DRIP Authentication Formats
draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2020-03-23
Replaces draft-wiethuechter-tmrid-auth
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text html xml pdf htmlized bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
DRIP                                                     A. Wiethuechter
Internet-Draft                                                   S. Card
Intended status: Standards Track                           AX Enterprize
Expires: 24 September 2020                                  R. Moskowitz
                                                          HTT Consulting
                                                           23 March 2020

                      DRIP Authentication Formats
                    draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth-00

Abstract

   This document describes how to include trust into the ASTM Remote ID
   specification defined in ASTM3411 under a Broadcast Remote ID (RID)
   scenario.  It defines a few different message schemes (based on the
   authentication message) that can be used to assure past messages sent
   by a UA and also act as an assurance for UA trustworthiness in the
   absence of Internet connectivity at the receiving node.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 September 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text

Wiethuechter, et al.    Expires 24 September 2020               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft              DRIP Auth Formats                 March 2020

   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Problem Space And Document Focus  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  ASTM Authentication Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Thoughts on ASTM Authentication Message . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  HIP Based Extensions to the ASTM Authentication Message . . .   7
     4.1.  Message Wrapper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.1.1.  Inner Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.2.  Trust Timestamp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.3.  Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.4.  Forward Error Correction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Signed Hash Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.2.1.  Hash Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.2.2.  Pseudo-blockchain Hashes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.2.3.  Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.3.  Offline Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       4.3.1.  Claim: Registry on Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.3.2.  Foward Error Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   5.  Example Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.1.  Trusted Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.2.  Wrapped Signed Hashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28

1.  Introduction

   UA Systems (UAS) are usually in a volatile environment when it comes
   to communication.  UA are generally small with little computational
   (or flying) horsepower to carry standard communication equipment.
Show full document text