Delegated Distributed Mappings
draft-watson-dinrg-delmap-01

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Last updated 2018-10-23
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Network Working Group                                          J. Watson
Internet-Draft                                               UC Berkeley
Intended status: Experimental                                      S. Li
Expires: April 26, 2019                                              EFF
                                                                  C. Man
                                                     Stanford University
                                                        October 23, 2018

                     Delegated Distributed Mappings
                      draft-watson-dinrg-delmap-01

Abstract

   Delegated namespaces underpin almost every Internet-scale system -
   domain name management, IP address allocation, Public Key
   Infrastructure, etc. - but are centrally managed by entities with
   unilateral revocation abilities and no common interface.  This draft
   specifies a generalized scheme for delegation that supports explicit
   time-bound guarantees and limits misuse.  Mappings may be secured by
   any general purpose distributed consensus protocol; clients can query
   the local state of any number of participants and receive the correct
   result barring a compromise at the consensus layer.

Status of This Memo

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   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Watson, et al.           Expires April 26, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             Delegated Mappings               October 2018

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Cells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Tables  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Root Key Listing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Interacting with a Consensus Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Storage Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Client Interface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Consensus-layer requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  DoS mitigation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.2.  Consensus node compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.3.  Upstream compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.4.  Root listing governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   Internet entities rely heavily on delegated namespaces to function
   properly.  Typical web services have been delegated a domain name
   (after negotitation with an appropriate registrar) under which they
   host the entirety of their public-facing content, or obtain a public
   IP range from their ISP, which itself has been delegated through
   intermediary registries by the Internet Numbers Registry [RFC7249].
   An enormous amount of value and trust is therefore placed in these
   assignments (in this draft, _mappings_) yet they are dangerously
   ephemeral.  Delegating authorities, either maliciously or
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