Trusted Path Routing
draft-voit-rats-trustworthy-path-routing-00
RATS Working Group E. Voit
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track June 25, 2020
Expires: December 27, 2020
Trusted Path Routing
draft-voit-rats-trustworthy-path-routing-00
Abstract
There are end-users who believe encryption technologies like IPSec
alone are insufficient to protect the confidentiality of their highly
sensitive traffic flows. These end-users want their flows to
traverse devices which have been freshly appraised and verified.
This specification describes Trusted Path Routing. Trusted Path
Routing protects sensitive flows as they transit a network by
forwarding traffic to/from sensitive subnets across network devices
recently appraised as trustworthy.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 27, 2020.
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Voit Expires December 27, 2020 [Page 1]
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Protocol Independent Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Trusted Path Routing Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Network Topology Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Link Appraisal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Trustworthiness Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Attestation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.6. Stamped Passport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.7. Appraising the Stamped Passport . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Implementable Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Protocol Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix C. Open Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1. Introduction
There are end-users who believe encryption technologies like IPSec
alone are insufficient to protect the confidentiality of their highly
sensitive traffic flows. These customers want their highly sensitive
flows to be transported over only network devices recently verified
as trustworthy.
With the inclusion of TPM based cryptoprocessors into network
devices, it is now possible for network providers to identify
potentially compromised devices as well as potentially exploitable
(or even exploited) vulnerabilities. Using this knowledge, it then
becomes possible to redirect sensitive flows around these devices.
Trusted Path Routing provides a method of establishing Trusted
Topologies which only include trust-verified network devices.
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