Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3
draft-urien-tls-im-04

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TLS Working Group                                            P. Urien 
  Internet Draft                                          Telecom Paris 
  Intended status: Experimental                                         
                                                                        
                                                        January 16 2021 
  Expires: June 2021 
 
                    Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 
                         draft-urien-tls-im-04.txt 
    
    
Abstract 
    
   TLS 1.3 will be deployed in the Internet of Things ecosystem. In 
   many IoT frameworks, TLS or DTLS protocols, based on pre-shared key 
   (PSK), are used for device authentication. So PSK tamper resistance, 
   is a critical market request, in order to prevent hijacking issues. 
   If DH exchange is used with certificate bound to DH ephemeral public 
   key, there is also a benefit to protect its signature procedure. The 
   TLS identity module (im) MAY be based on secure element; it realizes 
   some HKDF operations bound to PSK, and cryptographic signature if 
   certificates are used. Secure Element form factor could be 
   standalone chip, or embedded in SoC like eSIM. 
    
Requirements Language 
    
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 
    
Status of this Memo 
    
   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 
    
   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 
   Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 
   working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 
    
   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six 
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents 
   at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 
    
   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 2021. 
    
   . 

   Urien                       Expires June 2021            [Page 1] 


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   Urien                      Expires June 2021            [page 2] 

 
                 Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3    January 2021 
 
Table of Contents 
   Abstract........................................................... 1 
   Requirements Language.............................................. 1 
   Status of this Memo................................................ 1 
   Copyright Notice................................................... 2 
   1 Overview......................................................... 5 
   2 Protecting the Key Schedule for PSK.............................. 5 
      2.1 Context..................................................... 5 
      2.2 Identity Module Procedures.................................. 6 
      2.3 KSGS: Keys Secure Generation and Storage.................... 6 
      2.4 Identity Module Key Procedures (IMKP)....................... 6 
          2.4.1 CETS: Client Early Traffic Secret .................... 6 
          2.4.2 EEMS: Early Exporter Master Secret ................... 7 
          2.4.3 HEDSK: HKDF-Extract from Derived Secret Key .......... 7 
          2.4.4 HBSK: HMAC from Binder Key Secret .................... 7 
   3. Asymmetric Signature............................................ 7 
      3.1 GENKEY...................................................... 8 
      3.2 GETPUB...................................................... 8 
      3.3 SIGN........................................................ 8 
   4 Optional Procedures.............................................. 8 
      4.1 GENDHE...................................................... 8 
      4.2 GETEPK...................................................... 8 
      4.3 RAND........................................................ 8 
   5 Identity Module Procedures Summary............................... 9