@techreport{usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem-04,
    number =    {draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem-04},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem/04/},
    author =    {Muhammad Usama Sardar},
    title =     {{Analysis of Hybrid Key Establishment and Standalone ML-KEM in TLS 1.3}},
    pagetotal = 20,
    year =      2026,
    month =     jun,
    day =       21,
    abstract =  {This memo is a work-in-progress and maps out the technical facets relevant to the quantum-resistant key establishment in TLS 1.3 and provides some preliminary discussion to help developers and policymakers make informed choices. In particular, it presents hybrid key establishment and standalone ML-KEM in TLS 1.3. Moreover, it offers minimal implementation guidance for hybrid key establishment. The memo finally presents technical insights into hybrid key establishment and standalone ML-KEM in TLS 1.3. Our observation is that hybrid key establishment is preferable over standalone ML-KEM until a powerful CRQC exists which breaks most bits of pre-quantum. This memo is not a standard nor has it been shown to have consensus of the IETF community.},
}