Information Model of Interface to Network Security Functions Capability Interface
draft-xia-i2nsf-capability-interface-im-01
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Liang Xia , Dacheng Zhang , Nicolas Bouthors | ||
| Last updated | 2015-05-24 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-xibassnez-i2nsf-capability | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-xia-i2nsf-capability-interface-im-01
I2NSF L. Xia
Internet Draft Huawei
Intended status: Standard Track D Zhang
Alibaba
N. BOUTHORS
Qosmos
Expires: November 2015 May 25, 2015
Information Model of Interface to Network Security Functions
Capability Interface
draft-xia-i2nsf-capability-interface-im-01.txt
Status of this Memo
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Abstract
This draft is focused on the north-bound interface of NSFs (Network
Security Functions) and proposes an information model for
configuring various kinds NSF security functions, based on the
packet-based paradigm. The Yang structure and use examples are also
presented to clarify how to use the information model.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................ 2
2. Conventions used in this document ........................... 3
2.1. Terminology ............................................ 3
3. Information Model for Capability Interface .................. 4
3.1. Overview ............................................... 4
3.2. Packet-Based Paradigm .................................. 6
3.3. Rule ................................................... 9
3.4. Match ................................................. 10
3.5. Actions ............................................... 12
4. I2NSF Capability Interface IM Yang Structure ............... 12
5. Use Examples of I2NSF Capability Interface IM .............. 15
6. Security Considerations .................................... 15
7. IANA Considerations ........................................ 16
8. References ................................................. 16
8.1. Normative References .................................. 16
8.2. Informative References ................................ 16
9. Acknowledgments ............................................ 17
1. Introduction
Due to the rapid development and deployment of cloud computing
services, the demand of cloud-based security services is also
rapidly growing. The customers of them can be enterprises [I-
D.zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases], User Equipment (UE) of mobile
network and Internet of Things (IoT) [I-D.qi-i2nsf-access-network-
usecase], residential access users [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-access-
usecases], and so on.
Derived from [I-D.dunbar-i2nsf-problem-statement], two types of
I2NSF interface should be considered:
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o Interface between I2NSF user/client with network/security
controller: [I-D.xia-i2nsf-service-interface-DM] describes the
information model used by this type of interface. It's a service-
oriented interface, the main objective is to unify the
communication channel and the security service request
information model between various high-level application (e.g.,
openstack, various BSS/OSS, etc) with various network controllers.
The design goal of the service interface is to decouple security
service in application layer from various kinds of security
devices and their device-level security functions. The intent-
based information model approach derived from RBAC model can be a
feasible option for it;
o North-bound interface provided by NSFs (e.g., FW, AAA, IPS, Anti-
DDOS, Anti-Virus, etc), no matter whether the NSFs are Virtual
Machines (VM) on servers or physical appliances. In this document,
this type of interface is also called "capability interface". Any
network entities (e.g., I2NSF clients, network/security
controller, etc) can use this interface to configure the required
security functions of NSFs. Current situation is different NSF
vendors have different proprietary interfaces and information
models for configuring their security functions.
This draft is focused on the capability interfaces and proposes an
information model for configuring various kinds NSFs. It's used by
the NSFs to decouple from the various security services came from
the application layer and highlight the security capabilities they
can provide. Section 3 defines the information model for capability
interface. Section 4 gives its representation by Yang data model.
Section 5 includes some using examples to clarify how to use the
information model.
2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
2.1. Terminology
AAA -Access control, Authorization, Authentication
ACL - Access Control List
AD - Active Directory
ANSI - American National Standards Institute
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DDoS - Distributed Deny of Services
FW - Firewall
I2NSF - Interface to Network Security Functions
INCITS - International Committee for Information Technology
Standards
IoT - Internet of Things
IPS - Intrusion Prevention System
LDAP - Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
NAT - Network Address Translation
NBI - North-bound Interface
NIST - National Institute of Standard Technology
NSF - Network Security Function
RBAC - Role Based Access Control
UE - User Equipment
URL - Uniform/Universal Resource Locator
VM - Virtual Machine
3. Information Model for Capability Interface
3.1. Overview
Similar to switchs and routers, NSFs realize the security
capabilities (e.g., antivirus, IPS, FW, etc) in the device level,
not in the service level. Although in some conditions, they can
provide certain service-aware capabilities, i.e., application
recognition, virus detection, etc. In other words, the IM of the
capability interface should be designed by the way of abstracting
from the various specific security capabilities to a generic model,
so that it can be used to configure NSFs directly or by the
translation of the adaptor in NSF easily.
Below is the overall information model for I2NSF capability
interface.
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+-------------+
+-> User/tenant|
| | /VN-id |
| +-------------+
| +---------+
| |Address/ |
+->address |
| |group |
| +---------+
| +-----------+
| |Layer 2/3/4|
+->header, or |
| |payload |
+------+ | +-----------+
|Packet| | +---------+
+->based |-+-> Service |
| |match | | +---------+
| +------+ | +-----------+
| +->Application|
| +-----------+
+----+ +-----+ |
| | +->Match|-+ +----------+
+-->Rule| | +-----+ | +-> Session |
| | | | | | | state |
| +----+ | | +-------+ | +----------+
| | | |context| | +----------+
| * | +->based +-+-> Schedule |
| * | |match | | +----------+
| * | +-------+ | +---------+
| | | |Region/ |
| | +->region |
+------+ +----+ | |group |
| | | | | | +---------+
|Policy+--+-->Rule+--+
| | | | | | +-------+
+------+ | +----+ | +->Permit +
| | | +-------+
| * | +-------+ | +-------+
| * | +->Basic +-+-> Deny |
| * | | |actions| | +-------+
| | | +-------+ | +-------+
| | | +-> Mirror|
| | | +-------+
| | |
| | | +----------+
| | | +->Antivirus:|
| +----+ | | | |profile |
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| | | | +-------+ | | +----------+
+-->Rule| +->Actions+-+ | +---------+
| | +-------+ | +-> IPS: |
+----+ | |signature|
| | +---------+
| | +----------+
| | | URL |
| +->Filtering:|
| |data base |
| | +----------+
| +--------+ | +----------+
+->Advanced+-+ | File |
|actions | +->Blocking: |
+--------+ | |profile |
| +----------+
| +----------+
| | Data |
+->Filtering:|
| |profile |
| +----------+
| +-----------+
| |Application|
+-> control |
| +-----------+
| *
+-> *
*
Figure 1. The Overall Information Model for I2NSF Capability
Interface
At the top level, policy is a container including a set of security
rules. Each rule represents some specific security requirements or
actions. Security policy combines these rules together according to
some logic, i.e., their similarity or mutual relations, etc.
A Security policy is created and assigned to any NSFs depending on
specific requirements and scenarios. For example, a security policy
can be responsible for an enterprise branch, or can be used for the
access control to one set of services.
3.2. Packet-Based Paradigm
[I-D.lopez-i2nsf-packet] analyzes the common nature of NSF functions
that NSFs ultimately are packet-processing engines that inspect
packets traversing networks, either directly or in context to
sessions to which the packet is associated. This draft uses this
packet-based paradigm for the design of NSF capability interface IM.
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This packet-based design approach is very general and easily
extensible, and so can avoid any potential constraints which could
limit NSFs' functional capabilities.
Considering from the perspective of packet-processing, NSFs differ
in the depth of packet header or payload they can inspect, the
various session/context states they can maintain, and the actions or
specific profiles they can apply. Therefore, the NSF capabilities
can be characterized by the level of packet-processing and context
that a NSF can support, the actions and profiles that the NSF can
apply. In the other hand, NSF Vendors can register their provided
NSF capabilities by using the Subject-Object-Action-Function
categories described by [I-D.lopez-i2nsf-packet].
Table 1-4 below lists some examples included in the categories for
constructing the NSF capability:
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| Subject (packet) Capability Index |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Layer 2 | Layer 2 header fields: |
| Header | Source/Destination/s-VID/c-VID/EtherType/.|
| | |
|---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Layer 3 | Layer header fields: |
| | protocol |
| IPv4 objects | port |
| | src port |
| | dscp |
| | length |
| | flags |
| | ttl |
| | |
| IPv6 Object | |
| | addr |
| | protocol/nh |
| | src port |
| | length |
| | traffic class |
| | hop limit |
| | flow label |
| | |
| TCP | Port |
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| SCTP | syn |
| DCCP | ack |
| | fin |
| | rst |
| | psh |
| | urg |
| | window |
| | sockstress |
| UDP | |
| | flood abuse |
| | fragment abuse |
| | Port |
| HTTP layer | |
| | hash collision |
| | http - get flood |
| | http - post flood |
| | http - random/invalid url |
| | http - slowloris |
| | http - slow read |
| | http - r-u-dead-yet (rudy) |
| | http - malformed request |
| | http - xss |
| | https - ssl session exhaustion |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| IETF PCP | Configurable |
| | Ports |
| | |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| IETF TRAM | profile |
| | |
| | |
|---------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 1. Subject (packet) Capability Index
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| Object (context) Capability Index |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Session | Session state, |
| | bidirectional state |
| | |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
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| Time | time span |
| | days, minutes, seconds, |
| | Events |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Events | Event URL, variables |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 2. Object (context) Capability Index
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| Actions Capability Index |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Ingress port | SFC header termination , |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| | Pass |
| Egress | Deny |
| | Mirror |
| | Functional call |
| | Encap various header |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 3. Actions Capability Index
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| Functional profile (advanced actions) Capability Index |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Profile types | Vendor specific |
| | Flexible Profile URL |
| | Accept external |
| | |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 4. Functional profile (advanced actions) Capability Index
3.3. Rule
Each rule is defined in the classic "match & action" style that
already implemented in most NSFs today to minimize the needed
updates on existed NSFs and decrease the complexity.
The NSF follows the rules one by one to process the passing traffic
as follows:
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1. The NSF analyzes traffics by either one of packet-based match and
context-based match, or both of them. Packet-based match inspects
the packet header and/or payload to retrieve the traffic
attributes at network or application layers. The traffic
attributes include user, address, other packet attributes,
service and application. Context-based match analyzes and
retrieves a variety of contextual attributes associated with the
packet such as session state, schedule and region;
2. The NSF compares the attributes with the match conditions defined
in the first rule. If all the conditions are met, the traffic
matches the rule. If one or more conditions are not met, the NSF
compares the attributes with the conditions of objects defined in
the next rule. If all rules are not met, the NSF denies the
traffic by default;
3. If the traffic matches a rule, the NSF performs the defined basic
actions over the traffic. If the basic action is deny, the NSF
blocks the traffic. If the basic action is permit/mirror, the NSF
resumes checking whether certain advanced actions are referenced
in the rule. If yes, go to step 4. If no, the traffic is
permitted;
4. If certain advanced actions (e.g., Antivirus, IPS, etc) are
referenced in the rule and the basic action defined in the rule
is permit/mirror, the NSF performs integrated checks on the
content carried over the traffic. The integrated check inspects
the content carried over the traffic based on the conditions
defined in the referenced profiles of advanced action and
implements appropriate actions based on the check result. If any
advanced action determines to block the traffic, the NSF blocks
the traffic. If all advanced actions determine to permit the
traffic, the NSF allows the traffic through.
One rule can be applied multiple times on different places, i.e.,
links, devices, networks, vpns, etc. It not only guarantees the
consistent policy enforcement in the whole network, but also
decreases the configuration workload.
3.4. Match
Match (aka, Objects) consists of two categories of match condition:
packet-based match and context-based match. Each category includes
various match conditions representing different kinds of objects.
The logic relation among all the conditions is flexible, it can be
"AND", "OR". The former means the traffic must match all the
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conditions, while the latter means the traffic only needs to match
one of the conditions.
The general objects for packet-based match are as follows:
o User: A user is a person applicaiton who is authorized to access
network resources. A user can be an internet access user who
accesses Internet resources or intranet resources from inside the
intranet through a FW, or a remote access user who connects to a
FW in VPN, or PPPoE mode to access intranet resources. The NSFs
need to know the IP address or other information (i.e., user's
tenant or VN-id) of the user to identify the user's traffic and
perform the pre-defined actions. It can also define a group of
users to match and perform actions to them together;
o Source and destination address scope;
o Layer 2/3/4 header, or payload related attributes: other
meaningful and useful attributes in packet except for existing
objects;
o Service: A service is an application identified by a protocol
type and port number. It can be a service or a group of services.
NSF matches the service traffics based on the protocol types and
port numbers and applies the security actions to them;
o Application: An application is a computer program for a specific
task or purpose, and multiple applications constitute an
application group. It provides a finer granularity than service
in matching traffic. Even if different applications have the same
service, they still can be distinguished by analyzing the data
packets and comparing the signatures of each application. The
hierarchy category method is appropriate for identifying
applications. For example, the application of Gmail belongs to
the category of business systems, and the subcategory of Email.
Other key attributes that belongs to and can be used to identify
an application are data transmission model (e.g., client-server,
browser-based, networking, peer-to-peer, etc), risk level (e.g.,
Exploitable, Evasive, Data-loss, Bandwidth-consuming, etc).
The general objects for context-based match are as follows:
o Session state: any one specific state related to the
user/operation sessions, such as authentication state, TCP/UDP
session state, bidirectional state, etc;
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o Schedule: A schedule defines time ranges. A rule can reference a
schedule to filter traffic that passes through the NSF within the
schedule. A schedule can be a periodic schedule, or a one-time
schedule;
o Region/region group: the logical definition of users' location
which can be pre-defined in the in the location signature
database by the geographical information, or be manual defined by
the user's IP information.
Objects are extensible, new match conditions can be defined and
added into them any time according to requirements.
3.5. Actions
The action of a security rule is also divided into two categories
logically: basic actions and advanced actions. Basic actions are
either permit, deny or mirror. Deny simple means to block the
matching traffics. Permit and mirror have more meanings by
performing the referenced advanced actions. The all advanced actions
in one rule can inspect traffic content during one-pass, which
greatly improves system performance.
Every advanced action includes its own matching conditions to
identify specific traffic and perform required actions. The advanced
action is defined by specific requirements or for specific scenarios.
Some typical advanced actions are Antivirus, IPS, URL filtering,
File blocking, Data filtering, Application control, and so on.
By combining advanced actions and using them appropriately, NSFs can
defend against possible attacks and reduce the waste of system
resources.
4. I2NSF Capability Interface IM Yang Structure
This section specifies the I2NSF capability interface information
model in Yang structure [RFC6020].
module: Security Policies
+--security-policies
+--rw policy-set* [policy-name]
+--rw policy-name string
+--rw policy-id uint16
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+--rw security-rules
+--rw rule-set* [rule-name]
+--rw rule-name string
+--rw rule-id uint16
+--rw Match
| +--rw packet-based-match
| | +--rw user* [login-name]
| | | +--rw login-name string
| | | +--rw display-name string
| | | +--rw group-name string
| | | +--rw description string
| | | +--rw parent-group string
| | | +--rw password string
| | | +--rw expired-date data-and-time
| | | +--rw allow-multi-account-login boolean
| | | +--rw address-binding Boolean
| | | +--rw tenant? uint32
| | | +--rw VN-id? uint32
| | +--rw address-scope*
| | | +--rw src-address inet:ip-prefix
| | | +--rw dst-address inet:ip-prefix
| | +--rw layer-header-payload*
| | | ...
| | +--rw service* [name]
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| | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw description string
| | | +--rw protocol enumeration
| | | +--rw protocol-num uint8
| | | +--rw src-port-num uint16
| | | +--rw dest-port-num uint16
| | +--rw application* [name]
| | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw server-address inet:ip-address
| | | +--rw protocol enumeration
| | | +--rw dest-port-num uint16
| | | +--rw category enumeration
| | | +--rw subcategory enumeration
| | | +--rw data-transmission-model enumeration
| | | +--rw risk-level enumeration
| +--rw context-based-match
| +--rw session-state*
| | ...
| +--rw schedule* [name]
| | +--rw name string
| | +--rw type enumeration
| | +--rw start-time data-and-time
| | +--rw end-time data-and-time
| | +--rw weekly-validity-time? data-and-time
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| +--rw region*
| ...
+--rw actions
+--rw basic-actions enumeration
+--rw advanced-actions* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw profile-antivirus?
| ...
+--rw profile-IPS?
| ...
+--rw profile-url-filtering?
| ...
+--rw profile-file-blocking?
| ...
+--rw profile-data-filtering?
| ...
+--rw profile-application-control?
| ...
5. Use Examples of I2NSF Capability Interface IM
TBD
6. Security Considerations
TBD
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7. IANA Considerations
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2234] Crocker, D. and Overell, P.(Editors), "Augmented BNF for
Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, Internet Mail
Consortium and Demon Internet Ltd., November 1997.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the
Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
October 2010.
8.2. Informative References
[INCITS359 RBAC] NIST/INCITS, "American National Standard for
Information Technology - Role Based Access Control",
INCITS 359, April, 2003
[I-D.zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases] Zarny, M., et.al., "I2NSF
Data Center Use Cases", Work in Progress, October 2014.
[I-D.qi-i2nsf-access-network-usecase] Qi, M., et.al., "Integrated
Security with Access Network Use Case", Work in Progress,
October, 2014.
[I-D.pastor-i2nsf-access-usecases] Pastor, A., et.al., "Access Use
Cases for an Open OAM Interface to Virtualized Security
Services", Work in Progress, October, 2014.
[I-D.dunbar-i2nsf-problem-statement] Dunbar, L., et.al., "Interface
to Network Security Functions Problem Statement", Work in
Progress, September, 2014.
[I-D.xia-i2nsf-service-interface-DM] Xia, L., et.al., "Data Model of
Interface to Network Security Functions Service Interface",
February, 2015.
[I-D.lopez-i2nsf-packet] Lopez, E., "Packet-Based Paradigm For
Interfaces To NSFs", March, 2015.
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9. Acknowledgments
This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.
Authors' Addresses
Liang Xia
Huawei
Email: Frank.xialiang@huawei.com
DaCheng Zhang
Alibaba
Email: Dacheng.zdc@alibaba-inc.com
Nicolas BOUTHORS
Qosmos
Email: Nicolas.BOUTHORS@qosmos.com
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