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Analysis of Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Use Cases
draft-waltermire-sacm-use-cases-00

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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Author David Waltermire
Last updated 2012-07-09
Replaced by draft-ietf-sacm-use-cases, RFC 7632
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draft-waltermire-sacm-use-cases-00
Network Working Group                                 D. Waltermire, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                      NIST
Intended status: Informational                              July 2, 2012
Expires: January 3, 2013

  Analysis of Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Use
                                 Cases
                   draft-waltermire-sacm-use-cases-00

Abstract

   This document identifies foundational use cases, derived functional
   capabilities and requirements, architectural components, and the
   supporting standards needed to define an interoperable, automation
   infrastructure required to support timely, accurate and actionable
   situational awareness over an organization's IT systems.  Automation
   tools implementing a continuous monitoring approach will utilize this
   infrastructure together with existing and emerging event, incident
   and network management standards to provide visibility into the state
   of assets, user activities and network behavior.  Stakeholders will
   be able to use these tools to aggregate and analyze relevant security
   and operational data to understand the organizations security
   posture, quantify business risk, and make informed decisions that
   support organizational objectives while protecting critical
   information.  Organizations will be able to use these tools to
   augment and automate information sharing activities to collaborate
   with partners to identify and mitigate threats.  Other automation
   tools will be able to integrate with these capabilities to enforce
   policies based on human decisions to harden systems, prevent misuse
   and reduce the overall attack surface.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2013.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Key Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.1.  UC1: Assessment and Enforcement of Acceptable State  . . .  4
     3.2.  UC2: Behavioral Monitoring and Enforcement . . . . . . . .  5
     3.3.  UC3: Security Control Verification and Monitoring  . . . .  6
     3.4.  UC4: Secure Exchange of Governance, Risk and
           Compliance (GRC) Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.5.  UC5: Automated Forensics Investigation . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  Functional Capabillities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  Functional Capability 1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.2.  Functional Capability n  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Functional Components  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Data Exchange Models and Communications Protocols  . . . . . .  9
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Appendix A.  Additional Stuff  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

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1.  Introduction

   This document addresses foundational use cases in security
   automation.  Portions of these use cases may be considered when
   establishing a charter for the Security Automation and Continuous
   Monitoring (SACM) working group within the IETF.  This working group
   will address a portion of the standards needed to define an
   interoperable, automation infrastructure required to support timely,
   accurate and actionable situational awareness over an organization's
   IT systems.  This document enumerates use cases and break down
   related concepts that cross many IT security information domains.

   Sections [...] of this document focus on:

      Defining the key concepts and terminology used within the document
      providing a common frame of reference;

      Identifying foundational use cases that represent classes of
      stakeholders, goals, and usage scenarios;

      A set of derived functional capabilities and associated
      requirements that are needed to support the use cases;

      A break down of architectural components that address one or more
      functional capabilities that can be used in various combinations
      to support the use cases; and

      An inventory of existing, emerging, and needed data exchange
      models and communications protocols that are required to support
      interoperability between architectural components.

   The standards identified in this document provide a foundation for
   creating interoperable automation tools and continuous monitoring
   solutions that provide visibility into the state of assets, user
   activities, and network behavior.  Stakeholders will be able to use
   these tools to aggregate and analyze relevant security and
   operational data to understand the organizations security posture,
   quantify business risk, and make informed decisions that support
   organizational objectives while protecting critical information.
   Organizations will be able to use these tools to augment and automate
   information sharing activities to collaborate with partners to
   identify and mitigate threats.  Other automation tools will be able
   to integrate with these capabilities to enforce policies based on
   human decisions to harden systems, prevent misuse and reduce the
   overall attack surface.

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1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Key Concepts

   Define/reference the major concepts included in this document.

3.  Use Cases

   Describe use cases, one per sub-section.

   Things to consider including (but not limited to):

   o  Usage scenarios (e.g.  Security Control Verification, Endpoint
      Enforcement, Incident Detection, Forensic Investigation, etc.)

   o  Information Domains (e.g. configuration, vulnerability, digital
      events, etc.)

   o  Characteristics of the information used (e.g. real-time/periodic,
      static/dynamic, etc.)

3.1.  UC1: Assessment and Enforcement of Acceptable State

   Controlling access to networks and services based on the assessment
   and analysis of host and/or network state based on machine
   processable content.

   Possible "things" that are being measured:

   o  Asset information

   o  System configuration

   o  System vulnerabilities

   o  System weaknesses

   o  Semi-automated human interrogation methods to assess non-
      automatable, technical controls

   Possible desired outcomes to address:

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   o  User/system is allowed access to network resources

   o  User/system is denied access to network resources

      *  Potential mitigation actions are taken

   Possible other things to address:

   o  In this and subsequent sections, document how this work is related
      to Network Endpoint Assessment (nea) working group.

   o  Relevant processes, technologies and techniques.

3.2.  UC2: Behavioral Monitoring and Enforcement

   Controlling access to networks and services based on the detection
   and analysis of host and/or user behavior using automatable
   information from various sources.

   Possible "things" that are being measured:

   o  System configuration

   o  System vulnerabilities

   o  Network events

   o  User/host behavior

   Possible desired outcomes to address:

   o  Change in state is recorded and reported

   o  User/system activity is recorded and reported

   o  User/system access is terminated or altered

   Possible other things to address:

   o  In this and subsequent sections, document how this work is related
      to Network Endpoint Assessment (nea) working group.

   o  Discuss how this could potentially be related to the IP Flow
      Information Export (ipfix) working group.  Basically leveraging
      Netflow to detect network behavior.  This information could be
      received from what the MILE WG is doing with incident response.
      (see UC5 and UC4)

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   o  Relevant processes, technologies and techniques.

3.3.  UC3: Security Control Verification and Monitoring

   Continuous assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of
   security controls based on machine processable content.

   Possible "things" that are being measured:

   o  Compliance to organizationally defined/required controls

      *  System configuration

      *  System vulnerabilities

      *  Network events

      *  Semi-automated human interrogation methods to assess non-
         technical controls

   o  Deviations from expected state

   Possible desired outcomes to address:

   o  Compliance or non-compliance is recorded and reported

   Possible other things to address:

   o  Indicate the relationship to UC1 and UC2.  These use cases provide
      some of that data needed to support this use case.

   o  Relevant processes, technologies and techniques.

3.4.  UC4: Secure Exchange of Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC)
      Information

   Sharing security and/or operationally relevant information within and
   across trust boundaries using secure, automated communication
   channels and formats.

   Possible "things" that are being measured:

   o  ???

   Possible desired outcomes to address:

   o  Combining results from UC1-UC3, a report to an organizational
      authority is generated, including relevant data pertaining to the

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      user activities, potentially along with the aggregated data from
      other user activities.

   o  Potential sharing of risk and/or threat behavioral information
      with partners as well as reference data and content like USGCB,
      NVD, IAVM, and machine-readable US-CERT alerts

   o  Outcome of UC4 informs back through UC1-UC3, such as updates to
      policies, adjusted configurations, new patch data, etc.

   Possible other things to address:

   o  Indicate the relationship of this use case to UC3 and UC5.  This
      use case supports requests for and reporting of information
      generated by UC3 and UC5.

   o  Be sure to incorporate Incident/Security Event Exchange (UC5).

   o  Document how this use case supports methods to combine data sets
      to generate reports that would be shared between parties.  This is
      a touch point with the MILE GRC-Exchange work.  Establish the use
      cases for the exchange.  In the following sections, discuss
      additional work that may be needed to tie these pieces together

   o  Discuss the use of content repositories in support of information
      exchange.

   o  Relevant processes, technologies and techniques.

3.5.  UC5: Automated Forensics Investigation

   Remote and/or local collection of organizational, network, and/or
   host information for the purpose of incident investigation and
   response.

   Possible "things" that are being measured:

   o  Scope and impact of security incident

   Possible desired outcomes to address:

   o  Identify the need for additional data collection from UC1-UC3
      based on gaps in information currently collected

   o  Can be informed by UC4, such as shared risk/threat information

   o  Alteration to acceptable system state requirements necessary for
      UC1-UC2

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   o  Identify the need for additional or altered controls in UC3

   Possible other things to address:

   o  Relevant processes, technologies and techniques.

4.  Functional Capabillities

   Decompose the functional capabilities needed to support the use
   cases, one per sub-section.  Cross reference the use case
   dependencies where they exist.

   Things to consider including (but not limited to):

   o  Information Views/Reports (e.g. security posture, compliance,
      control effectiveness)

   o  Data Collection (e.g. configuration state, software inventory,
      user and network behavior)

   o  Reference Information Formats (e.g. control catalogs,
      configuration baselines, malware characteristics, vulnerability
      data)

4.1.  Functional Capability 1

   Describe the first capability.

4.2.  Functional Capability n

   Describe the n capability.

5.  Functional Components

   Describe the abstract functional components needed to provide the
   capabilities described in the previous section.  Describe any
   relationships between the components and how they can be composed to
   address functional capabilities. (this might be better defined in the
   previous section.)

   Things to consider including (but not limited to):

   o  Topologies

   o  Federation Strategy

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6.  Data Exchange Models and Communications Protocols

   Document where existing work exists, what is currently defined by
   SDOs, and any gaps that should be addressed.  Point to existing
   event, incident and network management standards when available.
   Describe emerging efforts that may be used for the creation of new
   standards.  For gaps provide insight into what would be a good fit
   for SACM or another IETF working groups.

   This will help us to identify what is needed for SACM to be
   successful.  This section will help determine which of the
   specifications can be normatively referenced and what needs to be
   addressed in the IETF.  This should help us determine any protocol or
   guidance documentation we will need to generate to support the
   described use cases.

   Things to address:

      For IETF related efforts, discuss work in NEA and MILE.  Address
      SNMP, NetConf and other efforts as needed.

      Reference any Security Automation work that is applicable.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

   All drafts are required to have an IANA considerations section (see
   the update of RFC 2434 [I-D.narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis]
   for a guide).  If the draft does not require IANA to do anything, the
   section contains an explicit statement that this is the case (as
   above).  If there are no requirements for IANA, the section will be
   removed during conversion into an RFC by the RFC Editor.

8.  Security Considerations

   All drafts are required to have a security considerations section.
   See RFC 3552 [RFC3552] for a guide.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

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   [min_ref]  authSurName, authInitials., "Minimal Reference", 2006.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis]
              Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs",
              draft-narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis-09 (work in
              progress), March 2008.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              July 2003.

Appendix A.  Additional Stuff

   This becomes an Appendix if needed.

Author's Address

   David Waltermire (editor)
   National Institute of Standards and Technology
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, Maryland  20877
   USA

   Phone:
   Email: david.waltermire@nist.gov

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