ECN and DSCP support for HTTPS's Connect-UDP
draft-westerlund-masque-connect-udp-ecn-dscp-02
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (candidate for masque WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Magnus Westerlund , Marten Seemann , Mirja Kühlewind , Marcus Ihlar | ||
| Last updated | 2026-04-21 (Latest revision 2026-03-17) | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Call For Adoption By WG Issued | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-westerlund-masque-connect-udp-ecn-dscp-02
MASQUE M. Westerlund
Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track M. Seemann
Expires: 19 September 2026 Smallstep
M. Kühlewind
M. Ihlar
Ericsson
18 March 2026
ECN and DSCP support for HTTPS's Connect-UDP
draft-westerlund-masque-connect-udp-ecn-dscp-02
Abstract
HTTP's Extended Connect's Connect-UDP protocol enables a client to
proxy a UDP flow from the HTTP server towards a specified target IP
address and UDP port. QUIC and Real-time transport protocol (RTP)
are examples of transport protocols that use UDP and support Explicit
Congestion Notification (ECN) and provide the necessary feedback.
This document specifies how ECN and DSCP can be supported through an
extension to the Connect-UDP protocol for HTTP without per-packet
byte overhead, soley using Context IDs.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://gloinul.github.io/masque-ecn/#go.draft-westerlund-masque-
connect-udp-ecn.html. Status information for this document may be
found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-westerlund-masque-
connect-udp-ecn-dscp/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the MASQUE Working Group
mailing list (mailto:masque@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/masque/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/masque/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/gloinul/masque-ecn.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 September 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Zero-byte Combined ECN and DSCP Extension . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Negotiating Extensions Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. ECN DSCP Context Assignment Format . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.1. HTTP Structured field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.2. ECN DSCP Context ID Assignment and ACK Capsules . . . 6
5. Tunnels and DSCP and ECN marking interactions . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Tunnel Endpoint Marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. DSCP Remarking Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Tunnel Transport Connection ECN Interactions and Congestion
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. Tunnel Transport Connection DSCP Interactions . . . . . . 9
5.5. QUIC Aware Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. HTTP Field Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1.1. DSCP-ECN-Context-ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. HTTP Capsule Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2.1. ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2.2. DSCP_ECN_CONTEXT_ACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
Connect-UDP, as currently defined, limits the Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) [RFC3168] exchange between the HTTP server and the
target. There is no support for carrying the ECN bits between the
HTTP Connect-UDP client and the HTTP server proxying the UDP flow.
Thus, it is not possible to establish the end-to-end ECN information
flow necessary to support either classic ECN [RFC3168] or L4S
[RFC9330], [RFC9331].
Diffserv [RFC2475] enables differential network treatment of packets.
Connect-UDP, as currently defined, lacks support for carrying the
DSCP field [RFC2474] through the tunnel.
This document specifies a Connect-UDP extensions that enable end-to-
end ECN and DSCP for proxied connections: the zero-bytes extension
adds no per-packet overhead by encoding the ECN and DSCP values
directly into Context IDs. This document specifies negotiation to
provide an intial set of Context IDs and capsules for dynamic
updates.
An alternative to this extension is Connect-IP [RFC9484]; however, it
carries a full IP header between the HTTP client and server,
resulting in significantly more overhead than this extension.
This extension is defined such that they allow clients to
optimistically start sending UDP packets in HTTP Datagrams, i.e.
before receiving the response to its UDP proxying request, as
described in Section 5 of [RFC9298].
2. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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3. Zero-byte Combined ECN and DSCP Extension
For a zero-overhead encoding, the ECN and DSCP bits are indicated by
using different Context IDs. An example use of three additional
Context IDs to only encode the ECN bit used together with a DSCP of 0
is shown in Table 1.
+==================+=========+===========+============+
| Context ID Value | ECN bit | ECN Value | DSCP Value |
+==================+=========+===========+============+
| 0 | 0b00 | Not-ECT | 0 |
+------------------+---------+-----------+------------+
| 2 | 0b01 | ECT(1) | 0 |
+------------------+---------+-----------+------------+
| 4 | 0b10 | ECT(0) | 0 |
+------------------+---------+-----------+------------+
| 6 | 0b11 | CE | 0 |
+------------------+---------+-----------+------------+
Table 1: ECN-only Encoding Table
No new Context ID value is defined to represent Not-ECT, since using
a Context ID without this extension would, by default, imply Not-ECT.
Additionally, Context IDs are defined to represent the combination of
an ECN value other than Not-ECT and the DSCP values. If an
application uses more DCSP values than just zero, additional Context
IDs must be defined.
This extension results in four times as many Context IDs within a
single Connect-UDP stream for each DSCP values used. We expect that
this is acceptable in most cases, as a total of 31 client initiated
Context IDs can be encoded in a single byte, thus resulting in no
packet expansion for applications that use upto 8 DSCP values.
An endpoint enabling this extension MUST define all three ECN values,
even if the ECN-enabled application expects that only one ECT value
(and CE) is used. This is because of transmission errors or
erroneous remarking in the network, where the other ECT codepoint, as
well as Not-ECT, may be observed.
Negotiation of the context ID values is defined using both HTTP
headers and capsules in Section 4.
4. Negotiating Extensions Usage
This section defines capability negotiation and Context ID
configuration for the zero-bytes combined ECN and DSCP extensions.
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Note that Context Identifiers are defined as QUIC varints (see
Section 16 of [RFC9000]) and support values up to
4,611,686,018,427,387,903 (2^62-1), which is larger than what a
Structure Header Integer supports (limited to 999,999,999,999,999).
We foresee no issues with this limitation, as Context Identifiers
should primarily use the single-byte representation for efficiency,
i.e., they should rarely exceed 63.
4.1. ECN DSCP Context Assignment Format
In this extension four Context IDs need to be configured for each
DSCP value.
A configuration of ECN and DSCP signaling is represented by a five-
tuple with the following format:
ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGNMENT {
DSCP_VALUE (6),
NOT_ECN_CONTEXT (i)
ECT_1_CONTEXT (i),
ECT_0_CONTEXT (i),
CE_CONTEXT (i),
}
Figure 1: ECN DSCP CONTEXT ASSIGNMENT Format
DCSP_VALUE: The DSCP value in the IP valid for the following Context
IDs.
NOT_ECN_CONTEXT: The Context ID used to indicate the payload was
marked as Not-ECN-Capable.
ECT_1_CONTEXT: The Context ID used to indicate the payload was
marked with ECN value ECT(1).
ECT_0_CONTEXT: The Context ID used to indicate the payload was
marked with ECN value ECT(0).
CE_CONTEXT: The Context ID used to indicate the payload was marked
with ECN value CE.
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4.1.1. HTTP Structured field
ECN-DSCP-Context-ID is a Structured Header Field [RFC9651]. Its
value is a List consisting of zero or more Inner Lists, where the
Inner List contains five Integer Items. The Integer Items MUST be
non-negative, as they are DSCP values and Context ID defined in
[RFC9298]. The DSCP value and four ECN Context IDs are those defined
in Figure 1, in that order.
When the header is included in an Extended Connect request, it
indicates, first of all, support for this ECN extension. Secondly,
it may define one or more 5-item inner lists of DSCP values and
corresponding ECN Context IDs for the requestor-to-responder
direction. If no 5-item inner lists of Context IDs are included,
then this header only indicates support for the extension, and the
Context IDs MAY be signaled using capsules.
When the request includes the ECN-DSCP-Context-ID header, the
responder MAY include this header in the response. If included with
one or more 5-item inner lists, it defines Context ID defined by the
server, usable in either direction.
The following example indicates support for this extension and
defines two sets of client initiated Context IDs: ID= 10, 12, 14, 16
(Not-ECN-Capable, ECT(1), ECT(0), CE) combined with DSCP 46 for
Expedited Forwarding (EF): 46 ; and ID=0, 4, 6, 8 combined with the
default DSCP value of 0. Note that the default context ID of 0 is
(re-)used to indicate the default ECN value of Not-ECN Capable.
ECN-Context-ID: (46,8,10,12,14), (0,0,2,4,6 )
Figure 2: Example of ECN-DSCP-Context-ID header
4.1.2. ECN DSCP Context ID Assignment and ACK Capsules
The ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGN capsule is used to assign additional
Context ID values after negotiation and initial assignment in the
HTPP header.
ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGN Capsule {
Type (i) = TBA_1
Length (i),
ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGNMENT (..) ...,
}
Figure 3: ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGN Capsule Format
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Type and Length as defined by Section 3.2 of the HTTP Capsule
specification [RFC9297]. The capsule value is the
ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGNMENT defined above in Figure 1. Thus, the
capsule value consists of zero or more ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGNMENT
five-tuples.
The ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ACK capsule confirms the registration of a
context IDs that were received via a ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGN capsule.
ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ACK Capsule {
Type (i) = TBA_2
Length (i),
ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGNMENT (..) ...,
}
Figure 4: ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ACK Capsule Format
An endpoint only send a ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ACK capsule if it received a
ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGN capsule with the same
ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGNMENT. If an endpoint receives
ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ACK capsule for a ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGNMENT it did
not attempt to register, that capsule is considered malformed.
5. Tunnels and DSCP and ECN marking interactions
5.1. Tunnel Endpoint Marking
The Tunnel Endpoint, when receiving an IP/UDP packet belonging to a
Connect-UDP request with the ECN DSCP extension enabled, the DSCP
value two ECN bits in the incoming IP/UDP packet are used to select
the appropriate Context ID. If a non-yet-know DSCP value is received
the endpoint can register a new Context ID assignments using the
ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGN capsule and optimistically start us them.
The Tunnel Endpoint on egress sets the DSCP that belongs to the
received Context ID and corresponding ECN values in the IP packet it
creates for this UDP Proxying payload.
A Tunnel endpoint which is unable to read or set the ECN Field SHALL
NOT enable the ECN extension.
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5.2. DSCP Remarking Considerations
The tunnel may interconnect two different administrative domains that
use DSCP values differently. Thus, the endpoints likely need to
perform remarking of DSCP field values, similar to what an inter-
domain router would. Depending on use cases and deployment, the HTTP
client can be in different network domains with different DSCP
usages. An HTTP server that, based on user identification, connects
the HTTP client to different network domains behind it may also need
to support multiple external domains.
The above complications in handling DSCP make it impossible to
provide a standardized remarking instruction. Instead, the
deployment will have to define whether remarking is handled by the
HTTP server, the HTTP client, or both, considering the tunnel a
specific network domain in itself.
5.3. Tunnel Transport Connection ECN Interactions and Congestion
Control
The primary goal of the ECN DSCP extension is to enable ECN usage
between the proxy and the target and to have the end-to-end transport
react to that ECN. However, different potential models exist for
providing ECN interactions for the tunnel, i.e., between the HTTP
client and server. The choice depends on how the tunnel is
configured and what additional support has been implemented for the
Connect-UDP protocol.
The default deployment would be to use congestion controlled
transport protocols between the HTTP endpoints or proxies for the
tunneled ECN enabled packets. This include all HTTP versions before
HTTP/3 [RFC9114], as well as HTTP/3 sending packets over reliable
streams as well as over congestion controlled datagrams. In this
deployment on the ingress to each congestion controlled transport an
Active Queue Management (AQM) is recommend that can mark the tunneled
packet's ECN field (or drop them) in case there is sufficient queue
build up.
For tunnels using HTTP/3 with datagrams, where the QUIC connection
disables congestion control on packets containing HTTP datagrams as
discussed in Section 6 of [RFC9298], the ECN marking on tunneled
packets can be propagated between the IP packet of the transport
connection and the end-to-end packet. This represents a specific
implementation of IP-in-IP tunnels with tightly coupled shim headers
as discussed in [RFC9601]. It is implemented as Feed-Forward-and-Up
as discussed in [RFC9599], and MUST use the normal mode on tunnel
ingress and follow the specified default behavior on egress as
defined in [RFC6040].
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5.4. Tunnel Transport Connection DSCP Interactions
For HTTP tunnels not using HTTP/3 [RFC9114], HTTP/3 using reliable
streams, or HTTP/3 with datagrams but without disabling congestion
control, the tunnel will consist of one or possibly several chained
congestion-controlled transport connections. These transport
connections can use only a single DSCP code point to avoid
inconsistent network treatment that might confuse the congestion
controller and retransmission mechanism. Thus, even if the tunneled
packets use different DSCP values, the transport connection must
settle on a single, suitable DSCP value. However, if the QUIC
multipath extension [I-D.ietf-quic-multipath] is used, each path can
have a different DSCP value. In this latter case, packets with
different DSCP values can be mapped to different paths with the
appropriate network treatment as indicated by their DSCP values.
For tunnels using HTTP/3 with datagrams and where the QUIC connection
disables congestion control on packets containing HTTP datagrams, as
discussed in Section 6 of [RFC9298], the QUIC packets can be marked
using the most suitable DSCP value based on the encapsulated packet.
In cases where the tunnel connection is sent into a different network
domain than the one on which the tunneled packet was received, a
suitable remapping must occur for the domain to which the tunnel
packet will be sent. The HTTP tunnel MUST NOT coalesce different
tunneled payloads that are not mapped to the same DSCP in a single
QUIC packet.
5.5. QUIC Aware Forwarding
An HTTP endpoint that supports this extension and QUIC Aware
Forwarding [I-D.ietf-masque-quic-proxy] MUST preserve ECN markings on
forwarded packets in both directions to ensure end-to-end ECN
functionality. Using this extension in combination with QUIC Aware
Forwarding, rather than relying solely on the latter, also ensures
that ECN black holes do not occur, for example, on long-header
packets or packets sent before the QUIC Aware Forwarding path is
established for short-header packets. Thus, supporting both provides
a consistent ECN experience.
6. IANA Considerations
6.1. HTTP Field Names
IANA is requested to register one new permanent Field name in the
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry (At time of
writing residing at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-fields/
http-fields.xhtml).
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6.1.1. DSCP-ECN-Context-ID
Field Name: DSCP-ECN-Context-ID
Status: Permanent
Structured Type: List
Reference: RFC-TO-BE
6.2. HTTP Capsule Type
IANA is requested ot register two new HTTP Capsule Types in the
permanent range (0x00-0x3f).
6.2.1. ECN_DSCP_CONTEXT_ASSIGN
Value: TBA_1
Capsule Type: ECN_CONTEXT_ASSIGN
Status: permanent
Reference: RFC-TO-BE
Change Controller: IETF
Contact: MASQUE Working Group masque@ietf.org
Notes: None
6.2.2. DSCP_ECN_CONTEXT_ACK
Value: TBA_2
Capsule Type: DSCP_ECN_CONTEXT_ACK
Status: permanent
Reference: RFC-TO-BE
Change Controller: IETF
Contact: MASQUE Working Group masque@ietf.org
Notes: None
7. References
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7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-masque-quic-proxy]
Pauly, T., Rosenberg, E., and D. Schinazi, "QUIC-Aware
Proxying Using HTTP", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-masque-quic-proxy-08, 2 March 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-masque-
quic-proxy-08>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
"Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2474, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2474>.
[RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3168>.
[RFC6040] Briscoe, B., "Tunnelling of Explicit Congestion
Notification", RFC 6040, DOI 10.17487/RFC6040, November
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000>.
[RFC9114] Bishop, M., Ed., "HTTP/3", RFC 9114, DOI 10.17487/RFC9114,
June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9114>.
[RFC9297] Schinazi, D. and L. Pardue, "HTTP Datagrams and the
Capsule Protocol", RFC 9297, DOI 10.17487/RFC9297, August
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9297>.
[RFC9298] Schinazi, D., "Proxying UDP in HTTP", RFC 9298,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9298, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9298>.
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[RFC9331] De Schepper, K. and B. Briscoe, Ed., "The Explicit
Congestion Notification (ECN) Protocol for Low Latency,
Low Loss, and Scalable Throughput (L4S)", RFC 9331,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9331, January 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9331>.
[RFC9599] Briscoe, B. and J. Kaippallimalil, "Guidelines for Adding
Congestion Notification to Protocols that Encapsulate IP",
BCP 89, RFC 9599, DOI 10.17487/RFC9599, August 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9599>.
[RFC9601] Briscoe, B., "Propagating Explicit Congestion Notification
across IP Tunnel Headers Separated by a Shim", RFC 9601,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9601, August 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9601>.
[RFC9651] Nottingham, M. and P. Kamp, "Structured Field Values for
HTTP", RFC 9651, DOI 10.17487/RFC9651, September 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9651>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-quic-multipath]
Liu, Y., Ma, Y., De Coninck, Q., Bonaventure, O., Huitema,
C., and M. Kühlewind, "Managing multiple paths for a QUIC
connection", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
quic-multipath-21, 17 March 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-
multipath-21>.
[I-D.schinazi-masque-connect-udp-ecn]
Schinazi, D., "An ECN Extension to CONNECT-UDP", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-schinazi-masque-connect-
udp-ecn-02, 28 March 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-schinazi-
masque-connect-udp-ecn-02>.
[RFC2475] Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z.,
and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated
Services", RFC 2475, DOI 10.17487/RFC2475, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2475>.
[RFC8311] Black, D., "Relaxing Restrictions on Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) Experimentation", RFC 8311,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8311, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8311>.
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[RFC9330] Briscoe, B., Ed., De Schepper, K., Bagnulo, M., and G.
White, "Low Latency, Low Loss, and Scalable Throughput
(L4S) Internet Service: Architecture", RFC 9330,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9330, January 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9330>.
[RFC9484] Pauly, T., Ed., Schinazi, D., Chernyakhovsky, A.,
Kühlewind, M., and M. Westerlund, "Proxying IP in HTTP",
RFC 9484, DOI 10.17487/RFC9484, October 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9484>.
Authors' Addresses
Magnus Westerlund
Ericsson
Email: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
Marten Seemann
Smallstep
Email: martenseemann@gmail.com
Mirja Kühlewind
Ericsson
Email: mirja.kuehlewind@ericsson.com
Marcus Ihlar
Ericsson
Email: marcus.ihlar@ericsson.com
Westerlund, et al. Expires 19 September 2026 [Page 13]