Deployment of Reconsidered Validation in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
draft-va-sidrops-deploy-reconsidered-00

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Last updated 2018-10-19
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Network Working Group                                      G. Michaelson
Internet-Draft                                                     APNIC
Intended status: Experimental                             T. Bruijnzeels
Expires: April 22, 2019                                      opennetlabs
                                                        October 19, 2018

    Deployment of Reconsidered Validation in the Resource Public Key
                         Infrastructure (RPKI)
                draft-va-sidrops-deploy-reconsidered-00

Abstract

   This document defines a deployment model for reconsidered validation
   [RFC8360] in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).

   It stipulates that Relying Parties in the RPKI MUST support
   reconsidered validation by 1 July TBD-Year, and that Certificate
   Authorities MAY use the reconsidered validation OIDs in CA
   certificates that they issue from this date.  Furthermore Certificate
   Authorities should monitor whether the set of resources in CA
   certificate they receive has shrunk, and make adjustments in the CA
   certificates and/or other RPKI objects when appropriate.

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Michaelson & Bruijnzeels Expires April 22, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             deploy-reconsidered              October 2018

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Table of Contents

   1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Phased Deployment of the Amended Certificate Profile  . . . .   3
     2.1.  Phase 1: Requirements for RP Software . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Phase 2: Requirements for operators . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Phase 3: Requirements for Certificate Authorities . . . .   4
   3.  Avoid over-claiming CA certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Avoid Invalidating Delegated CAs  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.1.  Graceperiod and Check Intervals . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.2.  Shrinking issued CA certificates  . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Self monitoring and clean-up  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Example use of the amended profile with transfers . . . . . .   6
   5.  RFC-EDITOR Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Overview

   This document defines a deployment model for reconsidered validation
   [RFC8360] in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).

   Reconsidered validation differs from normal validation [RFC6487] in
   that under reconsidered rules the intersection of resources between a
   child certificate and the resources contained in the (chain of)
   parent certificate(s) is accepted.  Any resources that are contained
   in the child certificate only result in a warning about these
   resources, rather than the rejection of that certificate.  Thus
   reconsidered validation limits the impact of over-claims in the RPKI
   to the set of resources under dispute.

   The applicability of reconsidered validation is signalled by the use
   of a distinct set of OIDs on a Resource Certificate [RFC8360].
   Because of this reconsidered validation can only be deployed when a
   majority of Relying Party software is updated to support this new
   algorithm.  This document stipulates that RP software MUST support
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