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Recommendations for Post-Quantum Signature Algorithms in TLS 1.3
draft-wang-tls-pq-sig-recommend-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Guilin WANG
Last updated 2026-11-02
Replaces draft-wang-pq-sig-recommend
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draft-wang-tls-pq-sig-recommend-00
Transport Layer Security Working Group                      G. Wang, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                       Huawei Int. Pte Ltd
Intended status: Standards Track                         2 November 2026
Expires: 6 May 2027

    Recommendations for Post-Quantum Signature Algorithms in TLS 1.3
                   draft-wang-tls-pq-sig-recommend-00

Abstract

   With over 30 distinct post-quantum and hybrid/composite signature
   algorithm parameters proposed or registered for TLS 1.3 [RFC9847]
   [IANA-TLS] [I-D.ietf-tls-composite-mldsa], implementations face
   increasing complexity and deployment overhead.  This document
   provides curated guidance to recommend a manageable subset of post-
   quantum signature schemes for standard TLS 1.3 deployments.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Post-Quantum Signature Landscape  . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Algorithm Recommendations and Engineering Logic . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  The Performance Matrix  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Profile A: General-Purpose Handshake Authentication . . .   5
     4.3.  Profile B: Long-Term Certificate Authority Trust
           Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   The rapid advancement of quantum computing structures introduces
   severe systemic risks to prevailing public-key infrastructures (PKIs)
   globally.  Traditional cryptographic primitives—primarily those
   reliant on integer factorization, finite field discrete logarithms,
   or elliptic curve discrete logarithms—are inherently vulnerable to
   polynomial-time quantum cryptanalysis via Shor's algorithm.  To
   preemptively mitigate these threats, the cryptographic community has
   initiated a wholesale transition toward post-quantum (PQ)
   cryptography and hybrid post-quantum/traditional (PQ/T) architectures
   across core transport layer validation frameworks.

   Within the context of Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.3
   [RFC8446] [RFC9846], this migration has triggered a massive expansion
   of the signature scheme namespace.  Various working groups within the
   Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the broader cryptographic
   ecosystem have introduced an extensive library of algorithm
   specifications.  Specifically, 16 distinct composite ML-DSA
   combinations [I-D.ietf-tls-composite-mldsa] have been proposed to use
   in TLS 1.3, alongside 3 standalone pure ML-DSA parameter sets
   [I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa] [IANA-TLS] and 12 stateless hash-based SLH-DSA
   parameter variations [I-D.reddy-tls-slhdsa] [IANA-TLS].  When
   aggregated across the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
   registries [IANA-TLS], over 30 separate post-quantum and hybrid
   signature schemes are now available for session negotiation and
   certificate chain path building.

   While this wide array of parameters offers flexible trade-offs
   between performance, signature boundaries, and mathematical hardness
   assumptions, it simultaneously introduces a critical challenge:
   implementation complexity.  Requiring TLS engines to store, process,
   and negotiate an unmanaged number of code points invariably leads to

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   increased software attack surfaces, potential interoperability
   friction, and inefficient ClientHello negotiations.  Furthermore, the
   inclusion of heavy signature options can induce network-level
   penalties, such as packet fragmentation and increased time-to-last-
   byte metrics across volatile or lossy connection channels.

   To prevent systemic fragmentation of the TLS ecosystem, this document
   provides structured deployment profiles that identify a curated,
   highly interoperable subset of post-quantum signature schemes.  By
   delineating clear boundaries between general-purpose handshake
   authentication and long-term certificate authority trust anchors,
   these recommendations enable protocol implementers to align with
   strict regulatory frameworks while keeping operational execution
   costs manageable.

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  The Post-Quantum Signature Landscape

   The post-quantum signature options currently specified for use within
   TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] originate from two fundamentally distinct
   mathematical families standardized by NIST: module-lattice-based
   cryptography and stateless hash-based cryptography.  Each family
   presents varying engineering trade-offs regarding computational
   execution times, public key boundaries, and signature verification
   payloads.  Understanding these characteristics is essential for
   analyzing how different algorithms affect standard TLS handshakes and
   packet processing pipelines.

   The Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)
   [FIPS204] represents the primary general-purpose public-key signature
   framework for post-quantum migration.  Derived from the Crystals-
   Dilithium primitive, ML-DSA is specified across three security
   levels: ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87, mapped respectively to
   the TLS SignatureScheme namespace as mldsa44, mldsa65, and mldsa87
   [I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa].  ML-DSA achieves a highly optimized balance
   between public key generation, signing speed, and verification
   efficiency.  Its signature sizes range from roughly 2,420 bytes to
   4,595 bytes.  While significantly larger than traditional elliptic
   curve or RSA signatures, these sizes generally fit within standard
   TCP initial window limits without triggering extensive packet
   fragmentation.

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   Conversely, the Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm
   (SLH-DSA) [FIPS205], derived from SPHINCS+, relies on the
   conservative security assumptions of symmetric hash functions (such
   as SHA-256 or SHAKE256).  SLH-DSA introduces zero new structural
   mathematical hardness assumptions beyond the collision resistance of
   its underlying hash primitives.  This property makes it exceptionally
   resilient against prospective lattice cryptanalysis breakthroughs.
   However, this robust security comes with heavy performance trade-
   offs.  Across its 12 registered variations [I-D.reddy-tls-slhdsa],
   the "small" (S) variants minimize payload size at the cost of slower
   signing speeds, yet still produce signatures ranging from 7,856 bytes
   to nearly 30 kilobytes.  The "fast" (F) variants accelerate signature
   production but increase verification overhead and result in much
   larger transmission payloads.  This substantial size boundary
   introduces a persistent risk of network-level disruptions, such as
   middlebox drops caused by fragmented UDP packets in DTLS
   environments.

   To bridge the operational gap during this multi-decade migration,
   Composite ML-DSA signature schemes [I-D.ietf-tls-composite-mldsa]
   have been introduced as a transitional framework for Post-Quantum/
   Traditional (PQ/T) hybrids.  A composite scheme packages both a post-
   quantum algorithm (such as ML-DSA) and a classical primitive (such as
   ECDSA, Ed25519, or RSA) into a single cryptographic element.
   Protocol logic treats this combination as a single opaque identifier,
   executing both signing and verification routines sequentially.
   Authentication succeeds if and only if both component signatures are
   verified as structurally valid.  This architecture provides robust
   defense-in-depth, protecting session security even in the event of an
   unforeseen structural break in early post-quantum lattice primitives
   or their initial software implementations.

4.  Algorithm Recommendations and Engineering Logic

   Selecting post-quantum signature schemes for TLS 1.3 requires
   navigating a multi-dimensional engineering trade-off matrix
   consisting of payload size, processing latency, and security
   longevity.  Ecosystem fragmentation can be avoided by dividing
   recommendations into distinct deployment profiles based on
   operational roles.  The following is a preliminary recommendation.

4.1.  The Performance Matrix

   To establish baseline engineering logic, the structural metrics of
   the candidate algorithms are compared below.  Byte overhead figures
   represent the combined total of the public key and the signature
   payload, which directly impacts the TLS handshake packet footprint.

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   +==============================+=========+=======+============+============+
   |Signature Scheme Identifier   |  Public |Signing|Verification|Primary     |
   |                              |  Key &  |Latency|  Latency   |Mathematical|
   |                              |Signature|       |            |Assumption  |
   |                              | (Bytes) |       |            |            |
   +==============================+=========+=======+============+============+
   |mldsa65                       |  5,251  |  Low  |  Very Low  |Module      |
   |                              |         |       |            |Learning    |
   |                              |         |       |            |With Errors |
   |                              |         |       |            |(M-LWE)     |
   +------------------------------+---------+-------+------------+------------+
   |mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512|  5,379  |  Low- |    Low     |Dual: M-LWE |
   |                              |         | Medium|            |and Elliptic|
   |                              |         |       |            |Curve ECDSA |
   +------------------------------+---------+-------+------------+------------+
   |slhdsa_shake_128s             |  7,888  |  High | Low-Medium |Symmetric   |
   |                              |         |       |            |Hash        |
   |                              |         |       |            |Function    |
   |                              |         |       |            |Strength    |
   +------------------------------+---------+-------+------------+------------+
   |slhdsa_shake_192s             |  16,272 |  High |   Medium   |Symmetric   |
   |                              |         |       |            |Hash        |
   |                              |         |       |            |Function    |
   |                              |         |       |            |Strength    |
   +------------------------------+---------+-------+------------+------------+

          Table 1: Post-Quantum Signature Scheme Resource Metrics

4.2.  Profile A: General-Purpose Handshake Authentication

   For standard ephemeral TLS handshakes where minimal time-to-last-byte
   (TTLB) and low CPU utilization are critical constraints, mldsa65 is
   RECOMMENDED as the default pure post-quantum baseline scheme.  As
   demonstrated in Table 1, the ~5.2 KB overhead of mldsa65 allows the
   handshake transmission to comfortably fit within standard TCP Initial
   Congestion Window limits (typically 10 packets or ~14.6 KB) without
   triggering multi-round-trip IP fragmentation anomalies.

   For deployments governed by transitional regulatory mandates or
   requiring cryptographic risk mitigation against prospective lattice
   flaws, the composite signature scheme mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512
   is RECOMMENDED.  The incremental transmission cost of adding the
   classical ECDSA layer is negligible (+128 bytes), while the
   processing overhead remains well within the operational tolerances of
   modern hardware accelerators.

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4.3.  Profile B: Long-Term Certificate Authority Trust Anchors

   The engineering logic shifts significantly when evaluating root and
   intermediate Certificate Authority (CA) trust anchors.  Because trust
   anchors and intermediate certificates are infrequently updated and
   are often cached by relying parties, signature verification
   reliability and long-term security safety take precedence over
   signature size limits.

   For these scenarios, SLH-DSA variants—specifically
   slhdsa_shake_128s—are RECOMMENDED for signing long-lived intermediate
   and root structures.  By trading away signing performance, the small
   ("s") variants limit the byte boundary inflation to under 8 KB,
   ensuring compatibility with standard X.509 certificate path parsers.
   Leveraging the conservative symmetric assumptions of SHAKE256 ensures
   that the root anchor framework remains secure against algorithmic
   breakthroughs targeting lattice geometry, providing a secure
   foundation throughout the post-quantum migration era.

5.  Acknowledgments

   To be added later.

6.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC9846]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9846>.

   [RFC9847]  Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
              and DTLS", RFC 9847, DOI 10.17487/RFC9847, December 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9847>.

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   [FIPS204]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS 204:
              Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", Federal
              Information Processing Standards Publication , August
              2024, <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.204.pdf>.

   [FIPS205]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS 205:
              Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard", Federal
              Information Processing Standards Publication , August
              2024, <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.205.pdf>.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-composite-mldsa]
              Reddy.K, T., Hollebeek, T., Gray, J., Fluhrer, S., and D.
              Van Geest, "Use of Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-composite-mldsa-
              00, 23 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
              composite-mldsa-00>.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa]
              Hollebeek, T., Schmieg, S., and B. Westerbaan, "Use of ML-
              DSA in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-tls-mldsa-06, 11 September 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
              mldsa-06>.

   [I-D.reddy-tls-slhdsa]
              Reddy.K, T., Hollebeek, T., Gray, J., and S. Fluhrer, "Use
              of SLH-DSA in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-reddy-tls-slhdsa-02, 17 November 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-tls-
              slhdsa-02>.

   [IANA-TLS] "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters", the Internet
              Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) ,
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters>.

7.  Informative References

   [RFC9794]  Driscoll, F., Parsons, M., and B. Hale, "Terminology for
              Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes", RFC 9794,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9794, June 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9794>.

Author's Address

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   Guilin Wang (editor)
   Huawei Int. Pte Ltd
   9 North Buona Vista Drive, #13-01
   The Metropolis Tower 1
   SINGAPORE 138588
   Singapore
   Email: wang.guilin@huawei.com

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