Deployment Considerations for Secure Origin BGP (soBGP)
draft-white-sobgp-bgp-deployment-01
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Russ White | ||
| Last updated | 2003-06-25 | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-white-sobgp-bgp-deployment-01.txt
Abstract
There is a great deal of concern over the security of routing systems within the Internet, particularly in relation to the Border Gateway Protocol [BGP], which is used to provide routing information between autonomous systems. This draft addresses various deployment scenarios and options using the extensions to BGP outlined in [SOBGP-BGP] in conjunction with [SOBGP-KEY] (which is not yet completed or published) and [SOBGP-RADIUS]. Each section of this draft discusses a different deployment situation or deployment option. The final section discusses how private key rollovers can be accomplished with no loss of routing information within soBGP deployments.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)