Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) CRYPTO Chunk
draft-westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-crypto-chunk-00
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Magnus Westerlund , John Preuß Mattsson , Claudio Porfiri | ||
| Last updated | 2023-02-16 | ||
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| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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draft-westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-crypto-chunk-00
TSVWG M. Westerlund
Internet-Draft J. Preuß Mattsson
Intended status: Standards Track C. Porfiri
Expires: 20 August 2023 Ericsson
16 February 2023
Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) CRYPTO Chunk
draft-westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-crypto-chunk-00
Abstract
This document describes a method for adding cryptographic protection
to the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP). The SCTP CRYPTO
chunk defined in this document is intended to enable communications
privacy for applications that use SCTP as their transport protocol
and allows applications to communicate in a way that is designed to
prevent eavesdropping and detect tampering or message forgery.
The CRYPTO chunk defined here in is one half of a complete solution.
Where a companion specification is required to define how the content
of the CRYPTO chunk is protected, authenticated, and protected
against replay, as well as how key management is accomplished.
Applications using SCTP CRYPTO chunk can use all transport features
provided by SCTP and its extensions.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-crypto-
chunk/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Area Working
Group (tsvwg) Working Group mailing list (mailto:tsvwg@ietf.org),
which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tsvwg/.
Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tsvwg/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/gloinul/draft-westerlund-tsvwg-sctp-crypto-chunk.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 August 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Protection Engines Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. SCTP CRYPTO Chunk Buffering and Flow Control . . . . . . 7
2.4. PMTU Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. Congestion Control Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6. ICMP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. New Parameter Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Protected Association Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. New Chunk Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Crypto Chunk (CRYPTO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Protected Association Parameter Validation Chunk
(PVALID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1. Mandatory Protected Association Parameter Missing . . . . 12
6.2. Error in Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2.1. No Supported Protection Engine . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2.2. Error During Protection Handshake . . . . . . . . . . 14
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6.2.3. Failure in Protection Engines Validation . . . . . . 14
6.2.4. Timeout During Protection Handshake or Validation . . 14
6.3. Critical Error from Protection Engine . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.4. Non-critical Error in the Protection Engine . . . . . . . 15
7. Protected SCTP State Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. New States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1.1. PROTECTION PENDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1.2. PROTECTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1.3. Consideration on T-valid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.1. Establishment of a Protected Association . . . . . . . . 19
8.2. Termination of a Protected Association . . . . . . . . . 20
9. Protected Data Chunk Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.1. Protected Data Chunk Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9.2. Protected Data Chunk Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9.2.1. SCTP Header Handler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10.1. Protection Engine Identifier Registry . . . . . . . . . 23
10.2. Protection Error Cause Codes Registry . . . . . . . . . 24
10.3. SCTP Chunk Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.4. SCTP Chunk Parameter Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.5. SCTP Error Cause Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11.1. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11.2. Downgrade Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
12. Requirements towards the protection engines . . . . . . . . . 27
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction
This document defines a CRYPTO chunk for the Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP), as defined in [RFC9260].
This specification defines the actual CRYPTO chunk. How to enable it
usage, how it interacts with the SCTP association establishment to
enable endpoint authentication, key-establishment, and other features
require a separate protection engine specification.
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This specification is intended to be capable of enabling mutual
authentication of endpoints, data confidentiality, data origin
authentication, data integrity protection, and data replay protection
for SCTP packets after the SCTP association has been established.
The exact properties will depend on the companion specification
defining the protection engine used with the CRYPTO chunk. The
protection engine specification might be based on an existing
security protocol.
Applications using SCTP CRYPTO chunk can use all transport features
provided by SCTP and its extensions. Due to its level of integration
as discussed in next section it will provide its security functions
on all content of the SCTP packet, and will thus not impact the
potential to utilize any SCTP functionalities or extensions.
2. Overview
2.1. Protocol Overview
The CRYPTO chunk is defined as a method for secure and confidential
transfer for SCTP packets. This is implemented inside the SCTP
protocol, in a sublayer between the SCTP common header handling and
the SCTP chunk handling. Once an SCTP packet has been received and
the SCTP common header has been used to identify the SCTP
association, the CRYPTO chunk is sent to the chosen protection engine
that will return the SCTP payload containing the unprotected SCTP
chunks, those chunks will then be handled according to current SCTP
protocol specification. Figure 1 illustrates the CRYPTO chunk
layering in regard to SCTP and the Upper Layer Protocol (ULP).
+---------------------+
| |
| ULP |
| |
+---------------------+ <-- User Level Messages
| |
| SCTP Chunks Handler | +-- SCTP Unprotected Payload
| |/
+---------------------+ +--------------------+
| CRYPTO +--->| Protection Engine |
| Chunk | +--------------------+
| Handler |<---+ Key Management |
+---------------------+ +--------------------+
| |\
| SCTP Header Handler | +-- SCTP Protected Payload
| |
+---------------------+
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Figure 1: CRYPTO Chunk Layering in Regard to SCTP and ULP
Use of the CRYPTO chunk is defined per SCTP association and a SCTP
association uses a single protection engine. Different associations
within the same SCTP endpoint may use or not use the CRYPTO chunk,
and different associations may use different protection engines.
On the outgoing direction, once the SCTP stack has created the
unprotected SCTP packet payload containing control and/or DATA
chunks, that payload will be sent to the protection engine to be
protected. The format of the protected payload depends on the
protection engine but the unprotected payload will typically be
encrypted and integrity tagged before being encapsulated in a CRYPTO
chunk.
The SCTP protection engine performs protection operations on the
whole unprotected SCTP packet payload, i.e., all chunks after the
SCTP common header. Information protection is kept during the
lifetime of the association and no information is sent unprotected
except than the initial SCTP handshake, the SCTP common Header, the
SCTP CRYPTO chunk header and the SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE chunk.
SCTP CRYPTO chunk capability is agreed by the peers at the
initialization of the SCTP association, during that phase the peers
exchange information about the protection engines available. Once
the peers have agreed on what protection to use, the SCTP endpoints
start sending SCTP CRYPTO chunks containing the initialization
information related to the protection engine including key agreement
and endpoint authentication. This is depending on the chosen
protection engine thus is not being detailed in the current
specification.
When the endpoint authentication has been completed, the association
is meant to be initialized and the ULP is informed about that, from
this time on it's possible for the ULPs to exchange data.
CRYPTO chunks will never be retransmitted, retransmission is
implemented by SCTP endpoint at chunk level as in the legacy.
Duplicated CRYPTO chunks, whenever they will be accepted by the
protection engine, will result in duplicated SCTP chunks and will be
handled as duplicated chunks by SCTP endpoint in the same way a
duplicated SCTP packet with those SCTP chunks would have been.
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2.2. Protection Engines Considerations
The protection engine, independently from the security
characteristics, needs to be capable working on an unreliable
transport mechanism same as UDP and have its own key management
capability.
SCTP CRYPTO chunk directly exploits the protection engine by
requesting protection and unprotection of a buffer, in particular the
protection buffer shall never exceed the SCTP payload size thus
protection engine shall be aware of the PMTU (see Section 2.4).
The key management part of the protection engine is the set of data
and procedures that take care of key distribution, verification, and
update.
Key management of protection engine is RECOMMENDED to use the SCTP
CRYPTO chunk for handshaking, in that case any packet being exchanged
between protection engine peers shall be transported as payload of
Crypto chunk (see Section 5.1).
Key management MAY use other mechanism than what provided by SCTP
CRYPTO chunks, in any case the mechanism for key management MUST be
specified in the specification for that protection engine.
Out-of-band communication between protection engines MAY exploit the
Flags byte provided by the CRYPTO chunk header (see Figure 3).
Details of the use of Flags, if different from what described in the
current document, MUST be specified in the Protection Engine
Specification document for that specific protection engine.
The SCTP common header is assumed to be implicitly protected by the
protection engine. This protection is based on the assumption that
there will be a one-to-one mapping between SCTP association and
individually established security contexts. If the protection engine
does not meet that assumption further protection of the common header
is likely required.
An example of protection engine can be DTLS.
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2.3. SCTP CRYPTO Chunk Buffering and Flow Control
Protection engine and SCTP are asynchronous, meaning that the
protection engine may deliver the decrypted SCTP Payload to the SCTP
endpoint without respecting the reception order. It's up to SCTP
endpoint to reorder the chunks in the reception buffer and to take
care of the flow control according to what specified in [RFC9260].
From SCTP perspective the CRYPTO chunk processing is part of the
transport network.
Even though the above allows the implementors to adopt a
multithreading design of the protection engines, the actual
implementation should consider that out-of-order handling of SCTP
chunks is not desired and may cause false congestions and
retransmissions.
2.4. PMTU Considerations
The addition of the CRYPTO chunk to SCTP reduces the room for
payload, due to the size of the CRYPTO chunk header and plain text
expansion due to ciphering algorithm and any authentication tag.
Thus, the SCTP layer creating the plain text payload needs to know
about the overhead to adjust its target payload size appropriately.
On the other hand, the protection engine needs to be informed about
the PMTU by removing from the value the sum of the common SCTP header
and the CRYPTO chunk header. This implies that SCTP can propagate
the computed PMTU at run time specifically. The way protection
engine provides the primitive for PMTU communication shall be part of
the protection engine specification.
From SCTP perspective, if there is a maximum size of plain text data
that can be protected by the protection engine that must be
communicated to SCTP. As such a limit will limit the PMTU for SCTP
to the maximum plain text plus CRYPTO chunk and algorithm overhead
plus the SCTP common header.
2.5. Congestion Control Considerations
The SCTP mechanism for handling congestion control does depend on
successful data transfer for enlarging or reducing the congestion
window CWND (see [RFC9260] section 7.2).
It may happen that protection engine discards packets due to internal
checks or because it has detected a malicious attempt.
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The protection engine shall not interfere with the SCTP congestion
control mechanism, this basically means that from SCTP perspective
the congestion control is exactly the same as how specified in
[RFC9260].
2.6. ICMP Considerations
SCTP implementation will be responsible for handling ICMP messages
and their validation as specified in [RFC9260] Section 10. This
includes for SCTP packets sent by the protection engines key
management function. However, valid ICMP errors or information may
indirectly be provided to the protection engine, such as an update to
PMTU values based on packet to big ICMP messages.
3. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
4. New Parameter Type
This section defines the new parameter type that will be used to
negotiate the use of the CRYPTO chunk and protection engines during
association setup. Table 1 illustrates the new parameter type.
+================+=======================+
| Parameter Type | Parameter Name |
+================+=======================+
| 0x80xx | Protected Association |
+----------------+-----------------------+
Table 1: New INIT/INIT-ACK Parameter
Note that the parameter format requires the receiver to ignore the
parameter and continue processing if the parameter is not understood.
This is accomplished (as described in [RFC9260], Section 3.2.1.) by
the use of the upper bits of the parameter type.
4.1. Protected Association Parameter
This parameter is used to carry the list of proposed protection
engines and the chosen protection engine during INIT/INIT-ACK
handshake.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Parameter Type = 0x80xx | Parameter Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Protection Engines |
| |
| +-------------------------------+
| | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Protected Association Parameter
Parameter Type: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
This value MUST be set to 0x80xx.
Parameter Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
This value holds the length of the Protection Engines field in
bytes plus 4.
Protection Engines: variable length
In the INIT chunk this holds the list of protection engines in
descending order of preference, i.e. the most preferred comes
first, and the least preferred last in this field. In the INIT-
ACK chunk this holds a single chosen protection engine. Each
protection engine is specified by a 16-bit unsigned integer.
Padding: 0 or 16 bits
If the length of the Protection Engines field is not a multiple of
4 bytes, the sender MUST pad the chunk with all zero bytes to make
the chunk 32-bit aligned. The Padding MUST NOT be longer than 2
bytes and it MUST be ignored by the receiver.
RFC-Editor Note: Please replace 0x08xx with the actual parameter type
value assigned by IANA and then remove this note.
5. New Chunk Types
5.1. Crypto Chunk (CRYPTO)
This section defines the new chunk type that will be used to
transport protected SCTP payload. Table 2 illustrates the new chunk
type.
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+============+=======================+
| Chunk Type | Chunk Name |
+============+=======================+
| 0x4X | Crypto Chunk (CRYPTO) |
+------------+-----------------------+
Table 2: CRYPTO Chunk Type
RFC-Editor Note: Please replace 0x4x with the actual chunk type value
assigned by IANA and then remove this note.
It should be noted that the CRYPTO chunk format requires the receiver
stop processing this SCTP packet, discard the unrecognized chunk and
all further chunks, and report the unrecognized chunk in an ERROR
chunk using the 'Unrecognized Chunk Type' error cause. This is
accomplished (as described in [RFC9260] Section 3.2.) by the use of
the upper bits of the chunk type.
The CRYPTO chunk is used to hold the protected payload of a plain
SCTP packet.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 0x4X | Chunk Flags | Chunk Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Payload |
| |
| +-------------------------------+
| | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: CRYPTO Chunk Structure
Chunk Type: 8 bits (unsigned integer)
This value MUST be set to 0x4X for all CRYPTO chunks.
Chunk Flags: 8 bits
This is used by the protection engine and ignored by SCTP.
Chunk Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
This value holds the length of the Payload in bytes plus 4.
Payload: variable length
This holds the encrypted data.
Padding: 0, 8, 16, or 24 bits
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If the length of the Payload is not a multiple of 4 bytes, the
sender MUST pad the chunk with all zero bytes to make the chunk
32-bit aligned. The Padding MUST NOT be longer than 3 bytes and
it MUST be ignored by the receiver.
5.2. Protected Association Parameter Validation Chunk (PVALID)
This section defines the new chunk types that will be used to
validate the negotiation of the protection engine selected for CRYPTO
chunk. This to prevent down grade attacks on the negotiation of
protection engines. Table 3 illustrates the new chunk type.
+============+=====================================================+
| Chunk Type | Chunk Name |
+============+=====================================================+
| 0x4X | Protected Association Parameter Validation (PVALID) |
+------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
Table 3: PVALID Chunk Type
It should be noted that the PVALID chunk format requires the receiver
stop processing this SCTP packet, discard the unrecognized chunk and
all further chunks, and report the unrecognized chunk in an ERROR
chunk using the 'Unrecognized Chunk Type' error cause. This is
accomplished (as described in [RFC9260] Section 3.2.) by the use of
the upper bits of the chunk type.
The PVALID chunk is used to hold the protection engines list.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 0x4X | Flags = 0 | Chunk Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Protection Engines |
| |
| +-------------------------------+
| | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: PVALID Chunk Structure
Chunk Type: 8 bits (unsigned integer)
This value MUST be set to 0x4X.
Chunk Flags: 8 bits
MUST be set to zero on transmit and MUST be ignored on receipt.
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Chunk Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
This value holds the length of the Protection Engines field in
bytes plus 4.
Protection Engines: variable length
This holds the list of protection engines where each protection
engine is specified by a 16-bit unsigned integer. The field MUST
be identical to the content of the Protected Association Parameter
(Section 4.1) Protection Engines field that the endpoint sent in
the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk.
Padding: 0 or 16 bits
If the length of the Protection Engines field is not a multiple of
4 bytes, the sender MUST pad the chunk with all zero bytes to make
the chunk 32-bit aligned. The Padding MUST NOT be longer than 2
bytes and it MUST be ignored by the receiver.
RFC-Editor Note: Please replace 0x4X with the actual chunk type value
assigned by IANA and then remove this note.
6. Error Handling
This specification introduces a new set of error causes that are to
be used when SCTP endpoint detects a faulty condition. The special
case is when the error is detected by the protection engine that may
provide additional information.
6.1. Mandatory Protected Association Parameter Missing
When an initiator SCTP endpoint sends an INIT chunk that doesn't
contain the Protected Association parameter towards an SCTP endpoint
that only accepts protected associations, the responder endpoint
SHALL raise a Missing Mandatory Parameter error. The ERROR chunk
will contain the cause code 'Missing Mandatory Parameter' (2) (see
[RFC9260] section 3.3.10.7) and the protected association parameter
identifier Section 4.1 in the missing param Information field.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cause Code = 2 | Cause Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Number of missing params = N |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Protected Association ID | Missing Param Type #2 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Missing Param Type #N-1 | Missing Param Type #N |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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Figure 5: ERROR Missing Protected Association Paramater
Cause Length is equal to the number of missing parameters 8 + N * 2
according to [RFC9260], section 3.3.10.2.
6.2. Error in Protection
A new Error Type is defined for Crypto Chunk, it's used for any error
related to the Protection mechanism described in this document and
has a structure that allows detailed information to be added as extra
causes.
This specification describes some of the causes whilst the Protection
Engine Specification MAY add further Causes related to the related
Protection Engine.
When detecting an error, SCTP will send an ABORT chunk followed by
ERROR chunk containing the relevant Error Type and Causes.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cause Code = TBA9 | Cause Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Extra Cause #1 | Extra Cause #2 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Extra Cause #N-1 | Extra Cause #N |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: Error in Protection Cause Format
Casuse Code: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
The SCTP Error Chunk Cause Code indicating "Error in Protection"
is TBA9.
Cause Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
Is for N extra Causes equal to 4 + N * 2
Extra Cause: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
Each Extra Cause indicate an additional piece of information as
part of the error. There MAY be 0 to as many as can fit in the
extra cause field in the ERROR Chunk (A maximum of 32764).
Editor's Note: Please replace TBA9 above with what is assigned by
IANA.
Below a number of defined Error Causes are defined, additional causes
can be registered with IANA following the rules in Section 10.2.
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6.2.1. No Supported Protection Engine
If list of protection engines contained in the INIT signal doesn't
contain at least an entry that fits the list of protection engines at
the responder, the responder will reply with an ERROR chunk with
error in protection cause code (specified in Section 6.2) and the "No
Supported Protection Engine" extra cause code identifier 0x00.
6.2.2. Error During Protection Handshake
If the protection engine specifies a handshake for example for
authentication, and key management is implemented inband, it may
happen that the procedure has errors. In such case an ERROR chunk
will be sent with error in protection cause code (specified in
Section 6.2) and extra cause "Error During Protection Handshake"
identifier 0x01.
6.2.3. Failure in Protection Engines Validation
A Failure may occur during protection engine Validation (see
Section 7.1.2). In such case an ERROR chunk will be sent with error
in protection cause code (specified in Section 6.2) and extra cause
"Failure in Protection Engines Validation" identifier 0x02 to
indicate this failure. This error MUST be sent together with an SCTP
abort to terminate the SCTP association.
6.2.4. Timeout During Protection Handshake or Validation
Whenever a T-valid timeout occurs, the SCTP endpoint will send an
ERROR chunk with "Error in Protection" cause (specified in
Section 6.2) and extra cause "Timeout During Protection Handshake or
Validation" identifier 0x03 to indicate this failure. To indicate in
which phase the timeout occurred an additional extra cause code is
added. If the protection engine specifies that key management is
implemented inband and the T-valid timeout occurs during the
handshake the Cause-Specific code to add is "Error During Protection
Handshake" identifier 0x01. If the T-valid timeout occurs during the
protection association parameter validation, the extra cause code to
use is "Failure in Protection Engines Validation" identifier 0x02.
6.3. Critical Error from Protection Engine
Protection engine MAY inform local SCTP endpoint about errors, in
such case it's to be defined in the protection engine specification
document. When an Error in the protection engine compromises the
protection mechanism, the protection engine may stop processing data
altogether, thus the local SCTP endpoint will not be able to send or
receive any chunk for the specified Association. This will cause the
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Association to be closed by legacy timer-based mechanism. Since the
Association protection is compromised no further data will be sent
and the remote peer will also experience timeout on the Association.
6.4. Non-critical Error in the Protection Engine
A non-critical error in the protection engine means that the
protection engine is capable of recovering without the need of the
whole Association to be restarted.
From SCTP perspective, a non-critical error will be perceived as a
temporary problem in the transport and will be handled with
retransmissions and SACKS according to [RFC9260].
When the protection engine will experience a non-critical error, an
ABORT chunk SHALL NOT be sent. This way non-critical errors are
handled and how the protection engine will recover from these errors
is being described in the Protection Engine Specifications.
7. Protected SCTP State Diagram
The Figure 7 shows the changes of the SCTP association state machine
as described in [RFC9260] section 4.
.-------- (from any state)
.-----. |
receive INIT | | | receive ABORT [ABORT]
--------------------- | v v -------------- or ----------
generate State Cookie | +---------+ delete TCB send ABORT
send INIT ACK '---+ CLOSED | delete TCB
+--+----+-+
/ \
/ \ [ASSOCIATE]
| |-----------------
| | create TCB
| | send INIT
receive valid | | start T1-init timer
COOKIE ECHO | v
(1) -----------------| +-----------+
create TCB | |COOKIE-WAIT| (2)
send COOKIE ACK | +-----+-----+
| |
| | receive INIT ACK
| |-------------------
| | send COOKIE ECHO
| | stop T1-init timer
| | start T1-cookie timer
| v
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| +-------------+
| |COOKIE-ECHOED| (3)
| +------+------+
| |
| | receive COOKIE ACK
| |-------------------
| | stop T1-cookie timer
+-----------------+-----+ |
| +-----------------)----+-----+
| | | |
| | v v
| | +---------------------+
| | | PROTECTION PENDING | If INIT/INIT-ACK
| | +----------+----------+ has Protected
| | | Association
| | | Parameter start
| | | T-valid timer.
| | |
| | | [CRYPTO SETUP]
| | |-----------------
| | | send and receive
| | | protection engine handshake
| | | by means of CRYPTO chunks.
| | |
| | |
| | v
| | +----------------------+
| | | PROTECTED |
| | +-----------+----------+
| | |
| | | [ENDPOINT VALIDATION]
| | |------------------------
| | | send and receive
| | | PVALID by means of
| | | CRYPTO chunk.
| | |
| | |
| +-----------------+ |
+-----------------+ | |
| | |
v v v
+---------------+
| ESTABLISHED |
+---------------+
Figure 7: SCTP State Diagram with Crypto
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7.1. New States
This section describes details on the amendment to the SCTP
association establishment state machine.
7.1.1. PROTECTION PENDING
The presence of a Protected Association Parameter in the INIT or
INIT-ACK chunk makes the State Machine entering PROTECTION PENDING
state instead of ESTABLISHED.
When entering PROTECTION PENDING state, a T-valid timer is started
that will cover the whole validation time including the in-band key
establishment. The value of T-valid is dependent on the protection
engine and may also be further adjusted based if expected RTT values
are outside of the ones commonly occurring on the general Internet,
see Section 7.1.3.
If key establishment is in-band, the protection engine will start the
handshake with its peer and in case of failure or T-valid timeout, it
will generate an ERROR chunk and an ABORT chunk. The ERROR handling
follows what specified in Section 6.2.2. When Handshake has been
successfully completed, the association state machine will enter
PROTECTED state.
The protection engine specification MUST specify when PROTECTED state
can be entered for each endpoint. If key establishment is out-of-
band, after starting T-valid timer the SCTP association will enter
PROTECTED state per protection engine specification when the
necessary security context is in place.
7.1.2. PROTECTED
The association state machine can only reach PROTECTED state from
PROTECTION PENDING state (see Section 7.1.1). When entering into
PROTECTED state the T-valid timer is running and the protection
engine has completed the key establishment so that protected data can
be sent to the peer.
From this time on, only CRYPTO chunks can be sent to the remote peer
and any other type of plain text SCTP chunks coming from the remote
peer will be silently discarded.
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In PROTECTED state the association initiating SCTP Endpoint
(initiator) MUST validate the INIT sent protected association
parameter, thus the initiator will send a PVALID chunk that will
contain exactly the same list of Protection Engines as previously
sent in protected association parameter of INIT chunk and in the same
order.
When the responder will receive PVALID, it will compare the list of
protection engines with the list received in the INIT chunk, if they
are identical it will reply to the initiator with a PVALID chunk
containing the Protection Engine previously sent as protected
association parameter in INIT-ACK chunk, it will clear the T-valid
timer and will move into ESTABLISHED state.
If the lists of Protection Engines don't match, it will generate an
ERROR chunk and an ABORT chunk. ERROR CAUSE will indicate "Failure
in Protection Engines Validation" and the SCTP association will be
terminated.
After sending PVALID, the initiator will wait for the responder to
reply with the PVALID confirmation. The initiator will compare the
Protection Engine received from the responder, if the value is the
same it will clear the T-valid timer and move into ESTABLISHED state.
If the chosen Protection Engines don't match, it will generate an
ERROR chunk and an ABORT chunk. ERROR CAUSE will indicate "Failure
in Protection Engines Validation" that is critical.
If T-valid timer expires either at initiator or responder, it will
generate an ERROR chunk and an ABORT chunk. The ERROR handling
follows what specified in Section 6.2.4.
7.1.3. Consideration on T-valid
The timer T-Valid supervises initializations that depend on how the
handshake is specified for the Protection Engine and also on the
characteristics of the transport network.
This specification recommends a default value of 30 seconds for
T-valid. This value is expected to be superseded by recommendations
in the Protection Engine Specification for each Protection Engine.
8. Procedures
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8.1. Establishment of a Protected Association
An SCTP Endpoint acting as initiator willing to create a Protected
association shall send to the remote peer an INIT chunk containing
the Protected Association parameter (see Section 4.1) where all the
supported Protection Engines are listed, given in descending order of
preference (see Figure 2).
As alternative, an SCTP Endpoint acting as responder willing to
support only protected associations shall consider INIT chunk not
containing the Protected Association parameter as an error, thus it
will reply with an ERROR chunk according to what specified in
Section 6.1 indicating that for this endpoint mandatory protected
association parameter is missing.
An SCTP Endpoint acting as responder, when receiving an INIT chunk
with protected association parameter, will search the list of
protection engines for the most preferred commonly supported choice
and will reply with INIT-ACK containing the protected association
parameter with the chosen protection engine. When the responder
cannot find a supported protection engine, it will reply with ABORT
and Error in Protection with the extra cause code for "No Supported
Protection Engine" (Section 6.2.1).
When initiator and responder have agreed on a protected association
by means of handshaking INIT/INIT-ACK with a common protection
engine, only control chunks and CRYPTO chunks will be accepted. Any
DATA chunk being sent on a Protected association will be silently
discarded.
After completion of initial handshake, that is after COOKIE-ECHO and
COOKIE-ACK, the Protection Engine shall initialize itself by
transferring its own data as Payload of the CRYPTO chunk (see
Figure 3) if necessary. At completion of Protection Engine
initialization, the setup of the Protected association is complete
and from that time on only CRYPTO chunks will be exchanged. Any
plain text chunks will be silently discarded.
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After completion of protected association initialization, the
initiator MUST send to the responder a PVALID chunk (see Table 3)
containing the list of Protection Engines previously sent in the
protected association parameter of the INIT chunk. The responder
receiving the PVALID chunk will compare the Protection Engines list
with the one previously received in the INIT chunk, if they are
exactly the same, with the same Protection engine in the same
position, it will reply to the initiator with a PVALID chunk
containing the chosen Protection Engine, otherwise it will reply with
an ABORT chunk. If the association was not aborted the protected
association is considered successfully established.
When the initiator receive the PVALID chunk, it will compare with the
previous chosen Protection Engine and in case of mismatch with the
one received previously in the protected association parameter in the
INIT-ACK chunk, it will reply with ABORT, otherwise the protected
association is successfully established.
8.2. Termination of a Protected Association
Besides the procedures for terminating an association explained in
[RFC9260], the protection engine SHALL ask SCTP endpoint for
terminating an association when having an internal error or by
detecting a security violation, using the procedure described in
Section 6.3. The internal design of Protection Engines and their
capability is out of the scope of the current document.
9. Protected Data Chunk Handling
With reference to the State Diagram as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 3
of [RFC9260], the handling of Control chunks, Data chunks and Crypto
chunks follows the rules defined below:
* When the association is in states CLOSED, COOKIE-WAIT, and COOKIE-
ECHOED, any Control chunk is sent unprotected (i.e. plain text).
No DATA chunks shall be sent in these states and DATA chunks
received shall be silently discarded.
* When the association is in state PROTECTION PENDING, any Control
chunk is sent unprotected (i.e. plain text). No DATA chunks shall
be sent in these states and DATA chunks received shall be silently
discarded. CRYPTO Chunks can be sent by the Protection Engine to
establish its security context.
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* When the association is in states PROTECTED, any SCTP chunk except
for DATA and CRYPTO chunks, will be used to create an SCTP payload
that will be encrypted by the Protection Engine and the result
from that encryption will be the used as payload for a CRYPTO
chunk that will be the only chunk in the SCTP packet to be sent.
DATA chunks received shall be silently discarded.
* When the association is in states ESTABLISHED and in the states
for association shutdown, i.e. SHUTDOWN-PENDING, SHUTDOWN-SENT,
SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED, SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT as defined by [RFC9260], any
SCTP chunk including DATA chunks, but excluding CRYPTO chunk, will
be used to create an SCTP payload that will be encrypted by the
Protection Engine and the result from that encryption will be the
used as payload for a CRYPTO chunk that will be the only chunk in
the SCTP packet to be sent.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Common Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Chunk #1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| . . . |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Chunk #n |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 8: Plain Text SCTP Packet
The diagram shown in Figure 8 describes the structure of any plain
text SCTP packet being sent or received when the association has not
reached the PROTECTED state yet. SCTP packet as depicted in Figure 9
may also be sent in PROTECTION PENDING state and in any later state
of the association.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Common Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| CRYPTO Chunk |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 9: Protected SCTP Packets
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The diagram shown in Figure 9 describes the structure of an SCTP
packet being sent after the PROTECTED state has been reached. Such
packets are built with the SCTP common header. Only one CRYPTO chunk
can be sent in a SCTP packet.
9.1. Protected Data Chunk Transmission
When the association state machine (see Figure 7) has reached the
PROTECTION PENDING state, it MAY perform protection engine key
management inband depending on how the specification for the chosen
Protection Engine has been defined. In such case, the CRYPTO chunk
Handler will receive plain control chunks from the SCTP chunk handler
and payload for CRYPTO chunks from the protection engine. Plain
control chunks and CRYPTO chunks MUST NOT be bundled within the same
SCTP packet.
When the association state machine (see Figure 7) has reached the
PROTECTED state, the CRYPTO chunk handler will receive control chunks
and DATA chunks from the SCTP chunk handler as a complete SCTP
payload with maximum size limited by PMTU reduced by the size of the
SCTP common header and the CRYPTO chunk overhead.
That plain payload will be sent to the protection engine in use for
that specific association, the protection engine will return an
encrypted payload.
Depending on the specification for the chosen protection engine, when
forming the CRYPTO chunk header the CRYPTO chunk handler MAY set the
chunk header flags (see Figure 3).
An SCTP packet containing an SCTP CRYPTO chunk SHALL be delivered
without delay and SCTP bundling SHALL NOT be performed.
9.2. Protected Data Chunk Reception
When the association state machine (see Figure 7) has reached the
PROTECTION PENDING state, it MAY handle key management inband
depending on how the specification for the chosen protection engine
has been defined. In such case, the CRYPTO chunk handler will
receive plain control chunks and CRYPTO chunks from the SCTP Header
Handler. CRYPTO chunks will be forwarded to the protection engine
whilst plain control chunks will be forwarded to SCTP chunk handler.
During PROTECTION PENDING state, plain control chunks and CRYPTO
chunks bundled within the same SCTP packet will be handled as
protocol error.
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When the association state machine (see Figure 7) has reached the
PROTECTED state, the CRYPTO chunk handler will receive CRYPTO chunks
from the SCTP Header Handler. Payload from CRYPTO chunks will be
forwarded to the protection engine in use for that specific
association for decryption, the protection engine will return a plain
SCTP Payload. The plain SCTP payload will be forwarded to SCTP Chunk
Handler that will split it in separated chunks and will handle them
according to [RFC9260].
Depending on the specification for the chosen protection engine, when
receiving the CRYPTO chunk header the CRYPTO Chunk Handler MAY handle
the Flags (see Figure 3) according to that specification.
Meta data belonging to the SCTP packet received SHALL be tied to the
relevant chunks and forwarded transparently to the SCTP endpoint.
9.2.1. SCTP Header Handler
The SCTP Header Handler is responsible for correctness of the SCTP
common header, it receives the SCTP packet from the lower transport
layer, discriminates among associations and forwards the payload and
relevant data to the SCTP protection engine for handling.
In the opposite direction it creates the SCTP common header and fills
it with the relevant information for the specific association and
delivers it towards the lower transport layer.
10. IANA Considerations
This document defines two new registries in the Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters group that IANA maintains.
Theses registries are for the protection engine identifiers and extra
cause codes for protection related errors. It also adds registry
entries into several other registries in the Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters group:
* Two new SCTP Chunk Types
* One new SCTP Chunk Parameter Type
* One new SCTP Error Cause Codes
10.1. Protection Engine Identifier Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry called "CRYPTO Chunk
Protection Engine Identifiers". This registry is part of the Stream
Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters grouping.
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The purpose of this registry is to enable identification of different
protection engines used by the CRYPTO chunk when performing the SCTP
handshake and negotiating support. Entries in the registry requires
a protection engine name, a reference to the specification for the
protection engine, and a contact. Each entry will be assigned by
IANA a unique 16-bit unsigned integer identifier for their protection
engine. Values 0-65534 are available for assignment. Value 65535 is
reserved for future extension. The proposed general form of the
registry is depicted below in Table 4.
+==========+==========================+===========+=========+
| ID Value | Name | Reference | Contact |
+==========+==========================+===========+=========+
| 0-65534 | Available for Assignment | RFC-To-Be | |
+----------+--------------------------+-----------+---------+
| 65535 | Reserved | RFC-To-Be | Authors |
+----------+--------------------------+-----------+---------+
Table 4: Protection Engine Identifier Registry
New entries are registered following the Specification Required
policy as defined by [RFC8126].
10.2. Protection Error Cause Codes Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry called "Protection Error
Cause Codes". This registry is part of the Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters grouping.
The purpose of this registry is to enable identification of different
protection related errors when using CRYPTO chunk and a protection
engine. Entries in the registry requires a Meaning, a reference to
the specification defining the error, and a contact. Each entry will
be assigned by IANA a unique 16-bit unsigned integer identifier for
their protection engine. Values 0-65534 are available for
assignment. Value 65535 is reserved for future extension. The
proposed general form of the registry is depicted below in Table 5.
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+============+=========================+===========+=========+
| Cause Code | Meaning | Reference | Contact |
+============+=========================+===========+=========+
| 0 | Error in the Protection | RFC-To-Be | Authors |
| | Engine List | | |
+------------+-------------------------+-----------+---------+
| 1 | Error During Protection | RFC-To-Be | Authors |
| | Handshake | | |
+------------+-------------------------+-----------+---------+
| 2 | Failure in Protection | RFC-To-Be | Authors |
| | Engines Validation | | |
+------------+-------------------------+-----------+---------+
| 3 | Timeout During KEY | RFC-To-Be | Authors |
| | Handshake or Validation | | |
+------------+-------------------------+-----------+---------+
| 4-65534 | Available for | RFC-To-Be | Authors |
| | Assignment | | |
+------------+-------------------------+-----------+---------+
| 65535 | Reserved | RFC-To-Be | Authors |
+------------+-------------------------+-----------+---------+
Table 5: Protection Error Cause Code
New entries are registered following the Specification Required
policy as defined by [RFC8126].
10.3. SCTP Chunk Types
In the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters group's
"Chunk Types" registry, IANA is requested to add the two new entries
depicted below in in Table 6 with a reference to this document. The
registry at time of writing was available at:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/sctp-parameters/sctp-
parameters.xhtml#sctp-parameters-1
+==========+===============================+===========+
| ID Value | Chunk Type | Reference |
+==========+===============================+===========+
| TBA6 | Crypto Chunk (CRYPTO) | RFC-To-Be |
+----------+-------------------------------+-----------+
| TBA7 | Protected Association | RFC-To-Be |
| | Parameter Validation (PVALID) | |
+----------+-------------------------------+-----------+
Table 6: New Chunk Types Registered
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10.4. SCTP Chunk Parameter Types
In the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters group's
"Chunk Parameter Types" registry, IANA is requested to add the new
entry depicted below in in Table 7 with a reference to this document.
The registry at time of writing was available at:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/sctp-parameters/sctp-
parameters.xhtml#sctp-parameters-2
+==========+=======================+===========+
| ID Value | Chunk Parameter Type | Reference |
+==========+=======================+===========+
| TBA8 | Protected Association | RFC-To-Be |
+----------+-----------------------+-----------+
Table 7: New Chunk Type Parameters Registered
10.5. SCTP Error Cause Codes
In the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters group's
"Error Cause Codes" registry, IANA is requested to add the new entry
depicted below in in Table 8 with a reference to this document. The
registry at time of writing was available at:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/sctp-parameters/sctp-
parameters.xhtml#sctp-parameters-24
+==========+=========================+===========+
| ID Value | Error Cause Codes | Reference |
+==========+=========================+===========+
| TBA9 | Protection Engine Error | RFC-To-Be |
+----------+-------------------------+-----------+
Table 8: Error Cause Codes Parameters Registered
11. Security Considerations
All the security and privacy considerations of the security protocol
used as the protection engine applies.
11.1. Privacy Considerations
Using a security protocol in the SCTP CRYPTO chunk might lower the
privacy properties of the security protocol as the SCTP Verification
Tag is an unique identifier for the association.
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11.2. Downgrade Attacks
The CRYPTO chunk provides a mechanism for preventing downgrade
attacks that detects downgrading attempts between protection engines
and terminates the association. The chosen protection engine is the
same as if the peers had been communicating in the absence of an
attacker.
The protection engine initial handshake is verified before the
association is set as ESTABLISHED, thus no user data are sent before
validation.
The downgrade protection is only as strong as the weakest of the
supported protection engines as an active attacker can trick the
endpoints to negotiate the weakest protection engine and then modify
the weakly protected CRYPTO chunks to deceive the endpoints that the
negotiation of the protection engines is validated. This is similar
to the downgrade protection in TLS 1.3 specified in Section 4.1.3. of
[RFC8446] where downgrade protection is not provided when TLS 1.2
with static RSA is used. It is RECOMMENDED to only support a limited
set of strongly profiled protection engines.
12. Requirements towards the protection engines
This section specifies what is to be specified in the description of
a protection engine.
* Define how to protect the plain text set of chunks and encapsulate
them in the CRYPTO Chunk payload.
* Can define its usage of the 8-bit chunk Flags field in the CRYPTO
chunk
* Is required to register the defined protection engine(s) with IANA
per Section 10.1.
* Define how it and in such case how it transmits SCTP packets that
are not created by the SCTP chunk handler, and instead by the
Protection engine. This requires consideration of congestion
control and path MTU.
* Detail the state transition between PROTECTION PENDING and
PROTECTED state (see Section 7).
13. References
13.1. Normative References
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9260] Stewart, R., Tüxen, M., and K. Nielsen, "Stream Control
Transmission Protocol", RFC 9260, DOI 10.17487/RFC9260,
June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9260>.
13.2. Informative References
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
Authors' Addresses
Magnus Westerlund
Ericsson
Email: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
John Preuß Mattsson
Ericsson
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
Claudio Porfiri
Ericsson
Email: claudio.porfiri@ericsson.com
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