Content-Locked Encryption and Authentication of Nameless Objects
draft-wood-icnrg-clean-01

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icnrg                                                            C. Wood
Internet-Draft                           University of California Irvine
Intended status: Informational                        September 12, 2017
Expires: March 16, 2018

    Content-Locked Encryption and Authentication of Nameless Objects
                       draft-wood-icnrg-clean-01

Abstract

   This document specifies CCNx CLEAN - content-locked encryption and
   authentication of nameless objects.  CLEAN describes how to
   transparently encrypt content objects in FLIC Manifests
   [I-D.irtf-icnrg-flic].  Relevant decryption information is carried in
   native FLIC nodes, i.e., without any extensions or modifications to
   FLIC.  CLEAN transparently encrypts public data and supports
   application-specific configuration for private data.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 16, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  CLEAN Crypto  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  CLEAN Construction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  CLEAN Publishing and Fetching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  FLIC Support  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.1.  Public Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.2.  Private Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   In CCN, nameless objects are content objects which do not carry a
   Name TLV field.  Thus, a necessary requisite to retrieve them from
   the network is to know their respective ContentObjectHashRestriction,
   or ContentId.  A ContentId is the cryptographic hash of a content
   object [I-D.irtf-icnrg-ccnxsemantics].  A router may only forward a
   nameless content object if its cryptographic hash digest matches the
   ContentId of the corresponding interest.

   By definition, a consumer cannot (with overwhelming probability)
   request a nameless content object without knowledge of its ContentId.
   Manifests are network-level structures that convey ContentIds to
   consumers.  FLIC Manifests [I-D.irtf-icnrg-flic] are one type of
   Manifest structure.  Manifests typically group segments of a large
   piece of data under a common name.  For example, suppose there exists
   a content with the name /foo/bar, which has a total size beyond the
   64KB limit imposed by the CCN packet [I-D.irtf-icnrg-ccnxmessages].
   The producer of /foo/bar can segment the data into fixed size chunks
   and, for each chunk, create a nameless content object whose payload
   is the chunk.  Then, the producer may create a Manifest with the name
   /foo/bar which contains the references to each of these constituent
   nameless object parts.  To fetch /foo/bar, a consumer then does the
   following:

   1.  Issue an interest for the name /foo/bar.

   2.  Receive, verify, and parse the Manifest.

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   3.  Issue requests for each nameless content object using the
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