Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks
draft-vyncke-opsec-v6-00

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Chittimaneni Kk  , Merike Kaeo  , √Čric Vyncke 
Last updated 2012-03-05
Replaced by draft-ietf-opsec-v6
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Operational Security Capabilities for                    K. Chittimaneni
IPv6 Network Infrastructure                                       Google
Internet-Draft                                                   M. Kaeo
Intended status: Informational                                       ISC
Expires: September 6, 2012                                     E. Vyncke
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                           March 5, 2012

         Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks
                        draft-vyncke-opsec-v6-00

Abstract

   Network managers know how to operate securely IPv4 network: whether
   it is the Internet or an enterprise internal network.  IPv6 presents
   some new security challenges.  RFC 4942 describes the security issues
   in the protocol but network managers need also a more practical,
   operation-minded best common practices.

   This document analyzes the operational security issues in all places
   of a network (service providers, enterprises and residential users)
   and proposes technical and procedural mitigations techniques.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Chittimaneni, et al.    Expires September 6, 2012               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 OPsec IPV6                     March 2012

   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Generic Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Addressing Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.1.  Overall Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.2.  Use of ULAs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.3.  Point-to-Point Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.4.  Privacy Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.1.5.  DHCP/DNS Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  Link Layer Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.2.1.  SeND and CGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.2.2.  DHCP Snooping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.2.3.  ND/RA Rate Limiting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.2.4.  ND/RA Filtering  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.3.  Control Plane Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       2.3.1.  Control Protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       2.3.2.  Management Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       2.3.3.  Packet Exceptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     2.4.  Routing Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       2.4.1.  Authenticating Neighbors/Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       2.4.2.  Securing Routing Updates Between Peers . . . . . . . . 11
       2.4.3.  Route Filtering  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     2.5.  Logging/Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       2.5.1.  Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       2.5.2.  Use of collected data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       2.5.3.  Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     2.6.  Transition/Coexistence Technologies  . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       2.6.1.  Dual Stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       2.6.2.  Tunneling Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       2.6.3.  Translation Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     2.7.  General Device Hardening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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