Controlling Service Function Access to Network Service Header
draft-vu-sfc-sf-access-control-00

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Vu Vu , Younghan Kim 
Last updated 2016-10-31
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Service Function Chaining                                      Vu Anh Vu
Internet-Draft                                              Younghan Kim
Intended status: Informational                       Soongsil University
Expires: May 3, 2017                                    October 30, 2016

     Controlling Service Function Access to Network Service Header
                   draft-vu-sfc-sf-access-control-00

Abstract

   This document describes a mechanism to control Service Function
   access to the Network Service Header (NSH).  It addresses the Service
   Function trust issue and provide a method to enforce predefined
   access control lists to limit Service Function access to Service
   Function Chain information in the NSH in NSH-based Service Chaining.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.3.  Definition Of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  SF Access Control List  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Access Control Enforcing Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Consideration for NSH Concealment . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2.  Problem Statement

   SFC Architecture document [RFC7665] defines architectural concepts
   and core components, inluding Service Functions (SFs), Service
   Function Forwarder (SFF), Classifier (CF), SFC Proxy.  These
   terminologies will be used in this documents.

   It is argued that whether or not we should trust the SFs in SFC.  In
   SFC general use cases, SFs vary from virtual services hosted in
   general-purpose servers to legacy service functions with dedicated
   hardware.  Most of the time, these SFs are deployed and operated by
   their service provider, therefore they are highly trusted.  Despite
   of being in isolated and relatively safe service provider networks,
   SFs are not invulnerable to all security threats.  Indeed, there are
   several reasons that cause the misbehavior of SFs.  For instance,
   they can still be manipulated by multiple types of malware.
   Furthermore, malfunctioned and misconfigured SFs can have anomaly
   behavior as well.

   Aside from their own SFs, service providers may use SFs from other
   sources such as third party service providers (in case they want to
   outsource their SFs), SFs on customer premise, and legacy black-box
   SFs.  In addition, enterprises are also trying to outsource their SFs
   to service providers, while still manage the SFC by themselves.

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   Although service providers always have some SLAs for each SF, these
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