Better-Than-Nothing-Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec
draft-williams-btns-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Nicolás Williams | ||
| Last updated | 2005-09-08 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document specifies how to use the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocols, such as IKEv1 and IKEv2, to setup "unauthenticated" security associations (SAs) for use with the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and the IPsec Authentication Header (AH). No IKE extensions are needed, but a Peer Authorization Database (PAD) extension in the form of an ID selector wildcard, 'UNKNOWN', specified. Unauthenticated IPsec is herein referred to by its popular acronym, "BTNS" (Better Than Nothing Security).
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)