Post-Quantum Cryptographic Discipline for x402 STARK Receipts
draft-vauban-x402-pqc-receipts-01
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draft-vauban-x402-pqc-receipts-01
Independent Submission V. Research
Internet-Draft Vauban Research
Intended status: Informational 25 May 2026
Expires: 26 November 2026
Post-Quantum Cryptographic Discipline for x402 STARK Receipts
draft-vauban-x402-pqc-receipts-01
Abstract
This document specifies a post-quantum cryptographic discipline for
x402 STARK receipts. The discipline applies on two layers : (a)
proof integrity via hash-based proving systems (the Stwo Circle STARK
M31 reference implementation), which are post-quantum sound under
standard cryptanalytic assumptions, and (b) signature integrity via
the hybrid ES256K + ML-DSA-65 dual-signed receipt variant
([FIPS204]). It maps the hybrid-pqc receipt variant of the x402
STARK Receipt Format Extension ([STARK-RECEIPTS]) to the NIST PQC
migration roadmap and to the EU eIDAS 2.0, ANSSI, and BSI migration
timelines for the 2025-2030 window. Reference runners are published
as the vauban-x402-jcs-conformance and vauban-x402-canonical Rust
crates. Companion documents are [STARK-RECEIPTS] (receipt format)
and [VPSF-ALGEBRA] (composability grammar).
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Threat Model : Quantum Adversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Assumed Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Receipt Forgery Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. ES256K Signature Break . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2. Hash Collision Under Grover . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.3. Algebraic Proof System Soundness Break . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Out-of-Scope Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Two-Axis PQC Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Proof System Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.1. Hash-Based Proving Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.2. Forbidden Proof System Families . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Signature Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.1. Hybrid Composition Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.2. Classical Fallback Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.3. Migration Window Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Receipt Format Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Proof System Layer Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Signature Layer Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3. PQ-Readiness Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. NIST PQC Migration Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. NIST Migration Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. EU and Member State Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.3. NIST SP 800-208 Hybrid Composition Guidance . . . . . . . 11
7. Implementation Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. Hash-Based Proof System Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. JCS Preimage Discipline Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3. ML-DSA-65 Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Implementation Downgrade Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Insecure Hybrid Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.3. ML-DSA-65 Side-Channel Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.4. STARK Proof System Auditability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.5. Migration Timing Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Known Adopters and Reference Implementations . . . . . . . . . . 15
Primary Maintainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Reference Implementation Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Adoption Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
Classical payment receipts signed under elliptic-curve schemes such
as ES256K become forgeable under a sufficiently capable quantum
adversary. The base x402 PAYMENT-RESPONSE ([X402-V2]) uses ES256K as
its default signature scheme. Under the present specification, a
PAYMENT-RESPONSE retained for audit purposes in year N is verifiable
today, but its long-term integrity depends on the absence of a
quantum computer capable of executing Shor's algorithm against
secp256k1. NIST timelines ([NIST-PQC-MIGRATION]), ANSSI guidance
([ANSSI-PQC]), and BSI guidance ([BSI-PQC]) converge on a 2030-2035
horizon for the migration of high-value or long-retention
cryptographic material away from classical-only signatures.
This document defines a two-axis post-quantum cryptographic
discipline for x402 receipts that addresses the long-term integrity
gap. The first axis applies at the proof-system layer : the stark-
vauban-pay-v1 variant of [STARK-RECEIPTS] uses Stwo Circle STARK M31
([STWO]), a hash-based proving system whose soundness rests on the
collision and second-preimage resistance of cryptographic hash
functions rather than on algebraic hardness assumptions broken by
Shor's algorithm. The second axis applies at the signature layer :
the hybrid-pqc variant of [STARK-RECEIPTS] composes ES256K and ML-
DSA-65 ([FIPS204]) signatures over the identical JCS canonical
preimage, producing a receipt that remains verifiable if either
single algorithm is broken.
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This document positions the discipline as the recommended profile for
x402 deployments that operate under statutory retention obligations
(for example, MiCA Art. 80 or EU AI Act Art. 12 transparency-and-
documentation duties). The discipline does not modify the wire
format defined in [STARK-RECEIPTS] or the composability grammar
defined in [VPSF-ALGEBRA] ; it constrains the choice of cryptographic
primitives and the negotiation discipline that producers and
verifiers SHOULD apply to satisfy post-quantum soundness for the
2025-2030 migration window and beyond.
This document is an Independent Submission. It is not the product of
an IETF Working Group. It is published for community review and to
establish a stable reference for implementors.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2.1. Terminology
Post-Quantum Sound: A cryptographic construction whose security
holds against an adversary in possession of a large-scale quantum
computer (specifically, an adversary capable of executing Shor's
algorithm against discrete logarithm and integer factorisation
problems, and Grover's algorithm against unstructured search). A
construction is post-quantum sound if no known quantum algorithm
reduces its security below an operationally acceptable level.
SHA-256, as used in hash-based proving systems, is post-quantum
sound at 128-bit security under Grover (which provides at most a
quadratic speedup against generic preimage search).
Hash-Based Proof System: A succinct proof system whose soundness
reduces to the collision and second-preimage resistance of an
underlying cryptographic hash function rather than to algebraic
assumptions (pairings, discrete logarithms, factorisation). STARK
proof systems are hash-based. SNARK proof systems based on
pairings (BN254, BLS12-381) are not hash-based.
ML-DSA: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm,
standardised in [FIPS204]. This document references the ML-DSA-65
parameter set, which provides 192-bit classical security and an
estimated 128-bit security against quantum adversaries per NIST's
category-3 classification.
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Hybrid Signature: A composite signature scheme that produces two or
more independent signatures over the same canonical message under
disjoint cryptographic assumptions. A hybrid signature is valid
if and only if every component signature verifies independently.
The hybrid construction is secure against an adversary that breaks
any proper subset of the component schemes.
Migration Window: The temporal interval between the publication of
post-quantum standards (NIST FIPS 204, August 2024) and the
deprecation of classical-only signatures under applicable
regulatory frameworks. For this document, the migration window
spans 2025 to 2030, with deprecation horizons varying by
jurisdiction.
Backwards Compatibility: The property that a receipt produced under
this discipline is verifiable by an implementation that supports
only classical primitives, provided the classical component of the
receipt is well-formed and independently verifiable. The hybrid
receipt variant satisfies backwards compatibility ; the STARK
proof system at the proof layer is independent of signature
backwards compatibility.
3. Threat Model : Quantum Adversary
3.1. Assumed Capability
The threat model assumes an adversary in possession of a large-scale,
fault-tolerant quantum computer capable of executing Shor's algorithm
against classical public-key primitives and Grover's algorithm
against unstructured search problems. The timeline for the
availability of such a machine is uncertain ; NIST guidance
([NIST-PQC-MIGRATION]) and ANSSI guidance ([ANSSI-PQC]) recommend
migration planning for high-value or long-retention cryptographic
material on a 2030-2035 horizon, with concrete migration steps
starting in 2025.
The adversary is assumed to have :
* Access to public-key material (signature verification keys) for
all receipts ever published.
* The ability to record receipts in transit and at rest indefinitely
(the "harvest-now-decrypt-later" assumption).
* No access to private signing material held by facilitators ; key
compromise is treated separately in Section 8.
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3.2. Receipt Forgery Vectors
Three forgery vectors are relevant for x402 receipts under the
quantum threat model :
3.2.1. ES256K Signature Break
ES256K signatures are based on the discrete logarithm problem over
the secp256k1 elliptic curve. Shor's algorithm reduces the discrete
logarithm problem to polynomial time on a quantum computer. An
adversary with a sufficiently large quantum computer can recover the
private signing key from the public verification key, and thereafter
forge arbitrary receipts under the compromised key. This vector
affects every receipt signed under ES256K, retroactively, once the
adversary's quantum capability becomes available.
3.2.2. Hash Collision Under Grover
The JCS canonical preimage discipline ([RFC8785]) and the receipt
content addressing in [STARK-RECEIPTS] both rely on SHA-256.
Grover's algorithm provides at most a quadratic speedup against
unstructured search, reducing the effective security of a 256-bit
hash output from 128 bits classical to 128 bits quantum against
second-preimage attack. SHA-256 therefore remains post-quantum sound
at the 128-bit security level for the use cases of this document
(preimage chaining and content addressing). No mitigation is
required at the hash layer for the receipt formats specified in
[STARK-RECEIPTS].
3.2.3. Algebraic Proof System Soundness Break
SNARK proof systems whose soundness rests on bilinear pairings
(BN254, BLS12-381, or equivalent) are vulnerable to Shor's algorithm
in the same manner as ES256K : the underlying discrete-logarithm
hardness assumption is broken. A SNARK-based receipt becomes
forgeable once the adversary can recover trapdoor material from the
proving key. This vector does not affect STARK proof systems, which
rely only on hash-function security.
3.3. Out-of-Scope Threats
The following threats are out of scope for this document :
* Key encapsulation mechanism analysis ; ML-KEM ([FIPS203]) is
treated in the NIST guidance but does not apply to receipt
signature integrity.
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* Quantum-secure channel establishment (TLS, x402 transport layer) ;
this document concerns receipt integrity at rest, not transport.
* Side-channel attacks against signing implementations ; see
Section 8 for hardening guidance specific to constant-time ML-
DSA-65 implementations.
4. Two-Axis PQC Discipline
The post-quantum cryptographic discipline for x402 STARK receipts
operates on two orthogonal layers. A deployment selects one or both
axes based on its threat model and regulatory environment.
4.1. Proof System Layer
4.1.1. Hash-Based Proving Requirement
The proof system underlying a receipt variant MUST be hash-based for
the variant to be considered post-quantum sound at the proof layer.
The stark-vauban-pay-v1 variant of [STARK-RECEIPTS] satisfies this
requirement by using the Stwo Circle STARK M31 prover ([STWO]). Stwo
Circle STARKs construct succinct proofs from Merkle commitments and a
hash-based polynomial-IOP transformation ; the soundness reduction
relies on the collision and second-preimage resistance of the
underlying hash function (Blake2s in the Stwo reference
implementation), neither of which is broken by Shor's algorithm.
4.1.2. Forbidden Proof System Families
Implementations claiming post-quantum soundness at the proof layer
MUST NOT use any of the following proof system families :
* Groth16, PLONK, or any SNARK construction based on bilinear
pairings over BN254, BLS12-381, or equivalent curves.
* Bulletproofs or any range proof construction whose soundness
reduces to the discrete logarithm problem.
* Any proof system whose security analysis explicitly invokes the
algebraic group model or generic group model without additional
hash-based safeguards.
A facilitator that advertises a stark-vauban-pay-v1-tier receipt MUST
in fact use a hash-based proof system. A facilitator that internally
uses a pairing-based SNARK and labels the result as a STARK receipt
is in violation of this discipline and MUST NOT claim conformance.
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4.2. Signature Layer
4.2.1. Hybrid Composition Requirement
A receipt variant that claims post-quantum soundness at the signature
layer MUST carry two independent signatures over the identical JCS
canonical preimage ([RFC8785]) : one classical signature (ES256K) and
one post-quantum signature (ML-DSA-65 per [FIPS204]). The hybrid-pqc
variant of [STARK-RECEIPTS] satisfies this requirement.
A verifier processing a hybrid-pqc receipt MUST :
1. Confirm that both signature (ES256K) and pqc_signature (ML-DSA-
65) cover the byte-identical JCS canonical preimage.
2. Verify each signature independently against the corresponding
public key referenced by kid_es256k and kid_mldsa65.
3. Reject the receipt if either signature fails to verify. A
receipt with a valid ES256K signature and an invalid ML-DSA-65
signature MUST be rejected under the hybrid discipline ; partial
verification is not equivalent to verification.
4.2.2. Classical Fallback Discipline
The classical-es256k variant of [STARK-RECEIPTS] carries only an
ES256K signature and is NOT post-quantum sound at the signature
layer. Deployments operating under statutory retention obligations
SHOULD treat the classical-es256k variant as a legacy interop format
only, and SHOULD migrate to hybrid-pqc or stark-vauban-pay-v1 before
the relevant deprecation horizon. The classical fallback remains
valid for non-retention deployments where the threat model permits.
4.2.3. Migration Window Profile
During the 2025-2030 migration window, the recommended profile is :
* For deployments under statutory retention obligations : hybrid-pqc
REQUIRED ; classical-es256k rejected for new receipts ; existing
classical-es256k receipts re-stamped as hybrid-pqc on first re-
presentation to a supervisor (re-stamping mechanism is
implementation-specific and out of scope here).
* For deployments without statutory retention obligations : hybrid-
pqc RECOMMENDED ; classical-es256k ACCEPTED for interop with non-
PQ-ready counterparties.
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Post-2030, classical-only signature variants SHOULD be deprecated for
new receipt issuance. The exact deprecation date is jurisdiction-
dependent and SHOULD follow the applicable NIST, ANSSI, BSI, or eIDAS
guidance.
5. Receipt Format Mapping
The two-axis discipline defined in this document maps to the receipt
variants of [STARK-RECEIPTS] as follows.
5.1. Proof System Layer Mapping
+=====================+===================+====================+
| Variant | Proof system | Post-quantum sound |
| | | at proof layer? |
+=====================+===================+====================+
| stark-vauban-pay-v1 | Stwo Circle STARK | Yes |
| | M31 (hash-based) | |
+---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+
| hybrid-pqc | None (signature- | Not applicable |
| | only variant) | |
+---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+
| classical-es256k | None (signature- | Not applicable |
| | only variant) | |
+---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+
Table 1
5.2. Signature Layer Mapping
+===================+====================+========================+
|Variant |Signature scheme |Post-quantum sound at |
| | |signature layer? |
+===================+====================+========================+
|stark-vauban-pay-v1|Facilitator-specific|Implementation-dependent|
| |outer signature | |
+-------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
|hybrid-pqc |ES256K + ML-DSA-65 |Yes |
| |(hybrid) | |
+-------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
|classical-es256k |ES256K only |No |
+-------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
Table 2
The two layers are orthogonal. A stark-vauban-pay-v1 receipt
provides proof-layer post-quantum soundness ; if the deployment also
requires signature-layer post-quantum soundness for the outer
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signature, it SHOULD combine the STARK proof with a hybrid signature
in the same receipt envelope. This combination is permitted by
[STARK-RECEIPTS] provided both the proof and the hybrid signature
cover the identical canonical preimage.
5.3. PQ-Readiness Negotiation
The receipt-format negotiation defined in [STARK-RECEIPTS] is the
carrier for PQ-readiness signalling. A facilitator advertising post-
quantum soundness MUST list hybrid-pqc or stark-vauban-pay-v1 (or
both) in the X-Payment-Options header. A client requiring post-
quantum soundness MUST include receipt_format with required: true in
the PAYMENT-SIGNATURE extension, naming the required variant.
A facilitator that lists hybrid-pqc in X-Payment-Options but cannot
in fact produce a valid ML-DSA-65 signature is in protocol violation.
Conformance testing for PQ-readiness SHOULD include emission of a
hybrid-pqc receipt and independent verification of both component
signatures by a third-party verifier.
6. NIST PQC Migration Alignment
6.1. NIST Migration Roadmap
The post-quantum cryptography migration roadmap published by NIST
([NIST-PQC-MIGRATION]) defines a multi-stage transition from
classical public-key primitives to standardised post-quantum
primitives. Key milestones relevant to x402 receipt integrity :
* August 2024 : publication of [FIPS204] (ML-DSA), [FIPS203] (ML-
KEM), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA). Implementations may begin
production deployment.
* 2025 : recommended start of hybrid deployment for high-value or
long-retention systems.
* 2030-2035 : recommended completion of migration ; classical-only
systems SHOULD be deprecated for new deployments.
The hybrid-pqc variant of [STARK-RECEIPTS] aligns with the NIST
hybrid deployment recommendation. The stark-vauban-pay-v1 variant
addresses the proof-system layer in parallel and is independent of
the signature migration timeline.
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6.2. EU and Member State Alignment
The EU eIDAS 2.0 regulation ([EIDAS-2]) introduces requirements for
qualified electronic signature schemes that anticipate the post-
quantum transition. National guidance documents from ANSSI
([ANSSI-PQC]) and BSI ([BSI-PQC]) publish concrete migration
timelines for cryptographic primitives used in regulated sectors.
A facilitator operating in an EU jurisdiction SHOULD :
* Publish a migration plan for ES256K to ML-DSA-65 (or a successor
scheme endorsed by the applicable national authority) aligned with
the relevant jurisdictional timeline.
* Issue hybrid-pqc receipts as the default variant for any payment
context subject to long-term retention (MiCA Art. 80, AMLR Art.
56, DORA Art. 14, or sector-specific obligations).
* Document the post-quantum readiness of its receipt infrastructure
in its qualified-trust-service-provider attestations where
applicable.
6.3. NIST SP 800-208 Hybrid Composition Guidance
NIST [SP800-208] provides hybrid composition guidance for hash-based
signature schemes. While SP 800-208 focuses on stateful hash-based
signatures (LMS, XMSS), the composition principles for hybrid
construction are relevant to the hybrid-pqc variant of
[STARK-RECEIPTS]. Implementations SHOULD :
* Compose the two component signatures over the identical canonical
message, not over a transformed version of the message.
* Treat the hybrid signature as a single object for serialisation
purposes, with both component signatures present in every well-
formed receipt.
* Reject any receipt where one of the two component signatures is
absent, malformed, or fails verification.
The composition pattern in the hybrid-pqc variant follows these
principles.
7. Implementation Evidence
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7.1. Hash-Based Proof System Reference
The Stwo Circle STARK M31 prover ([STWO]) is the reference
implementation of a hash-based proof system suitable for the stark-
vauban-pay-v1 variant of [STARK-RECEIPTS]. The prover has been
operationally deployed on Starknet mainnet since 2025 and is the
proving substrate for the reference deployment documented in
[STARK-RECEIPTS] (Sepolia demo at demo.pay.vauban.tech).
The Vauban Pay reference adapter for Stwo Circle STARK M31 is
published as an Apache 2.0 Rust crate within the Vauban zkpay
workspace. The adapter exposes a chain-agnostic proof backend
interface ; the hash-based property of the underlying proof system is
preserved across adapter implementations.
7.2. JCS Preimage Discipline Reference
The JCS canonical preimage discipline used by all three receipt
variants is implemented in the vauban-x402-jcs-conformance Rust crate
([VAUBAN-JCS-CRATE]). The crate provides conformance vectors and a
runner that has been cross-validated byte-identical against four
other independent JCS implementations (Python, TypeScript, Go, Java)
as documented in [STARK-RECEIPTS].
The canonical Claim Algebra encoder used to construct the preimage
objects covered by the hybrid signature is implemented in the vauban-
x402-canonical crate ([VAUBAN-CANONICAL-CRATE]). Both crates are
published under Apache 2.0 on crates.io.
7.3. ML-DSA-65 Implementation Status
Production-quality ML-DSA-65 implementations exist in the open-source
cryptographic library ecosystem (notably pq-crystals/dilithium and
oqs-rust). At the time of publication of this document, a dedicated
Vauban Pay crate wrapping ML-DSA-65 for the hybrid-pqc receipt
variant is planned for delivery in Phase 2 of the Vauban Pay roadmap.
Until then, implementations of the hybrid-pqc variant relying on
third-party ML-DSA-65 crates remain conformant provided the crate
implements [FIPS204] faithfully.
The third-party FeedOracle hybrid-PQC reference implementation listed
in [STARK-RECEIPTS] (Axis 2 fixture set [X402-2411]) is the
operational reference for the hybrid-pqc variant.
8. Security Considerations
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8.1. Implementation Downgrade Attack
An adversary in a network position between the client and the
facilitator MAY attempt to strip hybrid-pqc from the X-Payment-
Options header, forcing the client to fall back to classical-es256k.
The resulting receipt is not post-quantum sound, leaving the long-
term integrity exposed.
Mitigation : a client requiring post-quantum soundness MUST send
receipt_format with required: true in PAYMENT-SIGNATURE extensions,
naming the required variant. A facilitator that cannot honour the
request MUST return HTTP 402 with UnsupportedReceiptFormat rather
than silently downgrading. Verifiers SHOULD cross-check the X-
Receipt-Format header on the PAYMENT-RESPONSE against the client's
required variant and reject mismatches.
8.2. Insecure Hybrid Composition
A naive hybrid signature implementation that signs different
canonical messages with the two component schemes does not provide
the intended security property : an adversary who breaks ES256K can
produce a forged classical signature, and the verifier may accept the
receipt if the verification logic treats the two signatures as
covering disjoint content.
Mitigation : implementations MUST follow the composition principles
described in Section 6.3 : both signatures MUST cover the byte-
identical JCS canonical preimage. The reference encoder in
[VAUBAN-CANONICAL-CRATE] produces a single canonical byte string
consumed by both signing operations.
8.3. ML-DSA-65 Side-Channel Exposure
ML-DSA-65 signing operations involve rejection sampling, secret-
dependent control flow, and floating-point or arithmetic operations
whose timing may leak secret-key material to a co-located adversary.
Side-channel analysis of lattice-based signatures is an active
research area.
Mitigation : ML-DSA-65 signing implementations used in production
facilitator infrastructure MUST be constant-time and MUST be hardened
against the classes of side-channel attack documented in the
implementation's threat model. Implementors SHOULD select ML-DSA-65
libraries that have undergone public side-channel analysis (for
example, libraries audited by the post-quantum cryptography community
since the publication of [FIPS204]).
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8.4. STARK Proof System Auditability
The post-quantum soundness claim for STARK proof systems relies on
the collision and second-preimage resistance of the underlying hash
function. A flaw in the prover-verifier implementation, or in the
polynomial-IOP transformation, may produce false-positive
verifications independent of the hash function's strength.
Mitigation : implementations SHOULD use a reference STARK prover that
has undergone public audit ; the Stwo prover ([STWO]) is the
reference for this document. Implementations that fork or modify the
reference prover SHOULD re-audit the modifications against the
original soundness analysis before production deployment.
8.5. Migration Timing Risk
Premature deprecation of classical signature support may exclude
legitimate counterparties that have not yet migrated to post-quantum
infrastructure. Conversely, late migration leaves long-retention
receipts exposed to retroactive forgery once a quantum adversary
becomes available.
Mitigation : deployments SHOULD align their deprecation schedule with
the applicable jurisdictional guidance ([NIST-PQC-MIGRATION],
[ANSSI-PQC], [BSI-PQC], [EIDAS-2]). The 2025-2030 hybrid deployment
window described in Section 4.2.3 provides a five-year overlap during
which both classical and post-quantum verification paths SHOULD be
supported. Facilitators operating in regulated sectors SHOULD
publish their migration plan in advance of any deprecation step
affecting external counterparties.
9. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions. It defers to the x402 Receipt
Format registry established in [STARK-RECEIPTS] for the registration
of the hybrid-pqc and stark-vauban-pay-v1 tokens that the discipline
specified in this document maps onto. Future extensions introducing
additional post-quantum receipt variants SHOULD register the
corresponding tokens in that registry and reference this document for
migration profile alignment.
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Acknowledgments
The author thanks the participants in the x402 Linux Foundation
coalition for the shared canonicalisation discipline and the hybrid-
PQC receipt fixture set contributions documented in [STARK-RECEIPTS]
and [X402-2411]. The author thanks the NIST Post-Quantum
Cryptography working group for the standardisation of [FIPS204],
[FIPS203], and the migration guidance referenced throughout this
document. The author thanks the StarkWare Industries team for the
publication of the Stwo Circle STARK M31 prover ([STWO]) as an open-
source reference for hash-based proving systems.
Known Adopters and Reference Implementations
This appendix documents reference implementations and adopters of
this specification confirmed at the time of publication. The list is
informational and will be updated in subsequent revisions as
additional implementations are reported.
Primary Maintainer
Vauban Pay (https://pay.vauban.tech) maintains the reference post-
quantum receipt specification, the published conformance vectors
(https://github.com/vauban-org/x402-stark-receipts-conformance), and
the reference implementations listed below. The PQC discipline
integrates ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) for hybrid signatures and the
Stwo Circle STARK M31 prover ([STWO]) for hash-based receipt
integrity.
Reference Implementation Matrix
The conformance vector suite maintains an 8-implementation reference
matrix across Python, JavaScript, Go, Java, Rust, PHP, Ruby, and C#.
The first five are validated byte-for-byte against upstream JCS RFC
8785 libraries ; the last three are published as pure-stdlib
reference runners pending CI execution. Detailed validation status
is documented in _attestations/2026-05-25-vauban-8-impl-extended.md
in the conformance vectors repository.
The published Vauban Pay packages across 3 ecosystems : vauban-x402-
jcs-conformance@0.1.0, vauban-x402-canonical@0.1.0, vauban-
x402-wire@0.1.0 on crates.io (including the vauban-x402-pqc-signer
crate skeleton for ML-DSA-65 signature integration) ; vauban-x402-
stark-receipt@0.1.0 on PyPI ; @vauban-pay/substrate@0.1.0 on npm.
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Adoption Process
Implementers SHOULD notify the IETF contact at research@vauban.tech
when adopting this specification in production. Adoption
notifications include the post-quantum signature scheme implemented
(FIPS 204 ML-DSA parameter set, hybrid mode if applicable), the STARK
prover and hash function configuration, the canonical preimage
discipline emitted, and the contact for follow-on coordination.
Reported adopters will be listed in the next revision of this
appendix following a verification step against the conformance vector
matrix.
References
Normative References
[FIPS204] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-
Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA)", August
2024, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785>.
[SP800-208]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature
Schemes", October 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-208>.
[STARK-RECEIPTS]
"x402 STARK Receipt Format Extension", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-vauban-x402-stark-receipts-01, n.d.,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vauban-x402-stark-
receipts/>.
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[VPSF-ALGEBRA]
"VPSF Claim Algebra for x402 Payment Receipts", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-vauban-x402-vpsf-algebra-
00, n.d., <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vauban-
x402-vpsf-algebra/>.
Informative References
[ANSSI-PQC]
Agence nationale de la securite des systemes
d'information, "ANSSI Position Paper on Post-Quantum
Cryptography Migration", n.d.,
<https://cyber.gouv.fr/en/publications/anssi-views-post-
quantum-cryptography>.
[BSI-PQC] Bundesamt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, "BSI
Technical Guideline TR-02102 (cryptographic mechanisms)",
n.d., <https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Themen/Unternehmen-und-
Organisationen/Standards-und-Zertifizierung/Technische-
Richtlinien/TR-nach-Thema-sortiert/tr02102/
tr02102_node.html>.
[EIDAS-2] European Parliament and Council, "Regulation (EU)
2024/1183 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 (eIDAS
2.0)", April 2024,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1183/oj>.
[FIPS203] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-
Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard (ML-
KEM)", August 2024,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203>.
[NIST-PQC-MIGRATION]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Post-
Quantum Cryptography Migration Roadmap", n.d.,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-
cryptography>.
[STWO] "Stwo Circle STARK Prover (StarkWare Industries)", n.d.,
<https://github.com/starkware-libs/stwo>.
[VAUBAN-CANONICAL-CRATE]
"vauban-x402-canonical: canonical Claim Algebra encoder",
n.d., <https://crates.io/crates/vauban-x402-canonical>.
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[VAUBAN-JCS-CRATE]
"vauban-x402-jcs-conformance: JCS preimage discipline
reference runner", n.d.,
<https://crates.io/crates/vauban-x402-jcs-conformance>.
[X402-2411]
"Hybrid-PQC receipt-core fixture set (Axis 2)", n.d.,
<https://github.com/x402-foundation/x402/pull/2411>.
[X402-V2] "x402 Linux Foundation V2 Working Group", n.d.,
<https://github.com/x402-foundation/x402>.
Appendix A. References
A.1. Normative References
(Normative references are listed in the document header.)
A.2. Informative References
(Informative references are listed in the document header.)
Author's Address
Vauban Research
Vauban Research
Email: research@vauban.tech
URI: https://pay.vauban.tech
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