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PQC Readiness Observability Gaps in Networked Computing Environments
draft-vicente-pquip-pqc-readiness-gaps-05

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Brian Vicente
Last updated 2026-09-12
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draft-vicente-pquip-pqc-readiness-gaps-05
Post-Quantum Use In Protocols                            B. Vicente, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                        Sanctum SecOps LLC
Intended status: Informational                         13 September 2026
Expires: 17 March 2027

  PQC Readiness Observability Gaps in Networked Computing Environments
               draft-vicente-pquip-pqc-readiness-gaps-05

Abstract

   This document identifies observability gaps that prevent network
   operators and security teams from determining the post-quantum
   cryptography (PQC) readiness state of networked computing
   environments.  PQC readiness requires knowing which cryptographic
   algorithms are in use across the environment, which are vulnerable to
   quantum attack, and which have been or are being migrated to NIST-
   approved PQC algorithms.  Current network protocols and management
   frameworks do not provide sufficient visibility to answer these
   questions at scale.

Supplementary Materials

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Reference implementation: CygnetLib
   (https://github.com/sanctumsecopsmssp/CygnetLib
   (https://github.com/sanctumsecopsmssp/CygnetLib)).  JSON evidence:
   algorithm registry, CNSA 2.0 compliance matrix, IETF PQC
   interoperability status, and ACTV test vectors are in the evidence/
   directory.  CAGE/NCAGE: 20XS3.  Apex website:
   https://www.sanctumsecops.com/ (https://www.sanctumsecops.com/).

Source and Archival

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Source maintained at https://github.com/Sanc-Admin/pquip-pqc-
   readiness-gaps (https://github.com/Sanc-Admin/pquip-pqc-readiness-
   gaps).  Author ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-6395-5308
   (https://orcid.org/0009-0006-6395-5308).

IPR Considerations

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

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   Certain technology described in this document is covered or may be
   covered by pending United States patent applications owned by Sanctum
   SecOps LLC, including U.S.  Application Nos. 64/080,137 and
   19/698,870.  Brian Vicente is the inventor.  Patent pending.

   Sanctum SecOps LLC is prepared to grant to all implementers, under a
   separate written agreement, a non-exclusive, worldwide license on
   reasonable and non-discriminatory terms that may include reasonable
   fees or royalties, under Necessary Patent Claims owned or controlled
   by Sanctum SecOps LLC.

   "Necessary Patent Claims" means claims subject to the applicable IETF
   disclosure that would necessarily be infringed by implementing
   technology required by this specification and for which no
   technically and commercially feasible non-infringing alternative is
   available.

   The license applies only to the compliant portion of a product or
   service implementing required technology.  It does not extend to
   optional features, proprietary enhancements, noncompliant
   implementations, methods not required by the specification, unrelated
   Sanctum SecOps LLC products, hosted control planes, managed services,
   trade secrets or claims that are not Necessary Patent Claims.

   Licensing may be conditioned on reciprocal licensing on reasonable
   and non-discriminatory terms for necessary claims owned or controlled
   by the licensee.  Sanctum SecOps LLC reserves defensive suspension
   and available remedies if the licensee or an affiliate asserts
   patents against Sanctum SecOps LLC, its affiliates, licensees,
   customers, compliant products or compliant services, except for a
   defensive claim compelled by a prior assertion.

   Nothing in this document admits or warrants issuance, validity,
   enforceability, infringement, essentiality, claim scope, absence of
   alternatives or freedom to operate.  No patent license arises merely
   from publication of this specification.  The controlling IETF
   Datatracker IPR disclosures remain authoritative.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 March 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Differentiation from CBOM and Software Inventory
           Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Identified Readiness Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Gap 1: No Structured Algorithm Negotiation Export from
           TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Gap 2: No DNSSEC Algorithm Inventory Export . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Gap 3: No Certificate Algorithm Inventory in OCSP/CRL
           Infrastructure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Gap 4: No PQC Readiness Signal in QUIC Transport  . . . .   6
     3.5.  Gap 5: No Aggregated Readiness State Export Protocol  . .   6
   4.  Requirements for Closing the Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

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1.1.  Motivation

   Preparing a networked computing environment for the post-quantum era
   requires operators to know: which cryptographic algorithms are
   currently in use across all network endpoints, services, and
   protocols; which of those algorithms are vulnerable to attacks by a
   Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) using Shor's
   algorithm [SHOR1994]; and which have been or are actively being
   migrated to NIST-approved PQC algorithms (FIPS 204, FIPS 205).

   Current network protocols — TLS [RFC8446], QUIC [RFC9000], SSH,
   DNSSEC — do not provide machine-readable, network-layer signals that
   enable automated aggregation of cryptographic algorithm usage across
   an environment.  SNMP MIBs, NetFlow/IPFIX, and syslog carry no
   structured cryptographic algorithm inventory.  This creates five
   distinct observability gaps that prevent automated PQC readiness
   assessment at scale.

1.2.  Differentiation from CBOM and Software Inventory Approaches

   Cryptography Bill of Materials (CBOM) work — as developed in the
   context of software supply chain security and SBOM frameworks —
   addresses the inventory of cryptographic libraries and algorithms as
   software components within application and OS stacks.  CBOM answers:
   "which cryptographic libraries does this software use?"

   This document addresses a distinct and complementary problem: the
   absence of _network-layer_ observability signals that would allow a
   network security monitor to determine, from traffic analysis and
   protocol metadata alone, which cryptographic algorithms are in active
   use across live network sessions — regardless of what the software
   stack reports.  Network-layer observability gaps persist even when
   CBOM is fully deployed, because:

   1.  CBOM reflects software composition at build/install time;
       network-layer signals reflect algorithm use at session time.

   2.  CBOM cannot detect algorithm downgrade attacks or negotiation
       outcomes that differ from the declared software capability.

   3.  CBOM requires agent deployment on endpoints; network-layer
       observability can be achieved passively via traffic analysis
       without endpoint agents.

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2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174].

   PQC Readiness State:
      The assessed condition of a network environment with respect to
      its preparedness to operate securely in the presence of a CRQC,
      determined by the current distribution of classical vs. PQC
      algorithm usage across active network sessions.

   Network-Layer Readiness Signal:
      A machine-readable signal extractable from network traffic or
      protocol metadata — without endpoint agent access — that
      contributes to determining the PQC Readiness State of a session,
      endpoint, or service.

   Algorithm Negotiation Record:
      A structured log record capturing the cryptographic algorithm
      negotiated in a specific protocol session (e.g., TLS cipher suite,
      SSH key exchange method, DNSSEC algorithm).

   Readiness Gap:
      An absence of a normative mechanism for generating, transmitting,
      or aggregating a Network-Layer Readiness Signal that would
      contribute to PQC Readiness State assessment.

3.  Identified Readiness Gaps

3.1.  Gap 1: No Structured Algorithm Negotiation Export from TLS

   TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] negotiates cipher suites and key exchange groups
   via ClientHello/ServerHello.  The negotiated algorithms are
   observable in the TLS handshake but:

   1.  No IETF-standard mechanism exports structured Algorithm
       Negotiation Records from TLS implementations to a network
       management system.

   2.  IPFIX/NetFlow record types do not include TLS cipher suite as a
       standard information element available in all major
       implementations.

   3.  Passive TLS inspection (where legally permissible) requires
       decryption or relies on handshake metadata only — which is
       increasingly encrypted in TLS 1.3 via ECH.

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3.2.  Gap 2: No DNSSEC Algorithm Inventory Export

   DNSSEC [RFC4034] zone signing uses algorithm identifiers (RSA/SHA-
   256, ECDSA P-256/SHA-256, etc.) recorded in DNSKEY and RRSIG records.
   No standard mechanism aggregates DNSSEC algorithm usage across zones
   in a resolver's cache into a machine-readable inventory exportable to
   a network management system.

3.3.  Gap 3: No Certificate Algorithm Inventory in OCSP/CRL
      Infrastructure

   OCSP [RFC6960] responses and CRL [RFC5280] distributions carry
   certificate revocation status but do not carry structured information
   about the algorithm family of the certificate being checked.  No
   IETF-standard mechanism aggregates certificate algorithm distribution
   across an OCSP/CRL infrastructure into a readiness inventory.

3.4.  Gap 4: No PQC Readiness Signal in QUIC Transport

   QUIC [RFC9000] uses TLS 1.3 for its cryptographic handshake.  The
   same Gap 1 issues apply to QUIC sessions.  Additionally, QUIC's
   encrypted header format further reduces the visibility of handshake
   metadata to passive monitors.

3.5.  Gap 5: No Aggregated Readiness State Export Protocol

   Even if individual gaps 1-4 were addressed by adding algorithm-
   negotiation export to each protocol, no IETF-standard aggregation
   protocol exists for collecting per-session Algorithm Negotiation
   Records across protocols, computing a PQC Readiness State for an
   environment, and exporting that state to a security operations
   platform in a structured, machine-readable format.

4.  Requirements for Closing the Gaps

   *REQ-RG-1:* A normative mechanism SHOULD be defined for TLS
   implementations to export structured Algorithm Negotiation Records to
   a local collector without requiring decryption of session content.

   *REQ-RG-2:* DNSSEC resolvers SHOULD export per-zone algorithm usage
   records in a structured format to enable environment-wide DNSSEC
   algorithm inventory.

   *REQ-RG-3:* OCSP and CRL infrastructure SHOULD record and export the
   algorithm family of certificates for which status is checked,
   enabling a CA to monitor the classical-vs-PQC distribution of its
   actively-checked certificate population.

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   *REQ-RG-4:* A structured PQC Readiness State data model SHOULD be
   defined that aggregates per-session Algorithm Negotiation Records
   into an environment-level readiness score or distribution, exportable
   via an IETF-standard protocol (e.g., YANG/NETCONF, IPFIX extension).

   *REQ-RG-5:* The aggregated PQC Readiness State data model MUST be
   complementary to and interoperable with CBOM outputs, not duplicative
   of them.  Implementers SHOULD combine CBOM software inventory with
   network-layer Algorithm Negotiation Records for complete readiness
   coverage.

5.  Implementation Status

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   mechanisms described in this document at the time of posting, based
   on the proposal in [RFC7942].  A listing here does not imply
   endorsement by the IETF, and this section is expected to be removed
   by the RFC Editor before publication.

   Implementation:  CygnetSSL certification authority driver, Sanctum
      SecOps LLC.

   Description:  Certificate issuance, revocation, chain and profile
      verification, CRL generation and publication, and OCSP status
      responses, built on OpenSSL 3 with the FIPS provider active.

   Maturity:  Operated on a single administrator-managed estate.  No
      interoperability testing against independent implementations has
      been performed.

   Licensing:  Proprietary; source not publicly available.

   Contact:  bvicente@sanctumsecops.com

   Observations recorded on 2026-09-12 on that implementation: the
   OpenSSL base, default and FIPS providers were active with the kernel
   FIPS indicator set; 22 end-entity certificates were issued and
   verified across two profiles; all certificates used ECDSA on P-384
   with ecdsa-with-SHA384 signatures and carried non-sequential 20-octet
   serial numbers drawn from a CSPRNG; the certificate revocation list
   was published in DER form at the URI named in the CRL distribution
   points extension; and a newly issued certificate returned an OCSP
   status of "good" and, following revocation with reason
   cessationOfOperation, returned "revoked" with a matching revocation
   time.

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6.  Security Considerations

   Algorithm Negotiation Records may reveal information about the
   cryptographic capabilities of endpoints in a network.  Aggregated
   readiness inventories MUST be protected as sensitive security
   metadata.  Access to readiness state exports MUST be restricted to
   authorized security operations personnel.  Exporters MUST NOT include
   session content or key material in Algorithm Negotiation Records.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.  Future documents closing the
   identified gaps may require IANA registrations for IPFIX information
   elements, YANG module names, or algorithm identifier registries.

8.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

9.  Informative References

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

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   [RFC9000]  Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
              Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.

   [SHOR1994] Shor, P., "Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete
              logarithms and factoring", Proceedings of the 35th Annual
              Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science pp. 124-134,
              1994.

   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   The author thanks Mike Ounsworth (Entrust) for valuable feedback on
   draft structure and boilerplate compliance, and the IETF PQUIP,
   LAMPS, and OAuth working groups for their ongoing work on post-
   quantum cryptography standardization.

   CygnetLib (https://github.com/sanctumsecopsmssp/CygnetLib
   (https://github.com/sanctumsecopsmssp/CygnetLib)) serves as the
   reference implementation for algorithms described in this document.
   JSON evidence files including the algorithm registry, CNSA 2.0
   compliance matrix, IETF PQC interoperability status, and ACTV test
   vector results are available in the evidence/ directory of the
   CygnetLib repository.

Changelog

   This revision (-03) adds a Posture B IPR notice, differentiates from
   adjacent Cryptography Bill of Materials (CBOM) work, and adds
   machine-readable JSON evidence.  The gaps identified in this document
   are observability gaps — the absence of machine-readable, network-
   layer signals that enable automated PQC readiness assessment.  This
   differs from CBOM, which focuses on software composition and supply-
   chain inventory.

Author's Address

   Brian Vicente (editor)
   Sanctum SecOps LLC
   128 Dry Run Rd
   Pine City, NY 14871
   United States of America
   Email: bvicente@sanctumsecops.com

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   URI:   https://orcid.org/0009-0006-6395-5308

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