DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls-01

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2015-04-22 (latest revision 2014-07-04)
Replaced by draft-wing-dprive-dnsodtls
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls-01.txt

Abstract

DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the path between the DNS client and its server. These queries and responses can contain privacy-sensitive information which is valuable to protect. An active attacker can send bogus responses causing misdirection of the subsequent connection. To counter passive listening and active attacks, this document proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for DNS, to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks. As DNS needs to remain fast, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to reduce DTLS round trips and reduce DTLS handshake size. The proposed mechanism runs over the default DNS port and can also run over an alternate port.

Authors

Reddy K (tireddy@cisco.com)
Dan Wing (dwing@cisco.com)
Prashanth Patil (praspati@cisco.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)