An Unauthenticated, or Leap-of-Faith-Authorization Mode for Bump-In-The-Stack Implementations of IPsec Using Internet Key Exchange Protocols
draft-williams-btns-unauthenticated-bits-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Nicolás Williams | ||
| Last updated | 2005-05-02 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document specifies how to use the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocols, such as IKEv1 and IKEv2, to setup "unauthenticated" security associations (SAs) using public keys as IKE identities and unauthenticated public keys and/or certificates as IKE credentials. This unauthenticated SA negotiation protocol works by having IKE peers assert public keys as identities using a new IKE ID payload type for the purpose. Unauthenticated IPsec is herein referred to by its popular acronym, "BTNS" (Better Than Nothing Security). This document focuses on BITS (bump in the stack) mode IPsec, leaving specification of unauthenticated native IPsec to a separate document. We assume an RFC2401bis processing model, specifically a PAD (peer authorization database) separate from the SPD (security policy database).
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)