Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange in the IKEv2 with FrodoKEM
draft-wang-hybrid-kem-ikev2-frodo-02
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Guilin WANG | ||
| Last updated | 2024-10-18 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
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draft-wang-hybrid-kem-ikev2-frodo-02
IP Security Maintenance and Extensions G. Wang, Ed.
Internet-Draft Huawei Internatinoal Pte Ltd
Intended status: Informational 18 October 2024
Expires: 21 April 2025
Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange in the IKEv2 with FrodoKEM
draft-wang-hybrid-kem-ikev2-frodo-02
Abstract
RFC 9370 specifies a framework that supports mulitple key
encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol
Version 2 (IKEv2) by allowing up to 7 layers of additiona KEMs
employed with the oringal ECDH to derive the final shared secret keys
for IPsec protocols. The primitive goal is to mitigate the security
threat against quantum computers by hybriding additional post-quantum
(PQ) KEMs with the orinigal ECDH key exchange. This draft specifies
how one QP KEMs, FrodoKEM, is instantiated in the IKEv2 as the
additional KEMs with the main ECDH to achieve hybrid key agreement.
[EDNOTE: IANA KE code points for FrodoKEM may need to be assigned, as
the code points for ML-KEM has been considered in [I-D.D24]. ]
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
Discussion of this draft takes place on the rfc-interest mailing list
(rfc-interest@rfc-editor.org), which has its home page at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/mailman/listinfo/rfc-interest.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 April 2025.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Key Encapsulation Mechanism and FrodoKEM . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Examples of Running Hybrid KEMs in the IKEv2 with
FrodoKEMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
To mitigate the security threats on key exchanges again quantum
computers, especialy the harvest-now-and-decrypt-later (HNDL) attack,
the approach of hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) has been
proposed to achieve secure key exchange if at least one of KEMs is
still secure. In particular, hybrid KEMs is supposed to be used in
the scenarios where one or multiple traditional KEMs are used
together with one or multiple post-quantum KEMs [I-D.D24]. The
Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), which sepecifies
the key exchange procedures of IPSec, has to be updated for quantum
resistant security. For this purpose, RFC 9370 [RFC9370] describes a
framework to hybrid mulitple key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs),
which extends the IKEv2 by allowing multiple key exchanges to take
place for deriving shared secret keys during a Security Association
(SA) setup. Essentially, this speficiation employs the
IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, which is a new IKE message introduced in
[RFC9242] so that multiple key exchanges can be run to establish an
IKE SA via exchanging additional PQ public keys and ciphertexts
between a client and a server. RFC 9370 also introduces
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IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE, a new IKEv2 exchange for realizing the same purpose
when the IKE SA is being rekeyed or is creating additional Child SAs.
However, RFC 9370 just specifies the framework of hybrid KEMS but it
has not been instantiated for concrete multiple KEMS. [I-D.KR24]
desribes how the framework given by RFC 9370 can be run with the
post-quantum (PQ) ML-KEM [FIPS203], previously called Kyber, which is
the standard published by NIST in August of 2024. However, on the
one hand, FRC 9350 allows up to 7 layers of additiona KEMs employed
with the oringal ECDH to derive final shared secret keys for the
IKEv2. On the other hand, for some applications (e.g. financial
services) demanding high security level, additional PQ KEMs may be
desired for completing the hybrid KEMs for the IKEv2. Currently, ISO
is now standardizing three PQ KEM aglorithms: Kyber, FrodoKEM, and
classic McElliece. Note that Frodo [Frodo] is unstructured lattice
based KEM, whose security is more conservative compared to ML-KEM,
which is based on structured lattice. Therefore, this draft is
motivated to describe concretely how the frame of hybrid KEMs for the
IKEv2 specified in RFC 9370 can be run via hybriding the ogirinal
ECDH and FrodoKEM, even with ML-KEM together, if necessary.
Here are a few reasons for explaining why such diversity of KEMs is
important for the IKEv2 (and also other security protocols).
* The availability of various PQC algorithms is beneficial to
applications as different PQC algorithms could be selected
according to practical performance requirements and security
requirements.
* Generally speaking, post-quantum algorithms are still not mature
yet. Some algorithms may turn out to be insecure after a number
of years’ study and/or standardization. An example is SIKE, which
had been in the NIST standardization progres for several years
until it was totally broken in Aug. of 2022.
* Cryptographic agility shall play a crucial role in the PQ
migration [OPM23]. To facilitate cryptographic agility, not only
should the systems and protocols be engineered agile but also
there should be a good size of standardized PQC algorithms
available, which may be based on different hard problems.
However, the perfomace of Frodo is not as good as ML-KEM. In
particular, the sizes of pulic key and ciphtertext of FrodoKEM are
roughtly 10 times larger than those of ML-KEM. Consequently, this
will almost unavoidably triger the issue of IKE fragmentation.
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2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Key Encapsulation Mechanism and FrodoKEM
Key encapsulation mechanism(KEM) is a kind of key exchange, which
allows one entity to encapsulate a secret key under a (longterm or
ephemeral) public key of another entity. By following the definiton
given in [I-D.KR24], a KEM consists of three algorithms:
* KeyGen(k) -> (pk, sk): A probabilistic key generation algorithm,
which generates a public encapsulation key pk and a secret
decapsulation key sk, when a security parameter k is given.
* Encaps(pk) -> (ct, ss): A probabilistic encapsulation algorithm,
which takes as input a public encapsulation key pk and outputs a
ciphertext ct and shared secret ss.
* Decaps(sk, ct) -> ss: A decapsulation algorithm, which takes as
input a secret decapsulation key sk and ciphertext ct and outputs
a shared secret ss.
ML-KEM and FrodoKEM are two well-known post-quantum KEMs from
lattice. More specifically, ML-KEM [FIPS203], orignially called
Kyber, has been published as the only one KEM scheme by NIST in
August of 2024. It is a Module-Lattice based Key-Encapsulation
Mechanism, so called ML-KEM. ML-KEM is also specified as an Internet
Draft in IETF [I-D.Kyber24].
FrodoKEM [Frodo] is one of three KEMS in the process of ISO
stardandization, which is based on unstructured lattice problem.
However, the perfomace of Frodo is not as good as ML-KEM.
Specifically, as showen in Table 1, the sizes of pulic key and
ciphtertext of FrodoKEM are roughtly 10 times larger than those of
ML-KEM. Consequently, this will almost unavoidably triger the issue
of IKE fragmentation [RFC7383] [RFC9242].
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+===============+============+============+============+===============+
| Algorithms | secret key | public key | ciphterext | shared secret |
| | sk | pk | ct | ss |
+===============+============+============+============+===============+
| ML-KEM-512 | 800 | 1,632 | 768 | 32 |
+---------------+------------+------------+------------+---------------+
| ML-KEM-768 | 1,184 | 2,400 | 1,088 | 32 |
+---------------+------------+------------+------------+---------------+
| ML-KEM-1024 | 1,568 | 3,168 | 1,568 | 32 |
+---------------+------------+------------+------------+---------------+
| FrodoKEM-640 | 19,888 | 9,616 | 9,752 | 16 |
+---------------+------------+------------+------------+---------------+
| FrodoKEM-976 | 31,296 | 15,632 | 15,792 | 24 |
+---------------+------------+------------+------------+---------------+
| FrodoKEM-1344 | 43,088 | 21,520 | 21,696 | 32 |
+---------------+------------+------------+---------------+------------+
Table 1: Size (in bytes) of keys and ciphertexts of ML-KEM and FrodoKEM
4. Examples of Running Hybrid KEMs in the IKEv2 with FrodoKEMs
Following general exmaples given in Appendix A of [RFC9370], here is
an example to show that the initiator proposes the use of additional
key exchanges to establish an IKE SA. Here, the initiator proposes
three sets of additional key exchanges. Namely, the first set is
TBD36 (ml-kem-768), TBD37 (ml-kem-1024) [I-D.KR24] or NONE; the
second set is TBD43 (eFrodoKEM-976-<AES>), TBD45 (eFrodoKEM-
976-<SHAKE>) or NONE; and the third set is TBD49 (eFrodoKEM-
1344-<SHAKE>) or NONE (refer to Section 6). As all of the three
additional key exchanes are optional, the responder can choose NONE
for some or all of the additional exchanges if the proposed key
exchange methods are not supported or for whatever reasons the
responder decides not to perform the additional key exchange.
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Initiator Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAi1(.. ADDKE*...), --->
KEi(Curve25519), Ni, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
Proposal #1
Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
256-bit key)
Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
Transform ADDKE1 (ID = TBD36)
Transform ADDKE1 (ID = TBD37)
Transform ADDKE1 (ID = NONE)
Transform ADDKE2 (ID = TBD43)
Transform ADDKE2 (ID = TBD45)
Transform ADDKE2 (ID = NONE)
Transform ADDKE3 (ID = TBD49)
Transform ADDKE3 (ID = NONE)
<--- HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAr1(.. ADDKE*...),
KEr(Curve25519), Nr, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
Proposal #1
Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
256-bit key)
Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
Transform ADDKE1 (ID = TBD36)
Transform ADDKE2 (ID = TBD43)
Transform ADDKE3 (ID = NONE)
HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEi(1)(TBD36)} -->
<--- HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEr(1)(TBD36)}
HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEi(2)(TBD43)} -->
<--- HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEr(2)(TBD43)}
HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDi, AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr } --->
<--- HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{IDr, AUTH, SAr2,TSi, TSr}
Fig. 1 Hybrid KEMs of ECDH, TBD36 (ml-kem-768), and TBD43 (eFrodoKEM-976-<AES>)
In the above example, the responder chooses to run two additional key
exchanges. Namely, it selects TBD36 (ml-kem-768), TBD43 (eFrodoKEM-
976-<AES>), and NONE, respectively for the first, second, and third
additional key exchanges. According to the IKEv2 specification
[RFC7296], a set of keying materials can be derived, in particular
SK_d, SK_a[i/r], and SK_e[i/r], when the IKE_SA_INIT exchange has
been completed by the initiator and the responder with a successful
execution of ECDH based on the curve 25519. After that, both peers
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will perform an IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, carrying TBD36 payload,
which is protected with SK_e[i/r] and SK_a[i/r] keys. After the
completion of this IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, the SKEYSEED is updated
using SK(1), which is the TBD36 shared secret. Next, an
IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange for TBD43 payload will be performed so that
the SKEYSEED will be updated again.
After the completion of both IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges for TBD36 and
TBD43, the initiator and the responder will continue the IKE_AUTH
exchange phase.
More details and and further examples will be provided later
5. Security Considerations
Basically, security considerations from [RFC7383], [RFC9242] and
[RFC9370] apply to hybrid KEM exchange of ECDH, ML-KEM, and FrodoKEM
described in this draft.
In additon, due to the fragmentation of public key and cipthertext of
IKE message when FrodoKEM is hybrided, the performance of IKEv2 may
be affected and the chance of re-transmision of IKE packet could
become higher in some networking secnarios.
Further security analysis will be updated later.
6. IANA Considerations
In total, FrodoKEM has 12 variants. Namely, 3 security levels for
NIST Levels 1, 3, and 5; the pseudorandom generate (PRG) using AES128
or SHAKE 128; and the KEM public key can be a long-term key (standard
mode) or a short-term key (ephemeral mode). So, by following the new
values has been requested for "ml-kem-768" and "ml-kem-768" by
[I-D.KR24], it is planning to request 12 IANA values for the names in
the IKEv2 "Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange Method Transform IDs",
which are: "FrodoKEM-640-<AES>", , "eFrodoKEM-640-<AES>", "FrodoKEM-
640-<SHAKE>", "eFrodoKEM-640-<SHAKE>", "FrodoKEM-976-<AES>",
"eFrodoKEM-976-<AES>", "FrodoKEM-976-<SHAKE>", "eFrodoKEM-
976-<SHAKE>", "FrodoKEM-1344-<AES>", "eFrodoKEM-1344-<AES>",
"FrodoKEM-1344-<SHAKE>", and "eFrodoKEM-1344-<SHAKE>".. Table 2
below gives the list of 12 IANA values for the 12 versions of
FrodoKEM. The Recipient Tests field should point to this document as
well.
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+========+===============+========+===============+============+
| Number | Name | Status | Recipient | Reference |
| | | | Tests | |
+=========+==============+========+===============+============+
| TBD38 | FrodoKEM-640 | | [TBD, this | [TBD, this |
| | -<AES> | | draft] | draft] |
+---------+--------------+--------+---------------+------------+
| TBD39 |eFrodoKEM-640 | | [TBD, this | [TBD, this |
| |-<AES> | | draft] | draft] |
+---------+--------------+--------+---------------+------------+
| TBD40 | FrodoKEM-640 | | [TBD, this | [TBD, this |
| | -<SHAKE> | | draft] | draft] |
+---------+--------------+--------+---------------+------------+
| TBD41 |eFrodoKEM-640 | | [TBD, this | [TBD, this |
| |-<SHAKE> | | draft] | draft] |
+---------+--------------+--------+---------------+------------+
| TBD42 | FrodoKEM-976 | | [TBD, this | [TBD, this |
| | -<AES> | | draft] | draft] |
+---------+--------------+--------+---------------+------------+
| TBD43 |eFrodoKEM-976 | | [TBD, this | [TBD, this |
| |-<AES> | | draft] | draft] |
+---------+--------------+--------+---------------+------------+
| TBD44 | FrodoKEM-976 | | [TBD, this | [TBD, this |
| | -<SHAKE> | | draft] | draft] |
+---------+--------------+--------+---------------+------------+
| TBD45 |eFrodoKEM-976 | | [TBD, this | [TBD, this |
| |-<SHAKE> | | draft] | draft] |
+---------+--------------+--------+---------------+------------+
| TBD46 | FrodoKEM-1344| | [TBD, this | [TBD, this |
| | -<AES> | | draft] | draft] |
+---------+--------------+--------+---------------+------------+
| TBD47 |eFrodoKEM-1344| | [TBD, this | [TBD, this |
| |-<AES> | | draft] | draft] |
+---------+--------------+--------+---------------+------------+
| TBD48 | FrodoKEM-1344| | [TBD, this | [TBD, this |
| | -<SHAKE> | | draft] | draft] |
+---------+------------- +--------+---------------+------------+
| TBD49 |eFrodoKEM-1344| | [TBD, this | [TBD, this |
| |-<SHAKE> | | draft] | draft] |
+---------+--------------+--------+---------------+------------+
Table 2: Updates to the IANA "Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange"
7. Acknowledgments
To be added later.
8. Normative References
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7383] Smyslov, V., "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2) Message Fragmentation", RFC 7383,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7383, November 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7383>.
[RFC9242] Smyslov, V., "Intermediate Exchange in the Internet Key
Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 9242,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9242, May 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9242>.
[RFC9370] Tjhai, CJ., Tomlinson, M., Bartlett, G., Fluhrer, S., Van
Geest, D., Garcia-Morchon, O., and V. Smyslov, "Multiple
Key Exchanges in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol
Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 9370, DOI 10.17487/RFC9370, May
2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9370>.
9. Informative References
[I-D.D24] F. Driscoll, F., "Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional
Hybrid Schemes", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,,
February 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-
ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology/>.
[I-D.KR24] Kampanakis, K. and G. Ravago, "Post-quantum Hybrid Key
Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol
Version 2 (IKEv2)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,,
February 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-
kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2/>.
[I-D.Kyber24]
Schwabe, P. and B. Westerbaan, "Kyber Post-Quantum KEM",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,, January 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cfrg-schwabe-
kyber/>.
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[OPM23] Ott, D., Paterson, K., and D. Moreau, "Where Is the
Research on Cryptographic Transition and Agility?",
Communications of the ACM, 66(4): 29-32, January 2023.
[Frodo] Alkim, E., Bos, J. W., Ducas, L., Longa, P., Mironov, I.,
Naehrig, N., Nikolaenko, V., Peikert, C., Raghunathan, A.,
and D. Stebila, "FrodoKEM: Learning With Errors Key
Encapsulation", Preliminary Standardization Proposal
submitted to ISO , March 2023,
<https://frodokem.org/files/FrodoKEM-standard_proposal-
20230314.pdf>.
[FIPS203] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS 203:
Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism
Standard", Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication , August 2024,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.203.pdf>.
Author's Address
Guilin Wang (editor)
Huawei Internatinoal Pte Ltd
9 North Buona Vista Drive, #13-01
The Metropolis Tower 1
SINGAPORE 138588
Singapore
Email: wang.guilin@huawei.com
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