Structured Data for Filtered DNS
draft-wing-dnsop-structured-dns-error-page-01
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Dan Wing , Tirumaleswar Reddy.K , Neil Cook , Mohamed Boucadair | ||
| Last updated | 2021-11-09 (Latest revision 2021-10-13) | ||
| Replaces | draft-reddy-dnsop-error-page | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | plain text html xml htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-wing-dnsop-structured-dns-error-page-01
DNSOP WG D. Wing
Internet-Draft Citrix
Intended status: Standards Track T. Reddy
Expires: 16 April 2022 Akamai
N. Cook
Open-Xchange
M. Boucadair
Orange
13 October 2021
Structured Data for Filtered DNS
draft-wing-dnsop-structured-dns-error-page-01
Abstract
DNS filtering is widely deployed for network security, but filtered
DNS responses lack information for the end user to understand the
reason for the filtering. Existing mechanisms to provide detail to
end users cause harm especially if the blocked DNS response is to an
HTTPS website.
This document defines a mechanism to explain the reason for the DNS
filtering and provides HTTPS URIs to get more detail. This
information can be parsed by the client and displayed, logged, or
used for other purposes.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 April 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Structured Error EDNS(0) Option Code . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Structured JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Protocol Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Client Generating Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Server Generating Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Client Processing Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
DNS filters are deployed for a variety of reasons including endpoint
security, parental filtering, and filtering required by law
enforcement. Network-based security solutions such as firewalls and
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) rely upon network traffic
inspection to implement perimeter-based security policies and operate
by filtering DNS responses. In a home, DNS filtering is used for the
same reasons as above and additionally for parental control.
Internet Service Providers typically block access to some DNS domains
due to a requirement imposed by an external entity (e.g., law
enforcement agency) also performed using DNS-based content filtering.
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Users of DNS services which perform filtering may wish to receive
more information about such filtering to resolve problems with the
filter -- for example to contact the administrator to whitelist a
domain that was erroneously filtered or to understand the reason a
particular domain was filtered. With that information, the user can
choose another network, open a trouble ticket with the DNS
administrator to resolve erroneous filtering, log the information, or
other uses.
DNS responses can be filtered by sending a bogus (also called,
"forged") A or AAAA response, NXDOMAIN error or empty answer, or an
extended DNS error (EDE) code defined in [RFC8914]. Each of these
methods have advantages and disadvantages that are discussed below:
1. The DNS response is forged to provide a list of IP addresses that
points to an HTTP(S) server alerting the end user about the
reason for blocking access to the requested domain (e.g.,
malware). When an HTTP(S) enabled domain name is blocked, the
network security device (e.g., CPE, firewall) presents a block
page instead of the HTTP response from the content provider
hosting that domain. If an HTTP enabled domain name is blocked,
the network security device intercepts the HTTP request and
returns a block page over HTTP. If an HTTPS enabled domain is
blocked, the block page is also served over HTTPS. In order to
return a block page over HTTPS, man in the middle (MITM) is
enabled on endpoints by generating a local root certificate and
an accompanying (local) public/private key pair. The local root
certificate is installed on the endpoint while the network
security device(s) stores a copy of the private key. During the
TLS handshake, the network security device modifies the
certificate provided by the server and (re)signs it using the
private key from the local root certificate.
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* However, configuring the local root certificate on endpoints
is not a viable option in several deployments like home
networks, schools, Small Office/Home Office (SOHO), and Small/
Medium Enterprise (SME). In these cases, the typical behavior
is that the forged DNS response directs the user towards a
server hosted to display the block page which breaks the TLS
connection. For web-browsing this then results in an HTTPS
certificate error message indicating that a secure connection
could not be established, which gives no information to the
end-user about the reason for the error. The typical errors
are "The security certificate presented by this website was
not issued by a trusted certificate authority" (Internet
Explorer/Edge"), "The site's security certificate is not
trusted" (Chrome), "This Connection is Untrusted" (Firefox),
"Safari can't verify the identity of the website..." (Safari
on MacOS)".
* Enterprise networks do not assume that all the connected
devices are managed by the IT team or Mobile Device Management
(MDM) devices, especially in the quite common Bring Your Own
Device (BYOD) scenario. In addition, the local root
certificate cannot be installed on IoT devices without a
device management tool.
* An end user does not know why the connection was reset and,
consequently, may repeatedly try to reach the domain but with
no success. Frustrated, the end user may switch to an
alternate network that offers no DNS-level protection against
malware and phishing, potentially compromising both security
and privacy. Furthermore, certificate errors train users to
click through certificate errors, which is a bad security
practice. To eliminate the need for an end user to click
through certificate errors, an end user may manually install a
local root certificate on a host device. Doing so, however,
is also a bad security practice as it creates a security
vulnerability that may be exploited by a MITM attack. When a
manually installed local root certificate expires, the user
has to (again) manually install the new local root
certificate.
2. The DNS response is forged to provide a NXDOMAIN response to
cause the DNS lookup to terminate in failure. In this case, an
end user does not know why the domain cannot be reached and may
repeatedly try to reach the domain but with no success.
Frustrated, the end user may use insecure connections to reach
the domain, potentially compromising both security and privacy.
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3. The extended error codes Blocked, Censored, and Filtered defined
in Section 4 of [RFC8914] can be returned by a DNS server to
provide additional information about the cause of an DNS error.
If the extended error code "Forged Answer" defined in Section 4.5
of [RFC8914] is returned by the DNS server, the client can
identify the DNS response is forged together with the reason for
HTTPS certificate error.
4. These extended error codes do not suffer from the limitations
discussed in bullets (1) and (2), but the user still does not
know the exact reason nor he/she is aware of the exact entity
blocking the access to the domain. For example, a DNS server may
block access to a domain based on the content category such as
"Adult Content" to enforce parental control, "Violence &
Terrorism" due to an external requirement imposed by an external
entity (e.g., Law Enforcement Agency), etc. These content
categories cannot be standardized because the classification of
domains into content categories is vendor specific, typically
ranges from 40 to 100 types of categories depending on the vendor
and the categories keep evolving. Furthermore, the threat data
used to categorize domains may sometimes misclassify domains
(e.g., domains wrongly classified as Domain Generation Algorithm
(DGA) by deep learning techniques, domain wrongly classified as
phishing due to crowd sourcing, new domains not categorized by
the threat data). A user needs to know the contact details of
the IT/InfoSec team to raise a complaint.
5. When a resolver or forwarder forwards the received EDE option,
the EXTRA-TEXT field only conveys the source of the error
(Section 3 of [RFC8914]) and does not provide additional textual
information about the cause of the error.
For both DNS filtering mechanisms described above, the DNS server can
return extended error codes Blocked, Censored, Filtered, or Forged
Answer defined in Section 4 of [RFC8914]. However, these codes only
explain that filtering occurred but lack detail for the user to
diagnose erroneous filtering.
No matter which type of response is generated (forged IP address(es),
NXDOMAIN or empty answer, even with an extended error code), the user
who triggered the DNS query has little chance to understand which
entity filtered the query, how to report a mistake in the filter, or
why the entity filtered it at all. This document describes a
mechanism to provide such detail.
One of the other benefits of this approach is to eliminate the need
to "spoof" block pages for HTTPS resources. This is achieved since
clients implementing this approach would be able to display a
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meaningful error message, and would not need to connect to such a
block page. This approach thus avoids the need to install a local
root certificate authority on those IT-managed devices.
This document describes a protocol containing parsable data in a new
EDNS(0) [RFC6891] option code.
Clients indicate their support of this specification in their DNS
query so the DNS server can tailor its DNS response accordingly. The
information returned in a DNS response allows combinations of
headless devices (i.e., those lacking a display or other means to
communicate with a human), operating systems, and web browsers to be
informed of the filtering. This information returned can be logged
and/or displayed to the user, as appropriate for the user interface
capabilities of the client hardware and software.
This document does not recomment DNS filtering, but provides a
mechanism for better transparency to explain to the users why some
DNS queries are filtered.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses terms defined in DNS Terminology [RFC8499].
"Requestor" refers to the side that sends a request. "Responder"
refers to an authoritative, recursive resolver or other DNS component
that responds to questions. Other terminology is used here as
defined in the RFCs cited by this document.
"Encrypted DNS" refers to any encrypted scheme to convey DNS
messages, for example, DNS-over-HTTPS [RFC8484], DNS-over-TLS
[RFC7858], or DNS-over-QUIC [I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic].
3. Structured Error EDNS(0) Option Code
This document defines a new EDNS(0) [RFC6891] option code (OPT) to
include JSON providing information in the DNS response describing
filtering that occurred for this query, defined in Figure 1.
The value of this EDNS(0) option code (OPT) is TBA-BY-IANA.
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1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| STRUCTURED-ERROR-LENGTH (fixed, two octets) |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
/ STRUCTURED-ERROR-JSON (variable size) /
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Figure 1: Structured Error EDNS(0) Option Code
The description of the fields is as follows:
STRUCTURED-ERROR-LENGTH: Two octets containing the length of
STRUCTURED-ERROR-JSON, in octets. It MUST NOT be set to 0.
STRUCTURED-ERROR-JSON: JSON containing DNS filtering information
encoded in JSON, defined in Section 4.
4. Structured JSON
STRUCTURED-ERROR-JSON contains the following JSON names:
c: (complaint) a partial URI for the user to further diagnose and
possibly report mis-classified DNS filtering. The value is
converted to an expanded absolute URI. This field is optional,
but note its absence still allows a URI to be formed.
d: (domain) Contains the domain-name of the encrypted DNS server.
This is used to create the expanded URIs for both the "c" and "r"
fields, and also detect undesired forwarding of EDNS(0) options.
This field is mandatory.
j: (justification) the textual justification for this particular DNS
filtering. This field is mandatory.
o: (organization) human-friendly name of the organization that
filtered this particular DNS query. This field is optional.
r: (regulation) a partial URI to retrieve the public or private
rule, law, or regulation describing the reason for this DNS
filter. This might point at an employment agreement (for an
enterprise performing filtering) or a national government
regulation (for an ISP performing filtering). This field is
optional, but note its absence still allows a URI to be formed.
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To reduce packet overhead the generated JSON SHOULD be as short as
possible: short domain names, concise text in the values for the "j"
and "o" names, and minified JSON (that is, without spaces or line
breaks between JSON elements).
The JSON data can be parsed to display to the user, logged, or
otherwise used to assist the end-user or IT staff with
troubleshooting and diagnosing the cause of the DNS filtering.
5. Protocol Operation
5.1. Client Generating Request
When generating a DNS query, the client MUST include the Structured
Error EDNS(0) option when encrypted DNS is used so the DNS server
knows that the client is compliant with this specification.
5.2. Server Generating Response
When the DNS server filters its DNS response to an A or AAAA record
query, the DNS response MAY contain an empty answer, NXDOMAIN, or a
forged A or AAAA response, as desired by the DNS server. In
addition, if the query contained the Structured Error EDNS(0) option,
the DNS server MAY return more detail in the STRUCTURED-ERROR-JSON,
as described below.
Over time a domain name might be filtered, then not filtered, then
filtered again. Additionally, the user might take minutes or even
days before investigating a filtered DNS query. Thus the complaint
URI is RECOMMENDED to include sufficient detail to determine the
filtering state when the DNS filtering occurred. If and how this is
encoded into the complaint URI is an implementation decision.
5.3. Client Processing Response
On receipt of the DNS response, the following actions are performed
specific to Structured Error EDNS(0) option, in no particular order:
* The requestor MUST check that the response was received over an
encrypted DNS channel. If not, the requestor MUST discard any
returned Structured Error EDNS(0) option.
* If the DNS response contains more than one Structured Error
EDNS(0) option, the requestor MUST discard all Structured Error
ENDS(0) options.
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* The DNS response MUST also contain an extended error code of
"Censored", "Blocked", "Filtered" or "Forged", otherwise the
Structured Error EDNS(0) option is discarded.
* If either of the mandatory JSON names "d" and "j" are missing or
have empty values in the Structured Error EDNS(0) option, the
option is discarded.
* The Requestor expands the values in "c" and "r" by prefixing the
two values with "https://" and the value of the "d" name. Then
the Requestor further expands each of the "c" and "r" URIs by
appending two URL query parameters: "type" indicating the name of
the DNS resource record type queried and "name" indicating the
name of the DNS resource record queried.
| Note the parial URI value in "c" or "r" will already contain
| zero or more query parameters so implementations should
| substitute "?" and "&" accordingly.
* If a DNS client has enabled opportunistic privacy profile
(Section 5 of [RFC8310]) for DoT, the DNS client will either
fallback to an encrypted connection without authenticating the DNS
server provided by the local network or fallback to clear text
DNS, and cannot exchange encrypted DNS messages. Both of these
fallback mechanisms adversely impacts security and privacy. If
the DNS client has enabled opportunistic privacy profile for DoT,
the DNS client MUST ignore the Structured DNS Error EDNS(0) option
responses, but SHOULD process other parts of the response.
* If a DNS client has enabled strict privacy profile (Section 5 of
[RFC8310]) for DoT, the DNS client requires an encrypted
connection and successful authentication of the DNS server; this
mitigates both passive eavesdropping and client redirection (at
the expense of providing no DNS service if an encrypted,
authenticated connection is not available). If the DNS client has
enabled strict privacy profile for DoT, the client MAY process the
Structured DNS Error EDNS(0) option of the DNS response. Note
that the strict and opportunistic privacy profiles as defined in
[RFC8310] only apply to DoT; there has been no such distinction
made for DoH.
* If the DNS client determines that the encrypted DNS server does
not offer DNS filtering service, it MUST reject the Structured
Error EDNS(0) option. For example, the DNS client can learn
whether the encrypted DNS resolver performs DNS-based content
filtering or not by retrieving resolver information using the
method defined in [I-D.reddy-add-resolver-info].
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* DNS forwarders (or DNS proxies) are supposed to propagate unknown
EDNS(0) options (Sections 4.1 and 4.4.1 of [RFC5625]), which means
the Structured Error EDNS(0) option may get propagated by such a
DNS server. To detect this scenario, the DNS client MUST verify
the domain name in the Structured Error "d" value matches the
domain name of the encrypted DNS resolver. If this match fails,
the DNS client MUST ignore the Structured Error EDNS(0) option in
the response.
6. Examples
An example showing the nameserver at 'ns.example.net' that filtered a
DNS "A" record query for 'example.org' is shown in Figure 2.
{
"c": "?time=1621902483",
"d": "ns.example.com",
"j": "malware present for 23 days",
"o": "example.net Filtering Service",
"r": "?country=atlantis"
}
Figure 2: JSON returned in EDNS(0) Structured Error response
In Figure 3 the same content is shown with minified JSON (no
whitespace, no blank lines) with '\' line wrapping per [RFC8792].
============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===============
{"c":"?time=1621902483","d":"ns.example.com","j":"malware present \
for 23 days","o":"example.net Filtering Service","r":\
"?country=atlantis"}
Figure 3: Minified response
Upon receipt, the two partial URIs ("c" and "r") are expanded to
become fully-formed URIs. The class, type, and name are pulled from
the DNS response (that matches the associated query) so that the
fully-formed "c" URI becomes
"https://ns.example.net?time=1621902483&type=a&name=example.org" and
the "r" URI becomes
"https://ns.example.net?country=atlantis&type=a&name=example.org".
7. Security Considerations
Security considerations in Section 6 of [RFC8914] apply to this
document.
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To minimize impact of active on-path attacks on the DNS channel, the
client validates the response as described in Section 5.3.
If the browser visits either of the URIs in the response ("c" or
"r"), the browser SHOULD reduce the attack surface of the client by
using an isolated environment precautions such as clearly labeling
the page as untrusted or prevent user interaction with the page.
Such isolation should prevent transmitting cookies, block JavaScript,
block auto-fill of credentials or personal information, and be
isolated from the user's normal environment.
When displaying the free-form text of "o" and "j", the browser SHOULD
NOT make any of those elements into actionable (clickable) links.
Although the "d" value is validated, an attacker who is able to
inject the Structured Error EDNS(0) option so that a DNS proxy or DNS
forwarder, unaware of the option, will forward it and pass the
validation checks described in Section 5.3. This means the other
JSON fields can be controlled by the attacker. The "j" and "o"
fields are, perhaps, the most interesting for an attacker to modify
for nefarious purposes, because the "d" field has to match the
encrypted DNS server's name and the expanded URIs from the "c" and
"r" will point at the DNS resolver not under the attacker's control.
| The authors anticipate enhancements to
| [I-D.reddy-add-resolver-info] will reduce or eliminate the
| concern described in previous paragraph.
8. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA assign a DNS EDNS0 Option Code (OPT)
value in the Expert Review range named "Structured DNS Error".
This document requests IANA to register the "application/
json+structured-dns-error" media type in the "Media Types" registry
[IANA-MediaTypes]. This registration follows the procedures
specified in [RFC6838]:
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Type name: application
Subtype name: json+structured-dns-error
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: as defined in Section NN of [RFCXXXX].
Security considerations: See Section NNN of [RFCXXXX].
Interoperability considerations: N/A
Published specification: [RFCXXXX]
Applications that use this media type: Section NNNN of [RFCXXXX].
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information: N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF,
iesg@ietf.org
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: none
Author: See Authors' Addresses section.
Change controller: IESG
Provisional registration? No
9. Changes
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
9.1. Changes from 00 to 01
* removed support for multiple responsible parties
* one-character JSON names to minimize JSON length
* partial URI sent in "c" and "r" names, combined with "d" name sent
in JSON to minimize attack surface and minimize JSON length
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* moved EDNS(0) forgery-mitigation text, some Security
Considerations text, and some other text from
[I-D.reddy-dnsop-error-page] to this document
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC6891] Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms
for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6891, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8310] Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles
for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8310>.
10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic]
Huitema, C., Dickinson, S., and A. Mankin, "DNS over
Dedicated QUIC Connections", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-05, 11 October 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dprive-
dnsoquic-05>.
[I-D.reddy-add-resolver-info]
Reddy, T. and M. Boucadair, "DNS Resolver Information",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reddy-add-
resolver-info-03, 13 April 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-add-
resolver-info-03>.
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[I-D.reddy-dnsop-error-page]
Reddy, T., Cook, N., Wing, D., and M. Boucadair, "DNS
Access Denied Error Page", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-reddy-dnsop-error-page-08, 4 June 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-dnsop-
error-page-08>.
[IANA-MediaTypes]
IANA, "Media Types",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[RFC5625] Bellis, R., "DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines",
BCP 152, RFC 5625, DOI 10.17487/RFC5625, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5625>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
(DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.
[RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.
[RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
"Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.
[RFC8914] Kumari, W., Hunt, E., Arends, R., Hardaker, W., and D.
Lawrence, "Extended DNS Errors", RFC 8914,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8914, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8914>.
Authors' Addresses
Dan Wing
Citrix Systems, Inc.
United States of America
Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com
Wing, et al. Expires 16 April 2022 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Data for Filtered DNS October 2021
Tirumaleswar Reddy
Akamai
Bangalore
Karnataka
India
Email: kondtir@gmail.com
Neil Cook
Open-Xchange
United Kingdom
Email: neil.cook@noware.co.uk
Mohamed Boucadair
Orange
35000 Rennes
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Wing, et al. Expires 16 April 2022 [Page 15]