Using Netconf Pub/Sub Model for RATS Interaction Procedure
draft-xia-rats-pubsub-model-00

• Status
• IESG evaluation record
• IESG writeups
• Email expansions
• History

• Versions
• 00
• 01

Remote ATtestation ProcedureS                                     L. Xia
Internet-Draft                                                    W. Pan
Intended status: Standards Track                                  Huawei
Expires: April 23, 2020                                 October 21, 2019

       Using Netconf Pub/Sub Model for RATS Interaction Procedure
                     draft-xia-rats-pubsub-model-00

Abstract

   This draft defines the a new method of using the netconf pub/sub
   model in the RATS interaction procedure, to increse its flexibility,
   efficiency and scalability.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 23, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Xia & Pan                Expires April 23, 2020                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft              Abbreviated Title               October 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Pub/sub Model for Remote Attestation Procedure  . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Remote Attestation Event Stream Definition  . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Remote Attestation Subscription Definition  . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Remote Attestation Selection Filters Definition . . . . .   8
       3.4.1.  Remote Attestation Subscription Parameters Handling .   9
     3.5.  Remote Attestation Notification Distribution  . . . . . .   9
     3.6.  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  The YANG Module for Sub/pub Model Remote Attestation
       Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.1.  Tree Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.2.  Raw Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   Remote attestation is for acquiring the evidence about various
   integrity information from remote endpoints to assess its
   trustworthiness (aka, behave in the expected manner).  These evidence
   should be about: system component identity, composition of system
   components, roots of trust, system component integrity, system
   component configuration, operational state and so on.
   [I-D.richardson-rats-usecases] describes possible use cases which
   remote attestation are using for different industries, like: network
   devices, FIDO authentication for onlline transaction, Cryptographic
   Key Attestation for mobile devices, and so on.

   [I-D.birkholz-rats-architecture] lays a foundation of RATS
   architecture about the key RATS roles (i.e., Relying Party, Verifier,
   Attester and asserter) and the messages they exchange, as well as
   some key concepts.  Based on it,
   [I-D.birkholz-rats-reference-interaction-model] specifies a basic
   challenge-response-based interaction model for the remote attestation
   procedure, which a complete remote attestation procedure is triggered
   by a challenge message originated from the verifier, and finished
   when the attester sends its response message back.  This is a very
   generic interaction model with wide adoption.  This document proposes