PQC Readiness Observability Gaps in Networked Computing Environments
draft-vicente-pquip-pqc-readiness-gaps-05
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Brian Vicente | ||
| Last updated | 2026-09-12 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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draft-vicente-pquip-pqc-readiness-gaps-05
Post-Quantum Use In Protocols B. Vicente, Ed.
Internet-Draft Sanctum SecOps LLC
Intended status: Informational 13 September 2026
Expires: 17 March 2027
PQC Readiness Observability Gaps in Networked Computing Environments
draft-vicente-pquip-pqc-readiness-gaps-05
Abstract
This document identifies observability gaps that prevent network
operators and security teams from determining the post-quantum
cryptography (PQC) readiness state of networked computing
environments. PQC readiness requires knowing which cryptographic
algorithms are in use across the environment, which are vulnerable to
quantum attack, and which have been or are being migrated to NIST-
approved PQC algorithms. Current network protocols and management
frameworks do not provide sufficient visibility to answer these
questions at scale.
Supplementary Materials
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Reference implementation: CygnetLib
(https://github.com/sanctumsecopsmssp/CygnetLib
(https://github.com/sanctumsecopsmssp/CygnetLib)). JSON evidence:
algorithm registry, CNSA 2.0 compliance matrix, IETF PQC
interoperability status, and ACTV test vectors are in the evidence/
directory. CAGE/NCAGE: 20XS3. Apex website:
https://www.sanctumsecops.com/ (https://www.sanctumsecops.com/).
Source and Archival
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Source maintained at https://github.com/Sanc-Admin/pquip-pqc-
readiness-gaps (https://github.com/Sanc-Admin/pquip-pqc-readiness-
gaps). Author ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-6395-5308
(https://orcid.org/0009-0006-6395-5308).
IPR Considerations
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
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Certain technology described in this document is covered or may be
covered by pending United States patent applications owned by Sanctum
SecOps LLC, including U.S. Application Nos. 64/080,137 and
19/698,870. Brian Vicente is the inventor. Patent pending.
Sanctum SecOps LLC is prepared to grant to all implementers, under a
separate written agreement, a non-exclusive, worldwide license on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms that may include reasonable
fees or royalties, under Necessary Patent Claims owned or controlled
by Sanctum SecOps LLC.
"Necessary Patent Claims" means claims subject to the applicable IETF
disclosure that would necessarily be infringed by implementing
technology required by this specification and for which no
technically and commercially feasible non-infringing alternative is
available.
The license applies only to the compliant portion of a product or
service implementing required technology. It does not extend to
optional features, proprietary enhancements, noncompliant
implementations, methods not required by the specification, unrelated
Sanctum SecOps LLC products, hosted control planes, managed services,
trade secrets or claims that are not Necessary Patent Claims.
Licensing may be conditioned on reciprocal licensing on reasonable
and non-discriminatory terms for necessary claims owned or controlled
by the licensee. Sanctum SecOps LLC reserves defensive suspension
and available remedies if the licensee or an affiliate asserts
patents against Sanctum SecOps LLC, its affiliates, licensees,
customers, compliant products or compliant services, except for a
defensive claim compelled by a prior assertion.
Nothing in this document admits or warrants issuance, validity,
enforceability, infringement, essentiality, claim scope, absence of
alternatives or freedom to operate. No patent license arises merely
from publication of this specification. The controlling IETF
Datatracker IPR disclosures remain authoritative.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Differentiation from CBOM and Software Inventory
Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Identified Readiness Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Gap 1: No Structured Algorithm Negotiation Export from
TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Gap 2: No DNSSEC Algorithm Inventory Export . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Gap 3: No Certificate Algorithm Inventory in OCSP/CRL
Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Gap 4: No PQC Readiness Signal in QUIC Transport . . . . 6
3.5. Gap 5: No Aggregated Readiness State Export Protocol . . 6
4. Requirements for Closing the Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
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1.1. Motivation
Preparing a networked computing environment for the post-quantum era
requires operators to know: which cryptographic algorithms are
currently in use across all network endpoints, services, and
protocols; which of those algorithms are vulnerable to attacks by a
Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) using Shor's
algorithm [SHOR1994]; and which have been or are actively being
migrated to NIST-approved PQC algorithms (FIPS 204, FIPS 205).
Current network protocols — TLS [RFC8446], QUIC [RFC9000], SSH,
DNSSEC — do not provide machine-readable, network-layer signals that
enable automated aggregation of cryptographic algorithm usage across
an environment. SNMP MIBs, NetFlow/IPFIX, and syslog carry no
structured cryptographic algorithm inventory. This creates five
distinct observability gaps that prevent automated PQC readiness
assessment at scale.
1.2. Differentiation from CBOM and Software Inventory Approaches
Cryptography Bill of Materials (CBOM) work — as developed in the
context of software supply chain security and SBOM frameworks —
addresses the inventory of cryptographic libraries and algorithms as
software components within application and OS stacks. CBOM answers:
"which cryptographic libraries does this software use?"
This document addresses a distinct and complementary problem: the
absence of _network-layer_ observability signals that would allow a
network security monitor to determine, from traffic analysis and
protocol metadata alone, which cryptographic algorithms are in active
use across live network sessions — regardless of what the software
stack reports. Network-layer observability gaps persist even when
CBOM is fully deployed, because:
1. CBOM reflects software composition at build/install time;
network-layer signals reflect algorithm use at session time.
2. CBOM cannot detect algorithm downgrade attacks or negotiation
outcomes that differ from the declared software capability.
3. CBOM requires agent deployment on endpoints; network-layer
observability can be achieved passively via traffic analysis
without endpoint agents.
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2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174].
PQC Readiness State:
The assessed condition of a network environment with respect to
its preparedness to operate securely in the presence of a CRQC,
determined by the current distribution of classical vs. PQC
algorithm usage across active network sessions.
Network-Layer Readiness Signal:
A machine-readable signal extractable from network traffic or
protocol metadata — without endpoint agent access — that
contributes to determining the PQC Readiness State of a session,
endpoint, or service.
Algorithm Negotiation Record:
A structured log record capturing the cryptographic algorithm
negotiated in a specific protocol session (e.g., TLS cipher suite,
SSH key exchange method, DNSSEC algorithm).
Readiness Gap:
An absence of a normative mechanism for generating, transmitting,
or aggregating a Network-Layer Readiness Signal that would
contribute to PQC Readiness State assessment.
3. Identified Readiness Gaps
3.1. Gap 1: No Structured Algorithm Negotiation Export from TLS
TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] negotiates cipher suites and key exchange groups
via ClientHello/ServerHello. The negotiated algorithms are
observable in the TLS handshake but:
1. No IETF-standard mechanism exports structured Algorithm
Negotiation Records from TLS implementations to a network
management system.
2. IPFIX/NetFlow record types do not include TLS cipher suite as a
standard information element available in all major
implementations.
3. Passive TLS inspection (where legally permissible) requires
decryption or relies on handshake metadata only — which is
increasingly encrypted in TLS 1.3 via ECH.
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3.2. Gap 2: No DNSSEC Algorithm Inventory Export
DNSSEC [RFC4034] zone signing uses algorithm identifiers (RSA/SHA-
256, ECDSA P-256/SHA-256, etc.) recorded in DNSKEY and RRSIG records.
No standard mechanism aggregates DNSSEC algorithm usage across zones
in a resolver's cache into a machine-readable inventory exportable to
a network management system.
3.3. Gap 3: No Certificate Algorithm Inventory in OCSP/CRL
Infrastructure
OCSP [RFC6960] responses and CRL [RFC5280] distributions carry
certificate revocation status but do not carry structured information
about the algorithm family of the certificate being checked. No
IETF-standard mechanism aggregates certificate algorithm distribution
across an OCSP/CRL infrastructure into a readiness inventory.
3.4. Gap 4: No PQC Readiness Signal in QUIC Transport
QUIC [RFC9000] uses TLS 1.3 for its cryptographic handshake. The
same Gap 1 issues apply to QUIC sessions. Additionally, QUIC's
encrypted header format further reduces the visibility of handshake
metadata to passive monitors.
3.5. Gap 5: No Aggregated Readiness State Export Protocol
Even if individual gaps 1-4 were addressed by adding algorithm-
negotiation export to each protocol, no IETF-standard aggregation
protocol exists for collecting per-session Algorithm Negotiation
Records across protocols, computing a PQC Readiness State for an
environment, and exporting that state to a security operations
platform in a structured, machine-readable format.
4. Requirements for Closing the Gaps
*REQ-RG-1:* A normative mechanism SHOULD be defined for TLS
implementations to export structured Algorithm Negotiation Records to
a local collector without requiring decryption of session content.
*REQ-RG-2:* DNSSEC resolvers SHOULD export per-zone algorithm usage
records in a structured format to enable environment-wide DNSSEC
algorithm inventory.
*REQ-RG-3:* OCSP and CRL infrastructure SHOULD record and export the
algorithm family of certificates for which status is checked,
enabling a CA to monitor the classical-vs-PQC distribution of its
actively-checked certificate population.
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*REQ-RG-4:* A structured PQC Readiness State data model SHOULD be
defined that aggregates per-session Algorithm Negotiation Records
into an environment-level readiness score or distribution, exportable
via an IETF-standard protocol (e.g., YANG/NETCONF, IPFIX extension).
*REQ-RG-5:* The aggregated PQC Readiness State data model MUST be
complementary to and interoperable with CBOM outputs, not duplicative
of them. Implementers SHOULD combine CBOM software inventory with
network-layer Algorithm Negotiation Records for complete readiness
coverage.
5. Implementation Status
This section records the status of known implementations of the
mechanisms described in this document at the time of posting, based
on the proposal in [RFC7942]. A listing here does not imply
endorsement by the IETF, and this section is expected to be removed
by the RFC Editor before publication.
Implementation: CygnetSSL certification authority driver, Sanctum
SecOps LLC.
Description: Certificate issuance, revocation, chain and profile
verification, CRL generation and publication, and OCSP status
responses, built on OpenSSL 3 with the FIPS provider active.
Maturity: Operated on a single administrator-managed estate. No
interoperability testing against independent implementations has
been performed.
Licensing: Proprietary; source not publicly available.
Contact: bvicente@sanctumsecops.com
Observations recorded on 2026-09-12 on that implementation: the
OpenSSL base, default and FIPS providers were active with the kernel
FIPS indicator set; 22 end-entity certificates were issued and
verified across two profiles; all certificates used ECDSA on P-384
with ecdsa-with-SHA384 signatures and carried non-sequential 20-octet
serial numbers drawn from a CSPRNG; the certificate revocation list
was published in DER form at the URI named in the CRL distribution
points extension; and a newly issued certificate returned an OCSP
status of "good" and, following revocation with reason
cessationOfOperation, returned "revoked" with a matching revocation
time.
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6. Security Considerations
Algorithm Negotiation Records may reveal information about the
cryptographic capabilities of endpoints in a network. Aggregated
readiness inventories MUST be protected as sensitive security
metadata. Access to readiness state exports MUST be restricted to
authorized security operations personnel. Exporters MUST NOT include
session content or key material in Algorithm Negotiation Records.
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions. Future documents closing the
identified gaps may require IANA registrations for IPFIX information
elements, YANG module names, or algorithm identifier registries.
8. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9. Informative References
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
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[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
[SHOR1994] Shor, P., "Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete
logarithms and factoring", Proceedings of the 35th Annual
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science pp. 124-134,
1994.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The author thanks Mike Ounsworth (Entrust) for valuable feedback on
draft structure and boilerplate compliance, and the IETF PQUIP,
LAMPS, and OAuth working groups for their ongoing work on post-
quantum cryptography standardization.
CygnetLib (https://github.com/sanctumsecopsmssp/CygnetLib
(https://github.com/sanctumsecopsmssp/CygnetLib)) serves as the
reference implementation for algorithms described in this document.
JSON evidence files including the algorithm registry, CNSA 2.0
compliance matrix, IETF PQC interoperability status, and ACTV test
vector results are available in the evidence/ directory of the
CygnetLib repository.
Changelog
This revision (-03) adds a Posture B IPR notice, differentiates from
adjacent Cryptography Bill of Materials (CBOM) work, and adds
machine-readable JSON evidence. The gaps identified in this document
are observability gaps — the absence of machine-readable, network-
layer signals that enable automated PQC readiness assessment. This
differs from CBOM, which focuses on software composition and supply-
chain inventory.
Author's Address
Brian Vicente (editor)
Sanctum SecOps LLC
128 Dry Run Rd
Pine City, NY 14871
United States of America
Email: bvicente@sanctumsecops.com
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URI: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-6395-5308
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