Trusted Path Routing using Remote Attestation
draft-voit-rats-trusted-path-routing-01

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RATS Working Group                                               E. Voit
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track                          March 09, 2020
Expires: September 10, 2020

             Trusted Path Routing using Remote Attestation
                draft-voit-rats-trusted-path-routing-01

Abstract

   There are end-users who believe encryption technologies like IPSec
   alone are insufficient to protect the confidentiality of their highly
   sensitive traffic flows.  This specification describes two
   alternatives for protecting these sensitive flows as they transit a
   network.  In both alternatives, protection is accomplished by
   forwarding sensitive flows across network devices currently appraised
   as trustworthy.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Voit                   Expires September 10, 2020               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 trust-path                     March 2020

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Centralized Trusted Path Routing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Distributed Trusted Path Routing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Trusted Topology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Passport with Composite Evidence  . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Attestation Event Stream  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Subscribing to the stream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  YANG notifications placed on the Event Stream . . . . . .  11
     5.3.  Pre-filtering the Event Stream  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.4.  Replaying previous PCR Extend events. . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.5.  Configuring the Attestation Event Stream  . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Passport Protocol Bindings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Appendix B.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Appendix C.  Open Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28

1.  Introduction

   There are end-users who believe encryption technologies like IPSec
   alone are insufficient to protect the confidentiality of their highly
   sensitive traffic flows.  These customers want their highly sensitive
   flows to be transported over only network devices recently verified
   as trustworthy.

   With the inclusion of cryptoprocessor hardware into network devices,
   it is now possible for network providers to identify those network
   devices which have potentially exploitable or even exploited
   vulnerabilities.  Using this knowledge, it then becomes possible to
   redirect sensitive flows around these potentially compromised
   devices.

   This specification describes two architectural alternatives for
   exchanging traffic with end-user customer identified "sensitive
   subnets".  Traffic going to and from these subnets will transit a
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