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DNSSEC automation
draft-wisser-dnssec-automation-01

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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Authors Ulrich Wisser , Shumon Huque
Last updated 2021-02-22
Replaced by draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-automation
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draft-wisser-dnssec-automation-01
Domain Name System Operations (dnsop)                          U. Wisser
Internet-Draft                           The Swedish Internet Foundation
Intended status: Standards Track                                S. Huque
Expires: 25 August 2021                                       Salesforce
                                                        21 February 2021

                           DNSSEC automation
                   draft-wisser-dnssec-automation-01

Abstract

   This document describes an algorithm and a protocol to automate
   DNSSEC multi-signer [RFC8901] "Multi-Signer DNSSEC Models" setup,
   operations and decomissioning.  It primarily deals with Model 2 of
   the Multi-Signer specification, where each operator has their own
   distinct KSK and ZSK sets (or CSK sets).  It makes use of [RFC8078]
   "Managing DS Records from the Parent via CDS/CDNSKEY" and [RFC7477]
   "Child-to-Parent Synchronization in DNS" to accomplish this.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 August 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Out-Of-Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Running a multi-signer setup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Secure change of name server operator . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Setting up a new multi-signer group . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  A new signer joins the multi-signer group . . . . . . . .   4
       3.3.1.  Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.3.2.  Steps for joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  A signer leaves the multi-signer group  . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Automation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Centralized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Decentralized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   [RFC8901] describes the necessary steps and API for a multi-signer
   DNSSEC configuration.  In this document we will combine [RFC8901]
   with [RFC8078] and [RFC7477] to define a fully automatable algorithm
   for setting up, operating and decomissioning of a multi-signer DNSSEC
   configuration.

   One of the special cases of multi-signer DNSSEC is actually the
   secure change of DNS operator.

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1.1.  Out-Of-Scope

   In order for any multi-signer group to give consistent answers across
   all nameservers, the data contents of the zone also have to be
   synchronized (in addition to infrastructure records like NS, DNSKEY,
   CDS etc).  This content synchronization is out-of-scope for this
   document.

1.2.  Notation

   Short definitions of expressions used in this document

   signer  An entity signing a zone

   multi-signer group  A group of signers that sign the same zone

1.3.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Use Cases

2.1.  Running a multi-signer setup

   As described in [RFC8901] a multi-signer DNSSEC configuration has
   some challenges that can be overcome with the right infrastructure
   and following a number of steps for setup and operation.

   In this document we describe how all of the steps in the multi-signer
   DNSSEC setup can be automated.  That is, all except the initial trust
   between involved signers.

2.2.  Secure change of name server operator

   Changing the name server operator of a DNSSEC signed zone can be
   quite a challenge.  Currently the most common method is temporarily
   "going insecure".  This is a bad choice for security, and a bad
   choice for users relying on the security of the zone.

   Changing name server operators can be considered to be a transient
   special case of multi-signer DNSSEC operations.  A new operator joins
   the old operator in a temporary multi-signer setup.  Once that is
   completed, the old operator leaves the multi-signer setup.

3.  Algorithm

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3.1.  Setting up a new multi-signer group

   The zone is already authoritatively served by one DNS operator and is
   DNSSEC signed.  For full automation both the KSK and ZSK or CSK must
   be online.

   This would be a special case, a multi-signer group with only one
   signer.

3.2.  Configuration

   The following configuration has to be made for any signer of the
   multi-signer group before joining the group.  These steps are not
   automated by this draft.

   1.  The signers own keys (the keys the signer has the private part
       of)

   2.  The NS records in the zone

   3.  An established trust to the multi-signer group

3.3.  A new signer joins the multi-signer group

3.3.1.  Prerequisites

   The new signer

   1.  has a working setup of the zone, including DNSSEC signing.

   2.  uses the same algorithm for DNSSEC signing as the multi-signer
       group uses.

3.3.2.  Steps for joining

   1.   a new signer joins the group

   2.   Exchange of keys, after this step all signers must have the
        DNSKEY set of all other signers of the group

   3.   Calculate CDS/CDNSKEY set

   4.   All signers put the ZSK of all other signers in their DNSKEY
        set.

   5.   All signers publish their CDS/CDNSKEY set

   6.   Wait for parent to pick up DS updates

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   7.   Remove CDS/CDNSKEY set from all signers

   8.   Wait 2 time maximum TTL of DS at parent and DNSKEY at all
        children

   9.   Exchange of NS set, after this step all signers must have the NS
        set of all other signers

   10.  Compile new complete NS set with NS records from all signers

   11.  Compare to NS set at parent

   12.  If parent is different, publish CSYNC record with NS and A and
        AAAA bit set.

   13.  Wait for parent to pick up changes

   14.  Remove CSYNC record from all signers

3.4.  A signer leaves the multi-signer group

   1.   Signal to all other signers to remove the leaving signer's NS
        records

   2.   Compile new complete NS set with NS records from all signers

   3.   Compare to NS set at parent

   4.   If parent if different, publish CSYNC record with NS and A and
        AAAA bit set.

   5.   Wait for parent to pick up changes

   6.   Remove CSYNC record from all signers

   7.   Wait 2 times TTL of maximum NS TTL from parent and all signers

   8.   Signal all other signers leaving of multi-signer group

   9.   Stop answering queries

   10.  Remaining signers remove ZSK of leaving signer from their DNSKEY
        set

   11.  Remaining signers recalculate DNSKEY set

   12.  Calculate CDS/CDNSKEY set

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   13.  All signers put the ZSK of all other signers in their DNSKEY
        set.

   14.  All signers publish their CDS/CDNSKEY set

   15.  Wait for parent to pick up DS updates

   16.  Remove CDS/CDNSKEY set from all signers

4.  Automation

   Automation of the necessary steps described in the last section can
   be divided into two main models, centralized and decentralized.  Both
   have pros and cons and any zone operator should chose wisely.

4.1.  Centralized

   In a centralized model the zone operator will run software that
   executes all steps necessary and controls all signers.

4.2.  Decentralized

   In the decentralized models all signers will communicate with each
   other and execute the necessary steps on their instance only.  For
   this signers need a specialized protocol to communicate configuration
   details that are not part of the zone data.

5.  Acknowledgements

6.  IANA Considerations

7.  Security Considerations

8.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7477]  Hardaker, W., "Child-to-Parent Synchronization in DNS",
              RFC 7477, DOI 10.17487/RFC7477, March 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7477>.

   [RFC8078]  Gudmundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS Records from
              the Parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", RFC 8078,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8078, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8078>.

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9.  Informative References

   [RFC8901]  Huque, S., Aras, P., Dickinson, J., Vcelak, J., and D.
              Blacka, "Multi-Signer DNSSEC Models", RFC 8901,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8901, September 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8901>.

Authors' Addresses

   Ulrich Wisser
   The Swedish Internet Foundation
   Box 92073
   SE-12007 Stockholm
   Sweden

   Email: ulrich@wisser.se
   URI:   https://www.internetstiftelsen.se

   Shumon Huque
   Salesforce
   415 Mission Street, 3rd Floor
   San Francisco,  CA 94105
   United States of America

   Email: shuque@gmail.com

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