TM-RID Authentication Formats
draft-wiethuechter-tmrid-auth-01

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TMRID                                                    A. Wiethuechter
Internet-Draft                                                   S. Card
Intended status: Standards Track                           AX Enterprize
Expires: 30 April 2020                                      R. Moskowitz
                                                          HTT Consulting
                                                         28 October 2019

                     TM-RID Authentication Formats
                    draft-wiethuechter-tmrid-auth-01

Abstract

   This document describes how to include trust into the proposed ASTM
   Remote ID specification defined in WK65041 by the F38 Committee under
   a Broadcast Remote ID (RID) scenario.  It defines a few different
   message schemes (based on the authentication message) that can be
   used to assure past messages sent by a UA and also act as a assurance
   for UA trustworthiness in the absence of Internet connectivity at the
   receiving node.

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Wiethuechter, et al.      Expires 30 April 2020                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             TM-RID Auth Formats              October 2019

   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Problem Space And Document Focus  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Notation in the ASTM Remote ID Standard . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  ASTM Authentication Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  Thoughts on ASTM Authentication Message . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.5.  TM-RID Supporting Levels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  HIP Based Extensions to the ASTM Authentication
           Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  HIP Based Authentication Wrapper  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Signed Hash Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.2.1.  Pseudo-blockchain Hashes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.2.2.  Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.3.  HIP Based Offline Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Example Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.1.  Trusted Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.2.  Wrapped Signed Hashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   UA Systems (UAS) are usually in a volatile environment when it comes
   to communication.  UA are generally small with little computational
   (or flying) horsepower to carry standard communication equipment.
   This limits the mediums of communication to few viable options.

   The ASTM standard focuses on two ways of communicating to a UAS for
   RID: Broadcast and Network.

   This document will focus on adding trust to Broadcast RID in the
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