Resolver side mitigations
draft-wijngaards-dnsext-resolver-side-mitigation-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Wouter Wijngaards | ||
| Last updated | 2009-02-24 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes a set of mitigations that stop the known variations of the Kaminsky cache poisoning attacks against the DNS system, for which only resolver side deployment is necessary.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)