   An ephemerous public key EPK is generated, which is identified by 
   the KeyId attribute and can be retrieved by the GETEPK procedure. 
    
4.2 GETEPK 
    
   Input: KeyId 
   Output: Error or ephemerous public key 
    
   This procedure returns the ephemerous public key (EPK), identified 
   by the KeyId attribute, previously computed by GENDHE. 
    
4.3 RAND 
    
   Input: Number of random bytes, Nr 
   Output: Nr bytes 
    
   This procedure generates Nr random bytes 
    

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5 Identity Module Procedures Summary 
    
    
   First column: The procedure name 
   Second column: The procedure status Mandatory (M) or Optional (O) 
   for PSK or PKI (e.g. signature generation) 
   Third column: Input parameters 
   Fourth column: Output vale 
   Fifth column: The mode, ADMinistrator or USER 
    
    
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    |  Name  |Status |     Comment     |  Input  |    Output     |Mode| 
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    | KSGS   | M PSK | Compute Secrets | AlgoId  |  none         | ADM| 
    |        |       | from PSK        | Salt    |               |    | 
    |        |       |                 | PSK     |               |    | 
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    | GENKEY | M PKI | Generate Private| AlgoId  |   none        | ADM| 
    |        |       | and Public Key  | KeyId   |               |    | 
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    | CETS   | M PSK | Compute Early   | Length  | Client Early  |USER| 
    |        |       | Traffic Secret  | Message |Traffic Secret |    | 
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    | EEMS   | M PSK | Compute         | Length  | Early Exporter|USER| 
    |        |       | Early Exporter  | Message | Master Secret |    | 
    |        |       | Master Secret   |         |               |    | 
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    | HEDSK  | M PSK | Compute         |   DHE   | Handshake     |    | 
    |        |       | Handshake Secret|         | Secret        |USER| 
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    | HBSK   | M PSK | Compute HMAC For|   Data  | HMAC For      |    | 
    |        |       | Identity Binder |         |Identity Binder|USER| 
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    | GETPUB | M PKI | Read Public Key |  KeyId  | Public Key    |USER| 
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    |  SIGN  | M PKI | Compute         |  KeyId  | Public Key    |USER| 
    |        |       | Signature       |  Data   |               |    | 
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    | GENDHE |   O   | Generate Pub.Key| AlgoID  | DH Value      |USER| 
    |        |       | Compute DH      | PUB.Key |               |    | 
    |        |       |                 | KeyId   |               |    | 
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    | GETEPK |   O   | Read Ephemeris  | KeyId   | Public Key    |USER| 
    |        |       | Public Key      |         |               |    | 
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    |  RAND  |   O   | Generate        | Number  | Random Bytes  |USER| 
    |        |       | Random Bytes    |of Bytes |               |    | 
    +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ 
    
    

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6. Secure Element as Identity Module 
    
   Secure elements are defined according to [ISO7816] standards. They 
   support hash functions (sha256, sha384, sha512) and associated HMAC 
   procedures. They also provide DH procedures in Z/pZ* groups, and 
   elliptic curves. Open software can be released thanks to the 
   Javacard standards, such as JC3.04, JC3.05, JC3.1. 
    
   This section is an illustration of binary encoding rules for secure 
   element according to the T=1 ISO7816 protocol. 
    
   An ISO7816 command (TAPDU) is a set of bytes comprising a five bytes 
   header and an optional payload (up to 255 bytes) 
    
   The header comprises the following five bytes 
   - CLA, Class 
   - INS, Instruction code 
   - P1,  P1 byte 
   - P2,  P2 byte 
   - P3,  length of the payload, or number of expected bytes 
    
   The response comprises a payload (up to 255 bytes) and a two bytes 
   status word SW=(SW1, SW2), 9000 meaning successful operation. 
    
6.1 Administrator mode 
    
   The [ISO7816] command VERIFY (INS=0x20) SHOULD be used to enter the 
   administrative mode. 
    
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=20 P1=00 P2=Adm P3=PIN-Length [PIN-Value] 
   Rx: 9000 
    
6.2 User Mode 
    
   The [ISO7816] command VERIFY SHOULD be used to enter the user mode 
    
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=20 P1=00 P2=User P3=PIN-Length [PIN-Value] 
   Rx: 9000 
    
    
6.3 KSGS: Keys Secure Generation and Storage 
    
   Length= 2 + Salt-Length + PSK-Length 
    
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=TLS13 P1=AlgoId P2=KSGS P3=Length Salt-Length [Salt-
   Value] PSK-Length [PSK-Value] 
   Rx: 9000 
    
   This procedure computes and stores ESK, BSK DSK and FEK. 
    

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  6.3.1 Example 
    
   PSK=0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20 
    
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=85 P1=00 P2=0A P3=23 01 00 20 
   0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20 
   Rx:9000 
    
   Sha256(empty) = 
   E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649B934CA495991B7852B855 
    
   ESK= HMAC-SHA256(0,PSK) 
   ESK= 23499E7EDF0FBE6BAA137DF0F23BECAEF722AD19FC262855409DE8CD8B3C897 
    
   DSK= HMAC-SHA256(ESK,0020 0d746c7331332064657269766564 20 
   E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649B934CA495991B7852B855 01) 
   DSK=E8E7AC087158FC8440E41A12989F9194783764CD5FC36564028037F2C8206E96 
    
   BSK = HMAC-SHA256(ESK,0020 10746c733133206578742062696e646572 20 
   E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649B934CA495991B7852B855 01) 
   BSK=4351F8A53AA85AC394AB04C516464CAB96E9340C269632D09899537887EE651F 
    
   FEK= HMAC-256(BSK, 0020 0E746C7331332066696E6973686564 00 01) 
   FEK=FCA24690D17DDE3F727D29D2186A5F83E1AEBD4889A4841793139168A65BFCB0 
    
6.4 CETS: Client Early Traffic Secret 
    
   Length = 2 + Messages-Length 
   Hash-Length: the hash length (2 bytes) 
    
   Tx: CLA INS=TLS13 P1=CETS P2=ESK P3=Length Hash-Length Messages-
   Length [Messages] 
   Rx:[Client Early Traffic Secret] SW 
    
  6.4.1 Example 
    
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=85 P1=00 P2=0B P3=03 0020 00 
   Rx: 0738A2B6F6FAA2AF5CDD9B6F0F2B232F19B3256A5926EAC600B911F91E98D2D4 
   9000 
    
   Message= NULL = 0s 
   [Client Early Traffic Secret] =  
   HMAC-SHA256(ESK, 0020 11746c733133206320652074726166666963 00 01) 
    
    
6.5 EEMS: Early Exporter Master Secret 
    
   Length = 2 + Messages-Length 
   Hash-Length: the hash length (2 bytes) 
    

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   Tx: CLA INS=TLS13 P1=EEMS P2=ESK P3=Length Hash-Length Messages-
   Length [Messages] 
   Rx: [Early Exporter Master Secret] SW 
    
    
  6.5.1 Example 
    
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=85 P1=01 P2=0B P3=03 0020 00 
   Rx: 9B7FC6A8F854C16A301DFC566859931DB5EE9A22793142A0C67159C445E7BEAB 
   9000 
    
   Message= NULL = 0s 
   [Early Exporter Master Secret] = 
   HMAC-SHA256(ESK, 0020 12746c733133206520657870206d6173746572 00 01) 
    
6.6 HEDSK: HKDF-Extract from Derived Secret Key 
    
   Tx: CLA INS=TLS13 P1=0 P2=HEDSK P3=Data-Length [Data] 
   Rx: [HMAC(Data,DSK)] SW 
    
  6.6.1 Example 
    
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=85 P1=00 P2=0E P3=01 00 
   Rx: 7092C2117D67E6AEB5C5FDF5E6D9C70FBDC69B374E914C26AB08A122483D0E73 
    
   DHE=NULL=0s 
   HMAC-256(DSK,DHE)= HMAC-256(DSK,0s) 
    
6.7 HBSK: HMAC from Binder Key Secret 
    
   Tx: CLA INS=TLS13 P1=0 P2=HBSK P3=Data-Length [Data] 
   Rx: [HMAC(FEK,data)] SW 
    
  6.7.1 Example 
    
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=85 P1=00 P2=0C P3=01 00 
   Rx: 3E015D850B89C2470D4C49D4BD8E7C76F2B74175DDD85F393569315DA15480A4 
    
   Data=NULL=0s 
   HMAC-256(FEK,Data)= HMAC-256(DSK,0s) 
    
6.8 Signature Procedures 
    
  6.8.1 Keys Generation 
    
   Select Identity Module Application (AID= 010203040500) 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=A4 P1=04 P2=00 P3=06 01 02 03 04 05 00 
   Rx: 9000 
    
    
   Verify Administrator PIN (PIN= "00000000") 

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   Tx: CLA=00 INS=20 P1=00 P2=01 P3=08 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
   Rx: 9000 
    
   Clear Key (P2=KeyId=0) 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=81 P1=00 P2=00 P3=00 
   Rx: 9000 
    
   Init Curve secp256r1 (P1 = idCurve, P2=KeyId) 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=89 P1=00 P2=00 P3=00 
   Rx: 9000 
    
   GenKey (P2=KeyId) 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=82 P1=00 P2=00 P3=00 
   Rx:9000 
    
   Read PublicKey (P2=KeyId) 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=84 P1=06 P2=00 P3=00 
   Rx: 0041049E92726E24A548BB69ADA51103F265AA9B9F304E25971427D79EFAF471 
       889CCC52FD8B05A729A400105C06AF99592535A4EDF338B5A37BB6089D3B11E7 
       1B847B 9000 
    
   Read PrivateKey (P2= KeyId) 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=84 P1=07 P2=00 p3=00 
   Rx: 00208E8793D5C399659D8A35B585534B5D9D0FAB37AD3FC7E8B43373C4BAD81E 
       9000 
    
  6.8.2 Keys Setting 
    
   Select Identity Module Application (AID= 010203040500) 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=A4 P1=04 P2=00 P3=06 01 02 03 04 05 00 
   Rx: 9000 
    
   Verify Administrator PIN (PIN= "00000000") 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=20 P1=00 P2=01 P3=08 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
   Rx: 9000 
    
   Clear Key (P2=KeyId=0) 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=81 P1=00 P2=00 P3=00 
   Rx: 9000 
    
   Init Curve secp256r1 (P1 = idCurve, P2=KeyId) 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=89 P1=00 P2=00 P3=00 
   Rx: 9000 
    
   Set PrivateKey (P2=KeyId) 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=88 P1=07 P2=00 P3=20 
   2e86bdd6d3b241ddbd00999f6a0ac1cb546d2bfb55744dca40f0268ac2bf7338 
   Rx: 9000 
    
   Set PublicKey (P2=KeyId) 

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   Tx: CLA=00 INS=88 P1=06 P2=00 P3=41 
   045c8c90d0859dd96c722a589c4b62047ff01323cc74383e0e8eb80bea4ea45e55b8
   5499abd39d719885e874ed3f6327960d519ba25423c3fbdc14e6fd0cd5edee 
   Rx: 9000 
    
  6.8.3 Signature 
    
   Select Identity Module Application (AID= 010203040500) 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=A4 P1=04 P2=00 P3=06 01 02 03 04 05 00 
   Rx: 9000 
   Verify User PIN (PIN= "0000") 
   CLA=00 INS=20 P1=00 P2=00 P3=04 30 30 30 30 
    
   ECDSA secp256r1 Signature (P2=KeyId) 
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=80 P1=00 P2=00 P3=20 
   0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF 
   Rx: 0047304502206BB1B02742C90B5FEAD3EF34F87B49D2A87F846F0368D0DBB3A 
       0E9D9F3ABC450022100A0178CDE84FB9ACA4662ECC68638437D46EC27B69657 
       8F8080E43ACCA4B35586 
    
6.9 GENDHE 
    
   Tx: CLA INS=GENDHE P1=AlgoId P2=KeyId P3=Key-Length [Public Key] 
   Rx: [DHE] SW 
    
  6.9.1 Example 
    
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=8A P1=00=Secp256r1 P2=FF P3=41 
   4104C4B5F7682C374AAD1C9125C2F225D343A8986C8E0A475E4003F6C98DA13F99 
   9E80A55E66F0644E84F7F6503615B9EC4CB7C2844AF6BE7F9091BF319B0291A2D8 
   Rx: 1BEE561B95F9EC99EE0E49F28E415D4F74580ACB8D9E0019BD3A7974FF3148E5 
    
    
6.10 GETEPK 
    
   Tx: CLA INS=GETEPK P1=06 P2=KeyId P3=2+Key-length 
   Rx: [Key-Length] [Public Key] SW 
    
  6.10.1 Example 
    
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=84 P1=06 P2=FF P3=43 
   Rx: 004104CD8EF9695FAC953D89B9C91B994DC77F3140BDEDF54AABF63521548AB9 
   8031942C829FC5D958F143AA09E622E6CB190D7A91773E1794F792E1D4D7E1B84603
   FF9000 
    
6.11 RAND 
    
   Tx: CLA INS=RAND P1=00 P2=00 P3=[Number-Of-bytes] 
   Rx: [Number-Of-Bytes] SW 
    

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  6.11.1 Example 
    
   Tx: CLA=00 INS=8B P1=00 P2=00 P3=20 
   Rx: 85DEE2DD24BF79D8CCB6D21C1F515CE040A2E13B8C98177822BD3B66876CD9A1 
   9000 
    
7. A simple Identity Module code for Javacard 3.04 
    
    
   An example of TLS-IM code is available at [IM-JC]. 
    
    
    

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   package im; 
    
   import javacard.framework.*; 
   import javacard.security.* ; 
   import javacardx.crypto.*  ; 
    
   public class im extends Applet 
   {   
   final static byte  INS_SIGN             = (byte)  0x80 ; 
   final static byte  INS_CLEAR_KEYPAIR    = (byte)  0x81 ; 
   final static byte  INS_GEN_KEYPAIR      = (byte)  0x82 ; 
   final static byte  INS_GET_KEY_PARAM    = (byte)  0x84 ; 
   final static byte  INS_HMAC             = (byte)  0x85 ; 
   final static byte  INS_GET_STATUS       = (byte)  0x87 ; 
   final static byte  INS_SET_KEY_PARAM    = (byte)  0x88 ; 
   final static byte  INS_INIT_CURVE       = (byte)  0x89 ; 
   final static byte  INS_SELECT           = (byte)  0xA4 ; 
   public final static byte INS_VERIFY     = (byte)  0x20 ; 
   public final static byte INS_CHANGE_PIN = (byte)  0x24 ; 
    
   public final static short N_KEYS     = (short) 16; 
   public final static byte[] VERSION= {(byte)1,(byte)0}; 
    
   KeyPair[] ECCkp      = null ; 
   Signature ECCsig     = null ; 
   MessageDigest sha256 = null ; 
    
   short status=0  ; 
   byte [] DB = null                             ; 
   public final static short DBSIZE = (short)320 ; 
    
   private static OwnerPIN UserPin=null; 
    
   private static final  byte[]   MyPin = 
   {(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30, 
    (byte)0xFF,(byte)0xFF,(byte)0xFF,(byte)0xFF}; 
    
   private static OwnerPIN AdminPin=null; 
    
   private static final byte[]  OpPin = 
   {(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30, 
    (byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30}; 
    
   private final static short SW_VERIFICATION_FAILED  = (short)0x6300; 
   private final static short SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED  = 
   (short)0x6380; 
   final static  short SW_KPUB_DEFINED    = (short)0x6401; 
   final static  short SW_KPRIV_DEFINED   = (short)0x6402; 
   final static  short SW_KPRIV_UNDEFINED = (short)0x6403; 

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   final static  short SW_GENKEY_ERROR    = (short)0x6D10; 
   final static  short SW_SIGN_ERROR      = (short)0x6D20; 
   final static  short SW_DUMP_KEYS_PAIR  = (short)0x6D30; 
   final static  short SW_SET_KEY_PARAM   = (short)0x6D40; 
    
   private final static byte [] ParamA1 = 
   {(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, 
   (byte)0x00,(byte)0x01,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, 
   (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, 
   (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff, 
   (byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff, 
   (byte)0xff,(byte)0xfc}; 
    
   private final static byte [] ParamB1 = 
   {(byte)0x5a,(byte)0xc6,(byte)0x35,(byte)0xd8,(byte)0xaa,(byte)0x3a, 
   (byte)0x93,(byte)0xe7,(byte)0xb3,(byte)0xeb,(byte)0xbd,(byte)0x55, 
   (byte)0x76,(byte)0x98,(byte)0x86,(byte)0xbc,(byte)0x65,(byte)0x1d, 
   (byte)0x06,(byte)0xb0,(byte)0xcc,(byte)0x53,(byte)0xb0,(byte)0xf6, 
   (byte)0x3b,(byte)0xce,(byte)0x3c,(byte)0x3e,(byte)0x27,(byte)0xd2, 
   (byte)0x60,(byte)0x4b}; 
    
   private final static byte [] ParamField1= 
   {(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, 
   (byte)0x00,(byte)0x01,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, 
   (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, 
   (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff, 
   (byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff, 
   (byte)0xff,(byte)0xff}; 
    
   private final static byte [] ParamG1=  
   {(byte)0x04,(byte)0x6b,(byte)0x17,(byte)0xd1,(byte)0xf2,(byte)0xe1, 
   (byte)0x2c,(byte)0x42,(byte)0x47,(byte)0xf8,(byte)0xbc,(byte)0xe6, 
   (byte)0xe5,(byte)0x63,(byte)0xa4,(byte)0x40,(byte)0xf2,(byte)0x77, 
   (byte)0x03,(byte)0x7d,(byte)0x81,(byte)0x2d,(byte)0xeb,(byte)0x33, 
   (byte)0xa0,(byte)0xf4,(byte)0xa1,(byte)0x39,(byte)0x45,(byte)0xd8, 
   (byte)0x98,(byte)0xc2,(byte)0x96,(byte)0x4f,(byte)0xe3,(byte)0x42, 
   (byte)0xe2,(byte)0xfe,(byte)0x1a,(byte)0x7f,(byte)0x9b,(byte)0x8e, 
   (byte)0xe7,(byte)0xeb,(byte)0x4a,(byte)0x7c,(byte)0x0f,(byte)0x9e, 
   (byte)0x16,(byte)0x2b,(byte)0xce,(byte)0x33,(byte)0x57,(byte)0x6b, 
   (byte)0x31,(byte)0x5e,(byte)0xce,(byte)0xcb,(byte)0xb6,(byte)0x40, 
   (byte)0x68,(byte)0x37,(byte)0xbf,(byte)0x51,(byte)0xf5}; 
    
   private final static short ParamK1 = (short) 0x0001; 
    
   private final static byte [] ParamR1= 
   {(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, 
   (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff, 
   (byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xbc,(byte)0xe6, 
   (byte)0xfa,(byte)0xad,(byte)0xa7,(byte)0x17,(byte)0x9e,(byte)0x84, 
   (byte)0xf3,(byte)0xb9,(byte)0xca,(byte)0xc2,(byte)0xfc,(byte)0x63, 
   (byte)0x25,(byte)0x51}; 

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   private byte []   ESK = new byte[32]; // Early Secret Key 
   private byte []   HSK = new byte[32]; // Handshake Secret Key 
   private byte []  eBSK = new byte[32]; // Binder Secret Key 
   private byte []  rBSK = new byte[32]; // Binder Secret Key 
   private byte [] feBSK = new byte[32]; // Finished Binder Secret Key 
   private byte [] frBSK = new byte[32]; // Finished Binder Secret Key 
    
   private final static byte  EXTRACT_EARLY  =  (byte)0x0A; 
   private final static byte  EXPAND_EARLY   =  (byte)0x0B; 
   private final static byte  HMAC_EBSK      =  (byte)0x0C; 
   private final static byte  HMAC_RBSK      =  (byte)0x0D; 
   private final static byte  EXTRACT_HANDSHAKE =  (byte)0x0E; 
    
   private byte [] derived = 
   {(byte)0x00,(byte)32,(byte)13,(byte)'t',(byte)'l',(byte)'s', 
   (byte)'1',(byte)'3',(byte)' ',(byte)'d',(byte)'e',(byte)'r', 
   (byte)'i',(byte)'v',(byte)'e',(byte)'d', 
   (byte)0x20,(byte)0xE3,(byte)0xB0,(byte)0xC4,(byte)0x42,(byte)0x98, 
   (byte)0xFC,(byte)0x1C,(byte)0x14,(byte)0x9A,(byte)0xFB,(byte)0xF4, 
   (byte)0xC8,(byte)0x99,(byte)0x6F,(byte)0xB9,(byte)0x24,(byte)0x27, 
   (byte)0xAE,(byte)0x41,(byte)0xE4,(byte)0x64,(byte)0x9B,(byte)0x93, 
   (byte)0x4C,(byte)0xA4,(byte)0x95,(byte)0x99,(byte)0x1B,(byte)0x78, 
   (byte)0x52,(byte)0xB8,(byte)0x55,(byte)1}; 
    
   private byte [] ext_binder = 
   {(byte)0x00,(byte)32,(byte)16,(byte)'t',(byte)'l',(byte)'s', 
   (byte)'1',(byte)'3',(byte)' ',(byte)'e',(byte)'x',(byte)'t',  
   (byte)' ',(byte)'b',(byte)'i',(byte)'n',(byte)'d',(byte)'e', 
   (byte)'r',(byte)0x20,(byte)0xE3,(byte)0xB0,(byte)0xC4,(byte)0x42, 
   (byte)0x98,(byte)0xFC,(byte)0x1C,(byte)0x14,(byte)0x9A,(byte)0xFB, 
   (byte)0xF4,(byte)0xC8,(byte)0x99,(byte)0x6F,(byte)0xB9,(byte)0x24, 
   (byte)0x27,(byte)0xAE,(byte)0x41,(byte)0xE4,(byte)0x64,(byte)0x9B, 
   (byte)0x93,(byte)0x4C,(byte)0xA4,(byte)0x95,(byte)0x99,(byte)0x1B, 
   (byte)0x78,(byte)0x52,(byte)0xB8,(byte)0x55,(byte)0x01}; 
    
   private byte [] res_binder   = 
   {(byte)0x00,(byte)32,(byte)16,(byte)'t',(byte)'l',(byte)'s', 
   (byte)'1',(byte)'3',(byte)' ',(byte)'r',(byte)'e',(byte)'s',  
   (byte)' ',(byte)'b',(byte)'i',(byte)'n',(byte)'d',(byte)'e', 
   (byte)'r',(byte)0x00,(byte)0x01}; 
    
   private byte [] c_e_traffic  =  
   {(byte)17,(byte)'t',(byte)'l',(byte)'s',(byte)'1',(byte)'3',  
   (byte)' ',(byte)'c',(byte)' ',(byte)'e',(byte)' ',(byte)'t', 
   (byte)'r',(byte)'a',(byte)'f',(byte)'f',(byte)'i',(byte)'c'}; 
    
    
    
    

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   private byte [] c_exp_master =  
   {(byte)18,(byte)'t',(byte)'l',(byte)'s',(byte)'1',(byte)'3',  
   (byte)' ',(byte)'e',(byte)' ',(byte)'e',(byte)'x',(byte)'p',  
   (byte)' ',(byte)'m',(byte)'a',(byte)'s',(byte)'t',(byte)'e', 
   (byte)'r'}; 
    
   private byte [] finished = 
   {(byte)0x00,(byte)32,(byte)14,(byte)'t',(byte)'l',(byte)'s', 
   (byte)'1',(byte)'3',(byte)' ',(byte)'f',(byte)'i',(byte)'n', 
   (byte)'i',(byte)'s', (byte)'h',(byte)'e',(byte)'d',(byte)0, 
   (byte)1}; 
    
    
   public void process(APDU apdu) throws ISOException 
   { short adr=0,len=0,index=0,readCount=0; 
    
   byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer() ; 
    
   byte cla = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_CLA]; 
   byte ins = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_INS]; 
   byte P1  = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_P1] ; 
   byte P2  = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_P2] ; 
   byte P3  = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_LC] ; 
    
   adr = Util.makeShort(P1,P2)       ; 
   len = Util.makeShort((byte)0,P3)  ; 
    
   switch (ins) 
   { 
    
   case INS_SELECT:  
   readCount = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); 
   return; 
    
   case INS_GET_STATUS: 
   Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(VERSION,(short)0,buffer,(short)0,(short)VERS
   ION.length); 
   Util.setShort(buffer,(short)VERSION.length,status); 
   apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(2+VERSION.length)); 
   break; 
    
   case INS_VERIFY: 
   readCount = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); 
   if (P2 == (byte)1) 
   {  if (readCount != (short)8) 
      ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); 
      verify(AdminPin,buffer) ; 
      if(AdminPin.isValidated()) UserPin.resetAndUnblock(); 
    
    
    

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   else if (P2 == (byte)0xFF) 
   {  if (readCount != (short)8) 
      ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); 
      verify(AdminPin,buffer) ; 
      if(AdminPin.isValidated())  
      {  UserPin.resetAndUnblock(); 
         UserPin.update(MyPin,(short)0,(byte)8) ; 
      } 
   } 
   } 
   else if (P2 == (byte)0) 
   {  if (readCount > (short)8) 
      ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); 
      verify(UserPin,buffer); 
   } 
   else 
   ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_P1P2); 
   break; 
    
    
   case INS_CHANGE_PIN: 
   readCount = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive() ; 
   if (readCount != (short)16) 
   ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH);  
   buffer[4]=(byte)8; 
   if (P2 == (byte)1) 
   {  verify(AdminPin,buffer) ; 
      AdminPin.update(buffer,(short)13,(byte)8); 
   } 
   else if  (P2 == (byte)0) 
   {  verify(UserPin,buffer)  ; 
      UserPin.update(buffer,(short)13,(byte)8); 
   } 
   else 
   ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_P1P2); 
   break; 
    
    
   case INS_HMAC: 
    
    
   readCount = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); 
   len = Util.makeShort((byte)0,buffer[(short)4]);  
    
   if (len != readCount) 
   ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CORRECT_LENGTH_00); 
    
   else if ( (!AdminPin.isValidated()) && (!UserPin.isValidated()) ) 
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED); 
    
    

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   if (P2 == (byte)2) // Compute HMAC 
   {  len = Util.makeShort((byte)0,buffer[(short)5]) ; 
      hmac(buffer, (short)6, len, buffer, (short)(7+len), 
           Util.makeShort((byte)0, buffer[(short)(6+len)]), 
           sha256, buffer,(short)0,true); 
      apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)sha256.getLength()); 
   } 
    
   else if (P2 == EXTRACT_EARLY) 
   { len = Util.makeShort((byte)0,buffer[(short)5]); //HMAC: key-length 
     hmac(buffer,(short)6,len,buffer,(short)(7+len), 
           Util.makeShort((byte)0,buffer[(short)(6+len)]), 
           sha256, buffer,(short)0,true); 
      Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,ESK,(short)0, 
                              (short)ESK.length);  
      Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,buffer,(short)32, 
                              (short)32); 
    
    
      hmac(ESK,(short)0,(short)ESK.length, 
           derived,(short)0,(short)derived.length, 
           sha256, 
           buffer,(short)0,true); 
      Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,HSK,(short)0, 
                              (short)HSK.length);   
      Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,buffer,(short)64, 
                              (short)32); 
    
    
      hmac(ESK,(short)0,(short)ESK.length, 
           ext_binder,(short)0,(short)ext_binder.length, 
           sha256, 
           buffer,(short)0,true); 
       Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,eBSK,(short)0, 
                               (short)eBSK.length);   
       Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,buffer,(short)96, 
                               (short)32); 
    
    
       hmac(ESK,(short)0,(short)ESK.length, 
            res_binder,(short)0,(short)res_binder.length, 
            sha256, 
            buffer,(short)0,true); 
       Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,rBSK,(short)0, 
                               (short)rBSK.length);   
       Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,buffer,(short)128, 
                               (short)32); 
    
    
    

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       hmac(eBSK,(short)0,(short)eBSK.length, 
            finished,(short)0,(short)finished.length, 
            sha256, 
            buffer,(short)0,true); 
       Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,feBSK,(short)0, 
                               (short)feBSK.length);   
       Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,buffer,(short)160, 
                               (short)32); 
    
    
       hmac(rBSK,(short)0,(short)rBSK.length, 
                  finished,(short)0,(short)finished.length, 
                  sha256, 
                  buffer,(short)0,true); 
       Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,frBSK,(short)0, 
                              (short)frBSK.length);   
       Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,buffer,(short)192, 
                              (short)32); 
    
       If (P1==(byte)0xFF) 
       apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)32,(short)192); 
       return ; 
   } 
    
   else if (P2 == EXPAND_EARLY) 
   {  len = Util.makeShort((byte)0,buffer[(short)7]);  // data length 
      if (P1 == (byte)0) 
      { 
       Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)5,buffer,(short)0, 
                                      (short)2); 
       Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)7, 
                               buffer,(short)(2+ c_e_traffic.length), 
                               (short)(readCount-2)); 
       Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(c_e_traffic,(short)0,buffer,(short)2, 
                               (short)c_e_traffic.length); 
       buffer[(short)(readCount + c_e_traffic.length)] = (byte)0x01; 
       hmac(ESK,(short)0,(short)ESK.length, 
            buffer,(short)0,(short)(readCount+c_e_traffic.length+1), 
            sha256, 
            buffer,(short)0,true); 
            apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)32); 
            return; 
       } 
       else if (P1 == (byte)1) 
       { 
        Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)5,buffer,(short)0, 
                                (short)2); 
        Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)7,buffer, 
                                short)(2+ c_exp_master.length), 
                                (short)(readCount-2)); 

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        Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(c_exp_master,(short)0,buffer,(short)2, 
                                (short)c_exp_master.length); 
        buffer[(short)(readCount + c_exp_master.length)] = (byte)0x01; 
        hmac(ESK,(short)0,(short)ESK.length, 
             buffer,(short)0,(short)(readCount+c_exp_master.length+1), 
             sha256, 
             buffer,(short)0,true); 
        apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)32);  
        return; 
       } 
       else  
       ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2); 
    
   else if ( P2 == HMAC_RBSK) 
   {  hmac(frBSK,(short)0,(short)rBSK.length, 
           buffer,(short)5,readCount, 
           sha256, 
           buffer,(short)0,true); 
           apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)sha256.getLength()); 
   } 
    
   else if (P2 == HMAC_EBSK) 
   {  hmac(feBSK,(short)0,(short)eBSK.length, 
           buffer,(short)5,readCount, 
           sha256, 
           buffer,(short)0,true); 
           apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)sha256.getLength()); 
   } 
    
   else if (P2 == EXTRACT_HANDSHAKE ) 
   {  hmac(HSK,(short)0,(short)HSK.length, 
           buffer,(short)5,readCount, 
           sha256, 
           buffer,(short)0,true); 
           apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)32); 
   } 
    
   else 
   ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2); 
   break; 
    
    
   case INS_SIGN: 
   readCount = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive();   
   if ( (!AdminPin.isValidated()) && (!UserPin.isValidated()) ) 
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED); 
    
   index= Util.makeShort((byte)0,P2); 
   if ( (index <0) || (index >= N_KEYS)) 
   ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
   if (!ECCkp[index].getPublic().isInitialized()) 

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   ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPUB_DEFINED); 
   if (!ECCkp[index].getPrivate().isInitialized()) 
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPRIV_DEFINED); 
    
   switch (P1) 
   { 
    case (byte)0: // RAW 256 bits 
    case (byte)33:// ALG_ECDSA_SHA_256 
                  len= EccSign(ECCkp[index],buffer,P1) ; 
                  apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,len); 
                  break; 
    default: 
            ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2); 
            break; 
   } 
   break; 
    
    
   case INS_CLEAR_KEYPAIR: 
    
   if ( !AdminPin.isValidated())  
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED); 
   index= Util.makeShort((byte)0,P2); 
   if ( (index <0) || (index >= N_KEYS)) 
   ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED);   
   if (ECCkp[index].getPublic().isInitialized()) 
   ECCkp[index].getPublic().clearKey(); 
   if (ECCkp[index].getPrivate().isInitialized()) 
   ECCkp[index].getPrivate().clearKey();  
   break; 
    
   case INS_GEN_KEYPAIR: // Generate KeyPair 
    
   if ( !AdminPin.isValidated())  
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED); 
   index= Util.makeShort((byte)0,P2); 
   if ( (index <0) || (index >= N_KEYS)) 
   ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
   if (ECCkp[index].getPublic().isInitialized()) 
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPUB_DEFINED); 
   if (ECCkp[index].getPrivate().isInitialized()) 
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPRIV_DEFINED); 
   len=this.GenECCkp(ECCkp[index]); 
   break; 
    
   case INS_GET_KEY_PARAM: 
    
   if ( (!AdminPin.isValidated()) && (!UserPin.isValidated())  ) 
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED);  
   index= Util.makeShort((byte)0,P2); 
   if ( (index <0) || (index >= N_KEYS)) 

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   ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
   if ( (P1 == (byte)7) && !AdminPin.isValidated())  
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED); 
   if ( (P1 == (byte)6) && !ECCkp[index].getPublic().isInitialized()) 
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPUB_DEFINED); 
   if ( (P1 == (byte)7) && !ECCkp[index].getPrivate().isInitialized()) 
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPRIV_DEFINED) 
   try 
   {  switch (P1) 
      {  case 0: 
          len= ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
                .getA(buffer,(short)(2)); 
          Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); 
          apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); 
          break; 
    
          case 1: 
          len= ((ECPublicKey) ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
                .getB(buffer,(short)(2)); 
          Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); 
          apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); 
          break; 
    
          case 2: 
          len= ((ECPublicKey) ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
                .getField(buffer,(short)(2)); 
          Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); 
          apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); 
          break; 
    
          case 3: 
          len= ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
                 .getG(buffer,(short)(2)); 
          Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); 
          apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); 
          break; 
    
          case 4: 
          len= ((ECPublicKey) ECCkp[index].getPublic()).getK(); 
          Util.setShort(buffer,(short)2,len); 
          Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,(short)2); 
          apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)4);           
          break; 
    
          case 5: 
          len= ((ECPublicKey) ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
                .getR(buffer,(short)(2)); 
          Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); 
          apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); 
          break; 
    

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          case (byte)6: 
          len= ((ECPublicKey) ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
                .getW(buffer,(short)(2)); 
          Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); 
          apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); 
          break; 
    
          case (byte)7: 
          len= ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
                .getS(buffer,(short)(2)); 
          Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); 
          apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); 
          break; 
    
          default: 
          ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2); 
          break; 
      } 
   } 
   catch (CryptoException e) 
   {ISOException.throwIt(SW_DUMP_KEYS_PAIR); 
    break; 
   } 
    
   break; 
    
    
   case INS_SET_KEY_PARAM: 
    
   readCount = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive();  
    
   if ( !AdminPin.isValidated())  
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED); 
   index= Util.makeShort((byte)0,P2); 
   if ( (index <0) || (index >= N_KEYS)) 
   ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
   if ( (P1 == (byte)6) && ECCkp[index].getPublic().isInitialized()) 
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPUB_DEFINED); 
   if ( (P1 == (byte)7) && ECCkp[index].getPrivate().isInitialized()) 
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPRIV_DEFINED); 
    
   try 
   {  switch (P1) 
      { case (byte)0: 
        ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
          .setA(buffer,(short)5,len); 
        ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
         .setA(buffer,(short)5,len); 
        break; 
    

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        case (byte)1: 
        ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
         .setB(buffer,(short)5,len); 
        ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
         .setB(buffer,(short)5,len); 
        break; 
    
        case (byte)2: 
        ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
        .setFieldFP(buffer,(short)5,len) ; 
        ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
        .setFieldFP(buffer,(short)5,len); 
        break; 
    
        case (byte)3: 
        ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
         .setG(buffer,(short)5,len) ; 
        ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
         .setG(buffer,(short)5,len); 
        break; 
    
        case (byte)4: 
        ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
         .setK(Util.makeShort(buffer[5],buffer[6])) ; 
        ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
         .setK(Util.makeShort(buffer[5],buffer[6])); 
        break; 
    
        case (byte)5: 
        ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
         .setR(buffer,(short)5,len); 
        ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
         .setR(buffer,(short)5,len); 
        break; 
         
        case (byte)6: 
        ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
         .setW(buffer,(short)5,len) ; 
        break; 
    
        case (byte)7: 
        ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
         .setS(buffer,(short)5,len); 
        break;  
    
        default: 
        ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2); 
        break; 
       } 
   } 

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   catch (CryptoException e) 
   {ISOException.throwIt(SW_SET_KEY_PARAM); 
    break; 
   } 
    
   break; 
    
    
   case INS_INIT_CURVE: 
    
   if ( !AdminPin.isValidated())  
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED);  
   index= Util.makeShort((byte)0,P2); 
   if ( (index <0) || (index >= N_KEYS)) 
   ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
   if ( (P1 == (byte)6) && ECCkp[index].getPublic().isInitialized() ) 
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPUB_DEFINED); 
   if ((P1 == (byte)7) && ECCkp[index].getPrivate().isInitialized()) 
   ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPRIV_DEFINED); 
    
   switch((byte)P1) 
   {  case (byte)0: 
      case (byte)1: 
      (ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
       .setA(ParamA1,(short)0,(short)ParamA1.length) ; 
      ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
       .setA(ParamA1,(short)0,(short)ParamA1.length); 
      ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
       .setB(ParamB1,(short)0,(short)ParamB1.length) ; 
      ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
       .setB(ParamB1,(short)0,(short)ParamB1.length); 
       ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
       .setFieldFP(ParamField1,(short)0,(short)ParamField1.length); 
      ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
       .setFieldFP(ParamField1,(short)0,(short)ParamField1.length); 
      ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
       .setG(ParamG1,(short)0,(short)ParamG1.length) ; 
      ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
       .setG(ParamG1,(short)0,(short)ParamG1.length); 
      ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
       .setK(ParamK1) ; 
      ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
       .setK(ParamK1); 
      ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) 
       .setR(ParamR1,(short)0,(short)ParamR1.length) ; 
      ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) 
       .setR(ParamR1,(short)0,(short)ParamR1.length); 
       break;  
    
    

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      default: 
      ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2); 
      break; 
     } 
   break; 
    
   default: 
   ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
   } 
    
   } 
    
   public short EccSign(KeyPair ECCkeyPair, byte [] buf, byte mode)  
   { short len,sLen=(short)0; 
     len= Util.makeShort((byte)0,buf[4]); 
     Util.arrayCopy(buf,(short)5,buf,(short)2,len) // Sign 
     try 
     {  if (mode == (byte)0)// default 
         { ECCsig.init(ECCkeyPair.getPrivate(),Signature.MODE_SIGN); 
           sLen = ECCsig.signPreComputedHash(buf,(short)2,len buf, 
                (short)(2+len)); 
         } 
        else 
         { ECCsig.init(ECCkeyPair.getPrivate(),Signature.MODE_SIGN); 
           sLen = ECCsig.sign(buf, (short)2, len, buf, (short)(2+len)); 
         } 
      } 
     catch (CryptoException e) 
     {ISOException.throwIt(SW_SIGN_ERROR); 
      return (short)0; 
     } 
      
   Util.arrayCopy(buf,(short)(2+len),buf,(short)2,sLen); 
   Util.setShort(buf,(short)0,sLen); 
   return(short)(sLen+2); 
   } 
    
   public short GenECCkp(KeyPair ECCkeyPair) 
   { short len; 
     try 
     { ECCkeyPair.genKeyPair(); } 
     catch (CryptoException e) 
     { ISOException.throwIt(SW_GENKEY_ERROR); 
       return (short)0; 
     } 
   return 0; 
   } 
    
    
    

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   public void verify(OwnerPIN pin,byte [] buffer) throws ISOException 
     {short i,x; 
      x = Util.makeShort((byte)0,buffer[4]); 
      for(i=x;i<(short)8;i=(short)(i+1)) 
      buffer[(short)(5+i)]=(byte)0xFF; 
      if ( pin.check(buffer, (short)5,(byte)8) == false ) 
      ISOException.throwIt((short)((short)SW_VERIFICATION_FAILED |  
                                   (short)pin.getTriesRemaining())); 
     } 
    
   public static final short DB_off = (short)0 ; 
    
   public void hmac  
   ( byte []  k,short k_off, short lk, // Secret key 
     byte []  d,short d_off,short ld,  // data  
     MessageDigest md, 
     byte out[], short out_off, boolean init) 
   {  
   short i,DIGESTSIZE, DIGESTSIZE2=(short)64,BLOCKSIZE=(short)128;  
   DIGESTSIZE=(short)md.getLength(); 
   if (md.getAlgorithm() == md.ALG_SHA_512) 
   { DIGESTSIZE2= (short)64; BLOCKSIZE  = (short)128; } 
   else if (md.getAlgorithm() == md.ALG_SHA_256) 
   { DIGESTSIZE2= (short)32; BLOCKSIZE = (short)64;} 
    
   if (init) 
   { if (lk > (short)BLOCKSIZE )  
     { md.reset(); 
       md.doFinal(k,k_off,lk,k,k_off); 
       lk = DIGESTSIZE ; 
     } 
     for (i = 0 ; i < lk ; i=(short)(i+1))  
     DB[(short)(i+DB_off+BLOCKSIZE+DIGESTSIZE2)] = 
     (byte)(k[(short)(i+k_off)] ^ (byte)0x36) ; 
     Util.arrayFillNonAtomic ( 
     DB,(short)(BLOCKSIZE+DIGESTSIZE2+lk+DB_off), 
     (short)(BLOCKSIZE-lk),(byte)0x36); 
     for (i = 0 ; i < lk ; i=(short)(i+1))  
     DB[(short)(i+DB_off)] = (byte)(k[(short)(i+k_off)] ^ (byte)0x5C); 
     Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(DB,(short)(lk+DB_off), 
                             (short)(BLOCKSIZE-lk),(byte)0x5C); 
   } 
     md.reset(); 
     md.update(DB,(short)(DB_off+BLOCKSIZE+DIGESTSIZE2),BLOCKSIZE); 
     md.doFinal(d, d_off,ld,DB,(short)(DB_off+BLOCKSIZE)); 
     md.reset(); 
     md.doFinal(DB,DB_off,(short)(DIGESTSIZE+BLOCKSIZE),out,out_off); 
   } 
    
    

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   protected im(byte[] bArray,short bOffset,byte bLength) 
   { init(); 
     register(); 
   } 
    
    
   public void init() 
   { short i=0; 
     status = (short)0; 
     ECCkp  = new KeyPair[N_KEYS]; 
     UserPin   = new OwnerPIN((byte)3,(byte)8);  // 3 tries, 4=Max Size 
     AdminPin  = new OwnerPIN((byte)10,(byte)8); // 10 tries 8=Max Size 
     UserPin.update(MyPin,(short)0,(byte)8) ; 
     AdminPin.update(OpPin,(short)0,(byte)8); 
     for(i=0;i<N_KEYS;i++) 
     { 
       try{  
           ECCkp[i] = new 
           KeyPair(KeyPair.ALG_EC_FP,KeyBuilder.LENGTH_EC_FP_256); 
           status =(short)(status + (short)1); 
          } 
       catch (CryptoException e){} 
     } 
     try { 
          ECCsig =  
          Signature.getInstance(Signature.ALG_ECDSA_SHA_256, false); 
          status =(short)(status | (short)0x0100); 
         } 
     catch (CryptoException e){} 
     try { 
          sha256 = 
          MessageDigest.getInstance(MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_256, false); 
          status =(short)(status | (short)0x2000); 
         } 
     catch (CryptoException e){} 
     DB = JCSystem.makeTransientByteArray(DBSIZE, 
                                          JCSystem.CLEAR_ON_DESELECT); 
   } 
    
   public static void install(byte[] bArray, short bOffset,  
                              byte bLength ) 
   { new im(bArray,bOffset,bLength);} 
    
    
   public boolean select() 
   { if (UserPin.isValidated()) UserPin.reset(); 
     if (AdminPin.isValidated()) AdminPin.reset(); 
     return true; 
   } 
    

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8 IANA Considerations 
    
   This draft does not require any action from IANA. 
    
9 Security Considerations 
    
   This entire document is about security. 
    
10 References 
    
10.1 Normative References 
    
   [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 
   Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, 
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446. 
    
   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-
   Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, DOI 
   10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,  
   <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>. 
    
   [ISO7816] ISO 7816, "Cards Identification - Integrated Circuit Cards 
   with Contacts", The International Organization for Standardization 
   (ISO). 
    
   [GP-SPI-I2C] GlobalPlatform Technology, APDU Transport over SPI/I2C 
   Version 0.0.0.39, July 2019 
    
10.2 Informative References 
    
   [IM-JC] https://github.com/purien/TLS-SE/blob/master/im/im.java 
    
11 Authors' Addresses 
    
   Pascal Urien 
   Telecom Paris 
   19 place Marguerite Perey 
   91120 Palaiseau           Phone: NA 
   France                    Email: Pascal.Urien@telecom-paris.fr 

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