Deployment Considerations for Secure Origin BGP (soBGP)
draft-white-sobgp-bgp-deployment-01
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Russ White | ||
Last updated | 2003-06-25 | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
There is a great deal of concern over the security of routing systems within the Internet, particularly in relation to the Border Gateway Protocol [BGP], which is used to provide routing information between autonomous systems. This draft addresses various deployment scenarios and options using the extensions to BGP outlined in [SOBGP-BGP] in conjunction with [SOBGP-KEY] (which is not yet completed or published) and [SOBGP-RADIUS]. Each section of this draft discusses a different deployment situation or deployment option. The final section discusses how private key rollovers can be accomplished with no loss of routing information within soBGP deployments.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)