DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls-00

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Last updated 2014-04-22
Replaced by draft-wing-dprive-dnsodtls
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DNSOP Working Group                                             T. Reddy
Internet-Draft                                                   D. Wing
Intended status: Standards Track                                P. Patil
Expires: October 24, 2014                                          Cisco
                                                          April 22, 2014

                         DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
                      draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls-00

Abstract

   DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the path
   between the DNS client and its server.  These queries and responses
   can contain privacy-sensitive information which is valuable to
   protect.  An active attacker can send bogus responses causing
   misdirection of the subsequent connection.

   To counter passive listening and active attacks, this document
   proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for DNS,
   to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks.  As
   DNS needs to remain fast, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to
   reduce DTLS round trips and reduce DTLS handshake size.  The proposed
   mechanism runs over the default DNS port and can also run over an
   alternate port.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 24, 2014.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Relationship to TCP Queries and to DNSSEC . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Incremental Deployment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Demultiplexing, Polling, Port Usage, and Discovery  . . . . .   3
   6.  Performance Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  In-Band Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Authenticating a DNS Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  Established sessions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   12. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   The Domain Name System is specified in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035].  DNS
   queries and responses are normally exchanged unencrypted and are thus
   vulnerable to eavesdropping.  Such eavesdropping can result in an
   undesired entity learning domains that a host wishes to access, thus
   resulting in privacy leakage.  DNS privacy problem is further
   discussed in [I-D.bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy].

   Active attackers have long been successful at injecting bogus
   responses, causing cache poisoning and causing misdirection of the
   subsequent connection (if attacking A or AAAA records).  A popular
   mitigation against that attack is to use ephemeral and random source
   ports for DNS queries.

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   This document defines DNS over DTLS (DNSoD, pronounced "dee-enn-sod")
   which provides confidential DNS communication for stub resolvers,
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