Extensions to TLS FATT Process
draft-usama-tls-fatt-extension-02
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|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Muhammad Usama Sardar | ||
| Last updated | 2026-03-02 (Latest revision 2026-01-07) | ||
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draft-usama-tls-fatt-extension-02
Transport Layer Security M. U. Sardar
Internet-Draft TU Dresden
Intended status: Informational 2 March 2026
Expires: 3 September 2026
Extensions to TLS FATT Process
draft-usama-tls-fatt-extension-02
Abstract
This document applies only to non-trivial extensions of TLS, which
require formal analysis. It proposes the authors provide a threat
model and informal security goals in the Security Considerations
section, as well as motivation and a protocol diagram in the draft.
We also briefly present a few pain points of the team doing the
formal analysis which -- we believe -- require refining the process:
* Contacting FATT
* Understanding the opposing goals
* No response from some authors
* Slots at meeting
* Provide protection against FATT-bypass by other TLS-related WGs
* Process not being followed
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://muhammad-
usama-sardar.github.io/tls-fatt-extension/draft-usama-tls-fatt-
extension.html. Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-usama-tls-fatt-extension/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Layer
Security Working Group mailing list (mailto:tls@ietf.org), which is
archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/. Subscribe
at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/tls-fatt-extension.
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Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 September 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Protocol Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Definition of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Pain Points of Verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Provide Protection Against FATT-bypass by Other TLS-related
WGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Process not being followed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. ML-KEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2. Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Contacting FATT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Understanding the Opposing Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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3.5. No Response from Some Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.6. Slots at Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Responsibilities of Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Informal Security Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Protocol Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Document Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. Motivation and design rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4. Proposed solution (one or more sections) . . . . . . . . 11
5.5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.5.1. Threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.5.2. Desired security goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.5.3. Other security implications/considerations . . . . . 11
6. Responsibilities of Verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
While the TLS FATT process [TLS-FATT] marks a historic change in
achieving high cryptographic assurances by tightly integrating formal
methods in the working group (WG) process, the current FATT process
has some practical limitations. Given a relatively smaller formal
methods community, and a steep learning curve as well as very low
consideration of usability in the existing formal analysis tools,
this document proposes some solutions to make the FATT process
sustainable.
Specifically, the TLS FATT process does not outline the division of
responsibility between the authors and the team doing the formal
analysis (the latter is hereafter referred to as the "Verifier").
This document aims to propose some solutions without putting an
extensive burden on either party.
An argument is often presented by the authors that an Internet-Draft
is written for the implementers. We make several counter-arguments
here:
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* Researchers and protocol designers are also stakeholders of such
specifications [I-D.irtf-cfrg-cryptography-specification].
* Even implementers may like to understand the security implications
before blindly starting to implement it.
* With the FATT process, this argument is clearly invalid. The
Verifier may not be the same as the implementer.
This document outlines the corresponding changes in the way Internet-
Drafts are typically written. For the Internet-Draft to be useful
for the formal analysis, this document proposes that the draft should
contain four main items, namely:
* motivation,
* a threat model,
* informal security goals, and
* a protocol diagram (Section 2.1).
Each one of these is summarized in Section 4. Future versions of
this draft will include concrete examples.
Responsibilities of the Verifier are summarized in Section 6.
1.1. Motivation
A clear separation of responsibilities would help IRTF UFMRG to train
the authors and verifiers separately to fulfill their own
responsibilities.
Moreover, we believe that the experiences can help improve the FATT
process.
1.2. Scope
The scope of this document is only non-trivial extensions of TLS,
which require formal analysis.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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2.1. Protocol Diagram
In the context of this document, a Protocol Diagram specifies the
proposed cryptographically-relevant changes compared to the standard
TLS protocol [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]. This is conceptually similar
to the Protocol Model in [RFC4101]. However, while [RFC4101] only
recommends diagrams, we consider diagrams to be essential.
2.2. Verifier
In this document, the Verifier refers to the person (team) doing the
formal analysis.
2.3. Definition of Attack
Any ambiguity originating from the threat model, informal security
goals, and a Protocol Diagram is to be considered as an attack. The
authors are, therefore, encouraged to be as precise as possible. The
Verifier may propose text for consideration by authors/WG to
disambiguate or propose a fix to the attack.
3. Pain Points of Verifier
From the two extremes -- [I-D.ietf-tls-8773bis] where Russ kindly
provided all requested inputs and we were able to get it through
(with a small change (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/
tls/6Wk82oBGd61rTK23DgfYb7BmRKM/)) without any formal analysis to
[I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-08] where formal analysis revealed
vulnerabilities [ID-Crisis] and resulted in a separate WG to tackle
this problem -- we summarize the pain points of the Verifier with the
hope that we can refine the process.
Note that we are not at all asserting that the authors have no pain
points. They very likely have their own -- that is another
indication that the process needs a refinement.
3.1. Provide Protection Against FATT-bypass by Other TLS-related WGs
TLS-related WGs in particular those where the representation of TLS
WG is a minority -- including the one (SEAT WG) that the author has
defended himself as one of the six proponents -- MUST NOT be allowed
to make changes to the TLS protocol beyond what is explicitly allowed
in their charter.
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If rechartering of such WGs is _absolutely unavoidable_ and includes
non-trivial changes to the TLS protocol, it MUST only be done after
agreement with the TLS WG. This will prevent the short-circuit path
for FATT. If the WG does not have proper FATT-like process, TLS WG
may request FATT review before WGLC.
In short, our concern is:
What's the point of such a TLS FATT process when other WGs
can simply bypass this process to make key schedule level changes?
For example, [I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation-00] makes key
schedule level changes, breaks the SEAT WG charter and SEAT WG has no
formal FATT-like process.
3.2. Process not being followed
The process [TLS-FATT] states:
| When a document is adopted by the working group the chairs will
| make a determination whether the change proposed by the document
| requires review by the FATT to determine if formal protocol
| analysis is necessary for the change. For example a proposal that
| modifies the TLS key schedule or the authentication process or any
| other part of the cryptographic protocol that has been formally
| modeled and analyzed in the past would likely result in asking the
| FATT, whereas a change such as modifying the SSLKEYLOG format
| would not. The working group chairs will inform the working group
| of this decision.
However, such information has not been provided to the WG for at
least the following 2 documents:
3.2.1. ML-KEM
For the draft [I-D.ietf-tls-mlkem], the chairs acknowledge
(https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/
L2bWqpT3q8HVmACwD1Ta3NFimw0/) that the process was not followed:
| Unfortunately, the chairs did not announce this decision on the
| list (this is something that should be corrected in the process).
However:
It remains unclear what exactly "corrected in the process" entails.
The chairs further say (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/
L2bWqpT3q8HVmACwD1Ta3NFimw0/) :
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| The chairs made this decision because the mechanism in this draft
| fits into a well defined place in the TLS protocol and does not
| change the protocol itself.
We believe this argument does not stand, given the single data point
that has gone through the FATT process -- [RFC8773bis]. Both of the
mentioned conditions apply equally to [RFC8773bis] which indeed went
through FATT process. The mechanism defined in [RFC8773bis] "fits
into a well defined place in the TLS protocol" and "did not change
the protocol itself". So we request clarification of the matter in
comparison to [RFC8773bis].
We believe the security considerations of {{I-D.ietf-tls-mlkem}} are
insufficient. We also believe FATT review could have significantly
improved it, including but not limited to the key reuse ambiguity.
We have provided significant feedback during the two WGLCs. However,
almost none of that is actually reflected in the updated editor's
version.
3.2.2. Key Update
The process [TLS-FATT] states:
| The output of the FATT is posted to the working group by the FATT
| point person.
Based on authors' email (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/
KFUD3FPcrUlJmnXSyb3s25UFbdo/), while it is great that FATT could find
some threat, in our observation, the FATT process does not seem to be
followed in spirit.
3.3. Contacting FATT
The FATT process restricts the Verifier from contacting the FATT
directly. We argue that the Verifier should be allowed to contact
the FATT (at least the FATT person for a specific draft) because of
the following reasons:
* Formal methods community is small and within this small community,
those with deep knowledge of TLS are quite limited.
Such a restriction would not have been there if the Verifier
were not a member of the TLS WG and analyzing the same draft
and free to contact the same FATT for advice. Being a member
of the TLS WG actually puts the Verifier at unnecessary disadvantage.
* The feedback we receive on the list is really limited.
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* Communication via chairs is a source of misunderstandings, as it
has already happened with the chairs summarizing the intent of
"Tamarin-like" to just "Tamarin".
3.4. Understanding the Opposing Goals
The authors need to understand that the task of the Verifier is to
find the subtle corner cases where the protocol may fail. This is
naturally opposed to the goal of the authors -- that is, to convince
the WG that the protocol is good enough to be adopted/published.
Unless the Verifier remains really focused on checking subtleties,
there is little value of formal analysis.
In particular, some topics like remote attestation need more precise
specifications because small changes or ambiguites may make a big
difference.
3.5. No Response from Some Authors
Some authors of adopted drafts do not respond for several months,
despite repeated reminders [FormalAnalysisPAKE].
If any authors would like us not to do the analysis, it's
absolutely fine to clearly say so.
3.6. Slots at Meeting
Formal analysis -- just like any other code development -- is an
iterative process and needs to be progressively discussed with
the WG (and not just authors!) to be able to propose secure
solutions.
So at least some time should be allocated in the meetings for
discussion of formal analysis.
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* We requested a slot for 10 minutes (and 5 minutes if tight on
schedule) for discussion of our questions about
[I-D.ietf-tls-extended-key-update] at IETF 124. It seemed that
the slots were spread over the meeting time to show that there is
no time left for our topic. In the end, the meeting ended one
hour earlier where 10 minutes from that could have been utilized
for discussion on formal analysis of
[I-D.ietf-tls-extended-key-update]. Given that the authors were
informed [FormalAnalysisKeyUpdate] about the issues, what the
authors presented was not very helpful in terms of progressing the
formal analysis work and proposing some solutions. Key schedule
is a subtle topic and not something we can talk effectively on the
mic without a proper diagram on display. It is unclear why formal
analysis is such a low priority to the chairs.
* If the authors are doing the formal analysis themselves, they
should also present the current state of formal analysis for
discussion. This will help the Verifier give any feedback and
avoid any repititive effort.
4. Responsibilities of Authors
This document proposes that the authors provide the following four
items:
4.1. Motivation
The motivation of the work (i.e., the proposed extension of TLS)
needs to primarily come from the authors. The Verifier can ask
questions to improve it, but he cannot just cook it up.
4.2. Threat Model
A threat model outlines the assumptions and known weaknesses of the
proposed protocol. The threat model could be the classical Dolev-Yao
adversary. In addition, it could specify any keys (e.g., long-term
keys or session keys) which may be compromised (i.e., available to
the adversary).
4.3. Informal Security Goals
Knowing what you want is the first step toward achieving it. Hence,
informal security goals such as integrity, authentication, freshness,
etc. should be outlined in the Internet-Draft. If the informal
security goals are not spelled out in the Internet-Draft, it is safe
to assume that the goals are still unclear to the authors.
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4.4. Protocol Diagram
A Protocol Diagram should clearly mention the initial knowledge of
the protocol participants, e.g., which authentic public keys are
known to the protocol participants at the start of the protocol. An
example of a Protocol Diagram for [I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-08] is
provided in Figure 5 in [ID-Crisis].
5. Document Structure
While the needs may differ for some drafts, we propose the following
baseline template, with an example of
[I-D.wang-tls-service-affinity]:
TODO: Currently it is almost a copy of the guidance email
(https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/LfIHs1OVwDKWmDuCEx0p8wP-
KPs/) to the authors. We will add details in next version.
5.1. Introduction
* Problem statement: Say in general what the problem is.
* For [I-D.wang-tls-service-affinity], we believe this should _not_
include CATS. Anyone unfamiliar with CATS should be able to
understand your problem.
5.2. Terminology
* Define any terms not defined in RFC8446bis or point to other
drafts from where the definition is used.
5.3. Motivation and design rationale
* We really like how Russ motivates the problem statement in
[I-D.ietf-tls-8773bis]. Use it as a sample.
* Here authors should address all the concerns from WG, including
justification with compelling arguments and authentic references
why authors think it should be done within TLS WG (and within
handshake).
* For [I-D.wang-tls-service-affinity], authors could put CATS here
as a motivational use case.
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5.4. Proposed solution (one or more sections)
* Protocol design with Protocol Diagram: we work on the formal
analysis of TLS 1.3 exclusively. Please contact someone else if
your draft relates to older versions.
5.5. Security considerations
5.5.1. Threat model
5.5.2. Desired security goals
As draft proceeds these desired security goals will become what the
draft actually achieves.
5.5.3. Other security implications/considerations
6. Responsibilities of Verifier
When the authors declare the version as ready for formal analysis,
the Verifier takes the above inputs, performs the formal analysis,
and brings the results back to the authors and the WG. Based on the
analysis, the verifier may propose updates to the Security
Considerations section or other sections of the Internet-Draft.
7. Security Considerations
The whole document is about improving security considerations.
8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[TLS-FATT] IETF TLS WG, "TLS FATT Process", June 2025,
<https://github.com/tlswg/tls-fatt>.
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9.2. Informative References
[FormalAnalysisKeyUpdate]
Sardar, M. U., "Comments on draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-
update", October 2025,
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/
P_VdWSi20TZG0rJEaz7VCPKDIOg/>.
[FormalAnalysisPAKE]
Sardar, M. U., "Formal analysis of draft-ietf-tls-pake",
January 2026, <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/
igQGFE1INA6eR_Fdz8eTp74ffVc/>.
[I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation-00]
Sheffer, Y., Mihalcea, I., Deshpande, Y., Fossati, T., and
T. Reddy.K, "Using Attestation in Transport Layer Security
(TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-fossati-seat-early-
attestation-00, 9 January 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-fossati-seat-
early-attestation-00>.
[I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-08]
Tschofenig, H., Sheffer, Y., Howard, P., Mihalcea, I.,
Deshpande, Y., Niemi, A., and T. Fossati, "Using
Attestation in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-fossati-tls-attestation-08, 21
October 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-fossati-tls-attestation-08>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-8773bis]
Housley, R., "TLS 1.3 Extension for Using Certificates
with an External Pre-Shared Key", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-8773bis-13, 5 September
2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
tls-8773bis-13>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-extended-key-update]
Tschofenig, H., Tüxen, M., Reddy.K, T., Fries, S., and Y.
Rosomakho, "Extended Key Update for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-10, 2 March 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
extended-key-update-10>.
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[I-D.ietf-tls-mlkem]
Connolly, D., "ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS
1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-
mlkem-07, 12 February 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
mlkem-07>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-14, 13 September 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8446bis-14>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-cryptography-specification]
Sullivan, N. and C. A. Wood, "Guidelines for Writing
Cryptography Specifications", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-cryptography-specification-02, 7
July 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
irtf-cfrg-cryptography-specification-02>.
[I-D.wang-tls-service-affinity]
Wang, W., Wang, A., Sahni, M., and K. Sheth, "Service
Affinity Solution based on Transport Layer Security
(TLS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-wang-tls-
service-affinity-00, 17 October 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wang-tls-
service-affinity-00>.
[ID-Crisis]
Sardar, M. U., Moustafa, M., and T. Aura, "Identity Crisis
in Confidential Computing: Formal Analysis of Attested
TLS", November 2025, <https://www.researchgate.net/publica
tion/398839141_Identity_Crisis_in_Confidential_Computing_F
ormal_Analysis_of_Attested_TLS>.
[RFC4101] Rescorla, E. and IAB, "Writing Protocol Models", RFC 4101,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4101, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4101>.
[RFC8773bis]
Housley, R., "TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-Based
Authentication with an External Pre-Shared Key", RFC 8773,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8773, March 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8773>.
Appendix
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Document History
-02
* Added document structure
* FATT-bypass by Other TLS-related WGs
* FATT process not being followed
-01
* Pain points of Verifier Section 2.1
* Small adjustment of phrasing
Author's Address
Muhammad Usama Sardar
TU Dresden
Email: muhammad_usama.sardar@tu-dresden.de
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