Recommendations for Post-Quantum Signature Algorithms in TLS 1.3
draft-wang-tls-pq-sig-recommend-00
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Guilin WANG | ||
| Last updated | 2026-11-02 | ||
| Replaces | draft-wang-pq-sig-recommend | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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draft-wang-tls-pq-sig-recommend-00
Transport Layer Security Working Group G. Wang, Ed.
Internet-Draft Huawei Int. Pte Ltd
Intended status: Standards Track 2 November 2026
Expires: 6 May 2027
Recommendations for Post-Quantum Signature Algorithms in TLS 1.3
draft-wang-tls-pq-sig-recommend-00
Abstract
With over 30 distinct post-quantum and hybrid/composite signature
algorithm parameters proposed or registered for TLS 1.3 [RFC9847]
[IANA-TLS] [I-D.ietf-tls-composite-mldsa], implementations face
increasing complexity and deployment overhead. This document
provides curated guidance to recommend a manageable subset of post-
quantum signature schemes for standard TLS 1.3 deployments.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The Post-Quantum Signature Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Algorithm Recommendations and Engineering Logic . . . . . . . 4
4.1. The Performance Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Profile A: General-Purpose Handshake Authentication . . . 5
4.3. Profile B: Long-Term Certificate Authority Trust
Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
The rapid advancement of quantum computing structures introduces
severe systemic risks to prevailing public-key infrastructures (PKIs)
globally. Traditional cryptographic primitives—primarily those
reliant on integer factorization, finite field discrete logarithms,
or elliptic curve discrete logarithms—are inherently vulnerable to
polynomial-time quantum cryptanalysis via Shor's algorithm. To
preemptively mitigate these threats, the cryptographic community has
initiated a wholesale transition toward post-quantum (PQ)
cryptography and hybrid post-quantum/traditional (PQ/T) architectures
across core transport layer validation frameworks.
Within the context of Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.3
[RFC8446] [RFC9846], this migration has triggered a massive expansion
of the signature scheme namespace. Various working groups within the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the broader cryptographic
ecosystem have introduced an extensive library of algorithm
specifications. Specifically, 16 distinct composite ML-DSA
combinations [I-D.ietf-tls-composite-mldsa] have been proposed to use
in TLS 1.3, alongside 3 standalone pure ML-DSA parameter sets
[I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa] [IANA-TLS] and 12 stateless hash-based SLH-DSA
parameter variations [I-D.reddy-tls-slhdsa] [IANA-TLS]. When
aggregated across the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
registries [IANA-TLS], over 30 separate post-quantum and hybrid
signature schemes are now available for session negotiation and
certificate chain path building.
While this wide array of parameters offers flexible trade-offs
between performance, signature boundaries, and mathematical hardness
assumptions, it simultaneously introduces a critical challenge:
implementation complexity. Requiring TLS engines to store, process,
and negotiate an unmanaged number of code points invariably leads to
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increased software attack surfaces, potential interoperability
friction, and inefficient ClientHello negotiations. Furthermore, the
inclusion of heavy signature options can induce network-level
penalties, such as packet fragmentation and increased time-to-last-
byte metrics across volatile or lossy connection channels.
To prevent systemic fragmentation of the TLS ecosystem, this document
provides structured deployment profiles that identify a curated,
highly interoperable subset of post-quantum signature schemes. By
delineating clear boundaries between general-purpose handshake
authentication and long-term certificate authority trust anchors,
these recommendations enable protocol implementers to align with
strict regulatory frameworks while keeping operational execution
costs manageable.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. The Post-Quantum Signature Landscape
The post-quantum signature options currently specified for use within
TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] originate from two fundamentally distinct
mathematical families standardized by NIST: module-lattice-based
cryptography and stateless hash-based cryptography. Each family
presents varying engineering trade-offs regarding computational
execution times, public key boundaries, and signature verification
payloads. Understanding these characteristics is essential for
analyzing how different algorithms affect standard TLS handshakes and
packet processing pipelines.
The Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)
[FIPS204] represents the primary general-purpose public-key signature
framework for post-quantum migration. Derived from the Crystals-
Dilithium primitive, ML-DSA is specified across three security
levels: ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87, mapped respectively to
the TLS SignatureScheme namespace as mldsa44, mldsa65, and mldsa87
[I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa]. ML-DSA achieves a highly optimized balance
between public key generation, signing speed, and verification
efficiency. Its signature sizes range from roughly 2,420 bytes to
4,595 bytes. While significantly larger than traditional elliptic
curve or RSA signatures, these sizes generally fit within standard
TCP initial window limits without triggering extensive packet
fragmentation.
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Conversely, the Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm
(SLH-DSA) [FIPS205], derived from SPHINCS+, relies on the
conservative security assumptions of symmetric hash functions (such
as SHA-256 or SHAKE256). SLH-DSA introduces zero new structural
mathematical hardness assumptions beyond the collision resistance of
its underlying hash primitives. This property makes it exceptionally
resilient against prospective lattice cryptanalysis breakthroughs.
However, this robust security comes with heavy performance trade-
offs. Across its 12 registered variations [I-D.reddy-tls-slhdsa],
the "small" (S) variants minimize payload size at the cost of slower
signing speeds, yet still produce signatures ranging from 7,856 bytes
to nearly 30 kilobytes. The "fast" (F) variants accelerate signature
production but increase verification overhead and result in much
larger transmission payloads. This substantial size boundary
introduces a persistent risk of network-level disruptions, such as
middlebox drops caused by fragmented UDP packets in DTLS
environments.
To bridge the operational gap during this multi-decade migration,
Composite ML-DSA signature schemes [I-D.ietf-tls-composite-mldsa]
have been introduced as a transitional framework for Post-Quantum/
Traditional (PQ/T) hybrids. A composite scheme packages both a post-
quantum algorithm (such as ML-DSA) and a classical primitive (such as
ECDSA, Ed25519, or RSA) into a single cryptographic element.
Protocol logic treats this combination as a single opaque identifier,
executing both signing and verification routines sequentially.
Authentication succeeds if and only if both component signatures are
verified as structurally valid. This architecture provides robust
defense-in-depth, protecting session security even in the event of an
unforeseen structural break in early post-quantum lattice primitives
or their initial software implementations.
4. Algorithm Recommendations and Engineering Logic
Selecting post-quantum signature schemes for TLS 1.3 requires
navigating a multi-dimensional engineering trade-off matrix
consisting of payload size, processing latency, and security
longevity. Ecosystem fragmentation can be avoided by dividing
recommendations into distinct deployment profiles based on
operational roles. The following is a preliminary recommendation.
4.1. The Performance Matrix
To establish baseline engineering logic, the structural metrics of
the candidate algorithms are compared below. Byte overhead figures
represent the combined total of the public key and the signature
payload, which directly impacts the TLS handshake packet footprint.
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+==============================+=========+=======+============+============+
|Signature Scheme Identifier | Public |Signing|Verification|Primary |
| | Key & |Latency| Latency |Mathematical|
| |Signature| | |Assumption |
| | (Bytes) | | | |
+==============================+=========+=======+============+============+
|mldsa65 | 5,251 | Low | Very Low |Module |
| | | | |Learning |
| | | | |With Errors |
| | | | |(M-LWE) |
+------------------------------+---------+-------+------------+------------+
|mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512| 5,379 | Low- | Low |Dual: M-LWE |
| | | Medium| |and Elliptic|
| | | | |Curve ECDSA |
+------------------------------+---------+-------+------------+------------+
|slhdsa_shake_128s | 7,888 | High | Low-Medium |Symmetric |
| | | | |Hash |
| | | | |Function |
| | | | |Strength |
+------------------------------+---------+-------+------------+------------+
|slhdsa_shake_192s | 16,272 | High | Medium |Symmetric |
| | | | |Hash |
| | | | |Function |
| | | | |Strength |
+------------------------------+---------+-------+------------+------------+
Table 1: Post-Quantum Signature Scheme Resource Metrics
4.2. Profile A: General-Purpose Handshake Authentication
For standard ephemeral TLS handshakes where minimal time-to-last-byte
(TTLB) and low CPU utilization are critical constraints, mldsa65 is
RECOMMENDED as the default pure post-quantum baseline scheme. As
demonstrated in Table 1, the ~5.2 KB overhead of mldsa65 allows the
handshake transmission to comfortably fit within standard TCP Initial
Congestion Window limits (typically 10 packets or ~14.6 KB) without
triggering multi-round-trip IP fragmentation anomalies.
For deployments governed by transitional regulatory mandates or
requiring cryptographic risk mitigation against prospective lattice
flaws, the composite signature scheme mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512
is RECOMMENDED. The incremental transmission cost of adding the
classical ECDSA layer is negligible (+128 bytes), while the
processing overhead remains well within the operational tolerances of
modern hardware accelerators.
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4.3. Profile B: Long-Term Certificate Authority Trust Anchors
The engineering logic shifts significantly when evaluating root and
intermediate Certificate Authority (CA) trust anchors. Because trust
anchors and intermediate certificates are infrequently updated and
are often cached by relying parties, signature verification
reliability and long-term security safety take precedence over
signature size limits.
For these scenarios, SLH-DSA variants—specifically
slhdsa_shake_128s—are RECOMMENDED for signing long-lived intermediate
and root structures. By trading away signing performance, the small
("s") variants limit the byte boundary inflation to under 8 KB,
ensuring compatibility with standard X.509 certificate path parsers.
Leveraging the conservative symmetric assumptions of SHAKE256 ensures
that the root anchor framework remains secure against algorithmic
breakthroughs targeting lattice geometry, providing a secure
foundation throughout the post-quantum migration era.
5. Acknowledgments
To be added later.
6. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9846] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9846>.
[RFC9847] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", RFC 9847, DOI 10.17487/RFC9847, December 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9847>.
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[FIPS204] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS 204:
Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication , August
2024, <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.204.pdf>.
[FIPS205] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS 205:
Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard", Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication , August
2024, <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.205.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-composite-mldsa]
Reddy.K, T., Hollebeek, T., Gray, J., Fluhrer, S., and D.
Van Geest, "Use of Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-composite-mldsa-
00, 23 October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
composite-mldsa-00>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa]
Hollebeek, T., Schmieg, S., and B. Westerbaan, "Use of ML-
DSA in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-mldsa-06, 11 September 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
mldsa-06>.
[I-D.reddy-tls-slhdsa]
Reddy.K, T., Hollebeek, T., Gray, J., and S. Fluhrer, "Use
of SLH-DSA in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-reddy-tls-slhdsa-02, 17 November 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-tls-
slhdsa-02>.
[IANA-TLS] "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters", the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) ,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters>.
7. Informative References
[RFC9794] Driscoll, F., Parsons, M., and B. Hale, "Terminology for
Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes", RFC 9794,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9794, June 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9794>.
Author's Address
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Guilin Wang (editor)
Huawei Int. Pte Ltd
9 North Buona Vista Drive, #13-01
The Metropolis Tower 1
SINGAPORE 138588
Singapore
Email: wang.guilin@huawei.com
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